In a word, all relations were in the hands of the Executive; all our foreign intercourse was to him, and from him. Of course, he was the only judge of what was proper in this business. This being the case, it should seem as if that House had nothing to do with respect to the propriety of sending a Minister to Berlin, or in relation to other grades of Ministers, though they had the power of fixing their salaries. But it was contended by the gentleman from Georgia and others, that, by regulating these salaries, the Legislature had the power of preventing the extension of their establishment. This brought up an old question; but it was a very important one, and he did not regret that it was frequently drawn into discussion. He thought the great landmarks of our constitution could not be too well understood. He did not mean, however, to extend his observations on this subject. It was said, this was a Government of departments and checks, and of course, that the Legislature ought to check the Executive in its operations. That this was a Government of departments and checks, to a certain extent, he should readily allow; but that it was so to the extent which had been represented, he did deny. Our Government was divided into three departments, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; each of these had checks and balances in its own department. The President was checked by the Senate; the Legislature was checked by the President and Senate; the Judiciary was checked by having certain appeals, writs of error, &c. So far from one department checking the other, it was necessary that all the parts should act in unison like a clock, and the moment one part declined to act, the Government could not proceed. It was not in the power of the Legislature to reverse the decision of the lowest court, and should it then be said that they could judge over the head of the Executive? This remark was applicable to all the departments. No one department was a favorite of the constitution. Every act of a department ought to be considered as well done. This being the case, whenever the President had appointed a Minister, and done it constitutionally, when he informed the Legislature thereof, they might do any thing and every thing but doubt the propriety of establishing the Minister.
Mr. Harper.—As to the general policy of the present motion, as connected with the foreign relations of this country, Mr. H. said that he would add two or three remarks on that subject, and then conclude.
The motion went, he said, to reduce the appointments and salaries of three ministers: those to Madrid, Lisbon, and Berlin; and in support of the motion, it was alleged that the last of these Ministers was entirely unnecessary, and that the other two had been improperly, because unnecessarily, raised from Ministers Resident to Ministers Plenipotentiary. To him it was a sufficient answer to these allegations to say, that the President had thought otherwise; because, the President, being charged by the constitution with the foreign relations of the country, must be invested with the means necessary for conducting them with effect; and was infinitely better qualified by this situation to judge what those means were, and how they ought to be used, than the House can pretend to be. One of these means was the appointment of foreign Ministers, which was expressly vested in the President by the constitution. When the President, therefore, had thought fit to appoint foreign Ministers, or to alter their grades, he had exercised a constitutional power, and it did not lie with the House of Representatives to object or judge. To him, therefore, Mr. H. said, it was a sufficient answer to all those objections to say that the President had thought otherwise. To others, who might hold different opinions from him on this subject, he thought it was a sufficient answer to be told that the House of Representatives, as well as the President, had thought differently, and had sanctioned the changes which he had thought proper to make in this respect, by voting money to carry them into effect. This the House had done expressly in all the three cases contemplated by the present motion.
Mr. Gallatin said the committee had been told, in the course of the debate, by some gentlemen, that this attempt to reduce the number of our Ministers was unconstitutional; by others, that it was inexpedient; and even some gentlemen, who agreed to the general expediency of the measure, believed it would be attended with inconvenience from our present foreign relations.
In relation to the constitutionality of the thing, he did not believe, whatever doctrine was supported with respect to treaties, that upon this occasion the committee should be told that they were interfering with the constitutional power vested in the President. It was true that he had the general power of appointing Ambassadors, but it was not less true that the Legislature had the sole and exclusive power to provide for all the expenses of the Union. Hence arose the idea of ours being a Government of departments, so formed as to be a check upon each other. But the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. N. Smith) said there was no such thing as a check of departments; that each was distinct; and, though each had checks within itself, none of them checked the other. And to illustrate his position, he introduced the simile of a clock, at the same time that he told them that the Executive Department was the main-spring which put the clock in motion, whilst Mr. G. supposed he meant that the other branches were merely the hands, which moved as they were directed. But if there was any act which could not be done but by all the branches, each had its share in deciding upon the propriety of it. When a treaty was made it had been argued that that House had nothing to do but carry it into effect; but here it was said that the House were bound to provide for every Ambassador appointed; and if, by withholding salaries, they obliged the President to send Ministers Resident where he wished to send Ministers Plenipotentiary, they would act inconsistently with the constitution. Though gentlemen might make speeches on this subject, they must know that where the Legislature had a right to act, it had a right to deliberate and to use its discretion.
It was true treaties had been made, but no treaty had been made since the adoption of the present Government, by Ministers Resident at any Court at the time. If any benefits were derived to the country from the British treaty, they must be attributed to the Envoy Extraordinary, and not to our Minister at that court. And when our treaty with Spain was concluded, it was necessary to send a Minister Resident to another Court to do the business. Since our treaties were always made by special Envoys, what advantage could it be to have numerous Ministers Plenipotentiary in Europe? In the present critical situation of the country, agitated as it was to the centre, was it not to be apprehended that our Ministers would participate, in some degree, in the party spirit which there abounded, and rank themselves on one side or the other, which would have a tendency to draw this country into a vortex from which we were so happily separated by the Atlantic? We were the only nation, he said, who possessed a Government on a firm foundation, in which civil and religious liberty was fully recognized; we, therefore, enjoyed what the people of Europe were seeking after. We have nothing to wish, except to remain in our present situation. Why, then, should we hazard the being involved in European broils? He had before stated that Consuls were equal to every commercial regulation, and he had heard nothing to change his opinion. Seeing, therefore, that these diplomatic agents were rather dangerous than useful, he thought it time to put a stop to their increase.
Mr. Bayard began his observations by remarking, that the gentleman from Virginia had said that it was not his design that his motion should have an immediate effect upon the Ministers at present employed. If the gentleman was sincere in his avowal, it was clear that he did not understand his own motion; for whatever amendment was introduced into the third section, which the gentleman had intimated might be so amended as to give the regulation a distant operation, as it only related to the sum of money to be appropriated, it would not enable the President to employ a Minister Plenipotentiary, besides those at London and Paris, at a higher salary than $4,500.
Some gentlemen have said, it was idle talk about this House having the power to appropriate, without having the power at the same time to use their discretion. He contended that the power of appointing Ministers was vested in the President, and the House had no right to believe he would abuse this power. It had been supposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that he might appoint an indefinite number of Ministers; and were the House, in that case, he asked, blindly to appropriate for them? This question was predicated upon an abuse of power, whilst the constitution supposed it would be executed with fidelity. Suppose he were to state the question in an opposite light. Let it be imagined that this country has a misunderstanding with some foreign power, and that the Executive should appoint a Minister, but the House, in the plenitude of its powers, should refuse an appropriation. What might be the consequence? Would not the House have contravened the constitution, by taking from the President the power which by it is placed in him? It certainly would. So that this supposition of the abuse of power would go to the destruction of all authority. The Legislature was bound to appropriate for the salary of the Chief Justice of the United States, and though the President might appoint a chimney-sweeper to that office, they would still be bound. The constitution had trusted the President, as well as it had trusted that House. Indeed it was not conceivable that the House could act upon the subject of foreign Ministers. Our interests with foreign countries came wholly under the jurisdiction of the Executive. The duties of that House related to the internal affairs of the country; but what related to foreign countries and foreign agents was vested in the Executive Department. The President was responsible for the manner in which this business was conducted. He was bound to communicate, from time to time, our situation with foreign powers; and if plans were carried on abroad for dividing or subjecting us, if he were not to make due communication of the design, he would be answerable for the neglect.