Thursday, February 7.
Augmentation of the Navy.
On motion of Mr. Josiah Parker, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the augmentation of the Navy, and fixing the pay of the captains of ships or vessels of war; when the first section being under consideration—
Mr. Gallatin moved to strike out the words "six ships of war, of a size to carry, and which shall be armed with not less than seventy-four guns each; and these shall be built or purchased within the United States;" in order to take the sense of the committee on the propriety of building, at present, ships-of-the-line. When this subject was last year before the House, the general opinion was, that during the present war, considering the crippled state of the French navy, frigates and vessels of a smaller size, were sufficient to protect our vessels on our own coast, and in the West India seas; nor did that opinion seem to have undergone any material alteration; for, although the Secretary of the Navy, and the select committee, had reported that the expense of building the six seventy-four gun ships now proposed, would amount to $2,400,000, yet the appropriation asked for the present year was only one million of dollars. It was not expected that much more than one-third of the work necessary to send those ships to sea, could be executed during the present year. It was not expected that they could be finished in less than two or three years. They were not wanted for any immediate purpose. The proposed measure was not therefore a measure of defence. It was a project of a general nature. The question is, whether it be proper, at the present time, to lay the foundation of a navy, of a fleet, that might be able, hereafter, to give us a certain weight in relation to European nations; which might be able to cope with the fleets of those nations: and it was in order to bring that question fairly before the Committee of the Whole that he had made his motion. Should that motion prevail, it would not affect the building of the six sloops of war which were said to be immediately wanted, in addition to our present naval force, for the purpose of protecting our commerce. It would merely prevent the building, at present, of a fleet which was supposed, by the friends of the bill, to be wanted only for future purposes.
This led him naturally to consider the expense of that navy. It is stated by the Secretary of the Navy, that the annual expense of a 74-gun ship will exceed 216,000 dollars, and that therefore the annual expense of six of these ships will be about 1,300,000 dollars. That the building and equipping a 74-gun ship, exclusive of military stores, will be 342,700 dollars; and that the military stores will cost 48,000 dollars; so that the first building and equipping six of these vessels will cost about 2,400,000 dollars. This is the first expense, but nothing is said of the yearly repairing and building which will be necessary to keep up a fleet of this kind. It is estimated, in the navies of Europe, that a ship-of-the-line will last from 12 to 15 years; so that, besides ordinary repairs, the whole expense of building would have to be renewed every 12 or 15 years.[43] It would have been desirable, and it might have been expected, that the select committee should have laid before the House an estimate of the peace establishment of a navy to the extent proposed, in order to have enabled the House to have formed a just opinion on the main question. This they have not done; but supposing the other estimates to be perfectly correct; supposing that the expense would not overrun the calculations laid before the House, and, if so, it would be the first time it had not done it; supposing, according to those calculations, that a 74-gun ship will hereafter cost us less than two-thirds of what 44-gun frigates have heretofore cost us; it results, that the first necessary expense (including $150,000 for docks and timber) will exceed, for six ships only, two millions and a half of dollars; and that the annual expense of supporting them, when in commission, exclusively of annual repairs, and of building new ships, necessary to supply those that from time to time will become unfit for service, will amount to 1,300,000 dollars.
If these premises are true, and he knew they could not be contradicted, the conclusion must be most forcible that it is improper at present to build a navy, especially since there is no immediate demand for it. But if once the foundation of a large navy is laid, no one can say where it will stop. The Secretary of the Navy does not suppose that six 74-gun ships will be sufficient. He supposes twelve necessary; six are now proposed merely as an entering wedge. And when once twelve ships-of-the-line are obtained, if our commerce and coast, extensive as they are, must be effectually protected, these will not be deemed sufficient. He drew this conclusion from the naval force of European nations. Our tonnage exceeds that of any European nation, except Great Britain and Holland; and if we must have a navy to protect our commerce, it must bear some proportion to the extent of our coast, to the amount of our tonnage, and to the navies of the European nations. And upon what terms are we to cope with the powers of Europe with respect to any navy? It would be recollected that when last year there was a mutiny on board the British fleet, in order to put an end to it, the sailors' wages were advanced to one shilling sterling per day, equal to thirty shillings sterling, or six dollars and two-thirds per month, whilst we give our seamen seventeen dollars a month, so that we pay nearly three times as much for men to supply our navy, as England does.
Mr. G said, he would not detain the committee longer at present, though he meant to have made some observations with respect to the expense of navies to those nations who support them in order to show that the expense of them far exceeds the benefits derived from them. If reference were had to European nations, it would be found, Mr. G. said, that navies were used more as engines of power, than as a protection to commerce. Even with respect to Great Britain, which is the only nation which has succeeded in effecting any material object by a navy, though she has obtained a preponderancy at sea, and has been mistress of it for the last hundred years, yet it has been the means of involving her in almost continual war, and the support of it has always been attended with enormous expense. He believed he was correct, when he stated that from 1776 to 1789, the average expense of the navy of Great Britain (including a period of seven years of war and six of peace) was six millions of pounds sterling a year. Now, said Mr. G., if we calculate the rate at which we shall be obliged to pay for every thing appertaining to a navy, what will be the sum necessary to support a navy of any extent here? Suppose a navy should only be one-tenth part of the British, and instead of 120 ships-of-the-line, we should be content with twelve. The expense, according to the British rate of expenditure, would be £600,000 sterling, nearly three millions of dollars a year; but when we know that we pay three times as much for our seamen as they do, it is impossible precisely to calculate what the expense would be.
In relation to European nations, it would be found, that none had ever derived any advantage from a navy, except Great Britain. It has been said (and by high authority) that an extensive commerce cannot be maintained without a navy. In answer to this it may be said, that Spain has always had a considerable navy, but very little commerce; their tonnage compared with ours was insignificant, yet theirs is the third navy in Europe. Holland, for a time, had a powerful navy; but they gave it up, as more expensive than beneficial, since the wars of Queen Anne. Yet their commerce, on this account, never diminished in any considerable degree. They are the second commercial nation in Europe; and they never suffer for want of a navy, except when they become a party in war; he conceived, therefore, that a navy is not necessary to protect commerce. At this time, Mr. G. knew that the commerce of Holland was in a great degree annihilated; but so was that of France and Spain, notwithstanding their powerful navies. Holland being at the door of Great Britain, may, in time of war, be altogether blocked up by the fleets of that nation. Fortunately that was not our situation.
Mr. G. concluded by saying, that as he believed commerce might exist independently of a navy; that a navy would cost far more than it would ever benefit the country; and knowing our finances were not such as to admit of the expense, he must hope his motion would prevail.