Augmentation of the Navy.
The House then went into Committee of the Whole on the bill for augmenting the Navy, Mr. Gallatin's motion for striking out what relates to 74-gun ships being under consideration.
Mr. Josiah Parker hoped this amendment would not be agreed to. He was happy to find, however, that the gentleman from Pennsylvania did not go farther, and oppose the whole force, as he had heretofore always opposed every thing like a navy. Indeed, he has acknowledged that our infant navy has done some service, though he does not give to it all the credit which the committee who reported this bill thinks it deserves. He attributes the fall in insurance to other objects than the navy, because he says it has fallen more on vessels to Europe, where our navy could have had no effect, than to the West Indies, where that effect was more likely to be produced. But the gentleman should have recollected that the fall to Europe may have been occasioned by the vigilance of the British navy; but in the West Indies, the British, or at least the officers of the British men of war, seemed rather to countenance, than prevent, the depredations of the French; as, in many instances, they have suffered captures to be made by the French, and immediately afterwards recaptured the vessels, and by that means obtained a salvage upon them. Nor did he suppose the British Government would regret these depredations, since they knew such treatment would serve to rouse the resentment of this country against her enemy. Mr. P. supposed that the saving produced by our navy had even been greater than the committee had supposed, as, by the report made yesterday on the subject of our exports, it appears they have been ten millions more than the committee calculated them at. He allowed that our navy had not been the sole cause of safety to our commerce; the British navy had also contributed greatly to it. But it would be recollected that when this navy was first fitted out, French privateers and picaroons were not only upon our coast, but in our very bays; and, but for these measures, there can be no doubt, but our shores would at this time have swarmed with French privateers, which the British would have suffered, in order to widen the breach between the two countries.
Mr. P. hoped when the quantity of shipping, and the number of seamen we employ, is considered—that these are the means of bringing us from foreign countries all that we desire to have from thence, and that they thereby fill our treasury with money—gentlemen will not hesitate to allow our commerce a competent protection. No nation, except Great Britain, exceeds this country in the number of vessels and men engaged in this service, yet no nation has done so little to protect them. He trusted we should be allowed to have a sufficient navy to protect our commerce and coast, and to cause us to be respected abroad.
The British Government, Mr. P. said, has 141 sail-of-the-line, (according to Steele's list, which he had lately seen,) and these, according to the opinion of the first statesman and politician that England ever possessed, Lord Chatham, require as many thousand seamen; not that each vessel requires 1000 men, but it is necessary to have this number in order to employ their frigates and sloops of war, not that the ships of the line require 1000 men; yet, though Britain has this immense navy, she has not double the number of merchant vessels and seamen which this country possesses. If, said Mr. P., these six 74-gun ships and six sloops are agreed to, we shall not want more than 12,000 seamen to man our navy. At present we have only 4,000; and the whole annual expense will be 4,230,149 dollars. Mr. P. believed, in order to give us efficient protection, we ought to have eleven sail-of-the-line; but as he considered six to be as many as our present finances will allow, he should be satisfied with that number.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania wished to be informed as to the expense of a peace establishment of our navy. A large navy in time of peace would be unnecessary; he should wish it, however, to be kept on a respectable footing. Many of our ships, Mr. P. said, will last much longer than the gentleman from Pennsylvania had supposed; some of them, he doubted not, would last forty or fifty years. The British have ships which have been in service thirty years; when poorly built they may not last more than seven years. He had not made an estimate of what would be the expense of a peace establishment with respect to the navy; nor did he know what force the President of the United States might think it necessary to maintain in time of peace, but he supposed it would be small, and a single officer and thirty men would be sufficient to take care of a ship where she is laid up in ordinary: that only a few of the best ships would be kept, and the others sold.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania had represented the expense of a navy in this country as being much greater than in England; but when he spoke of the pay of British sailors being only one shilling sterling a day, he was certainly mistaken. They have at least a guinea and an half a month, which is seven dollars; and ours average fourteen dollars, which is double to that of England. If the same means were taken here that are taken in England, of raising men by means of press-gangs (which, however, he rejoiced never could be suffered in this country,) they might, perhaps, be gotten on easier terms, as the Government might follow the example of Great Britain, by fixing the pay and pressing the men. He would much rather pay higher wages; especially when it is considered that a very small part of the money paid to seamen will ever go out of the country; they spend their money freely, and the United States will not, therefore, lose it.
And as to the number of men employed in the navy, if they were not thus employed in our own service, they would go abroad, since this is the employment they choose; indeed, if all our citizens were employed in cultivating the ground, our produce would be so great, and sell for so little, as to make it scarcely worth the trouble of raising. And if we do not provide for our own defence, we shall be at the mercy of every foreign power which chooses to insult or ill-treat us. The interests of commerce and agriculture must always go hand in hand; and farmers who now get so much better a price for their product than they heretofore got, ought to be the first in supporting a navy sufficient to protect our vessels in carrying that produce to foreign countries. When they see their interests more clearly, Mr. P. trusted they would, like the gentleman from Pennsylvania, be ready to allow that our navy is of service. It would be happy for us, and for the world, Mr. P. said, if there were no use for navies, and nations might be permitted to carry their productions wherever they pleased without annoyance; but, while nations continue to make war upon each other, we must expect to come in for our share of the evils of such a system, and it will be necessary to have some force not only to guard against injuries, but to keep foreign belligerent nations in check, lest we should throw our force into the scale against them. The French Directory, said Mr. P., have lately passed a decree, which ought to be considered as a declaration of war against the world, "that the citizens of neutral countries found on board of any of their ships shall be considered and punished as pirates!" Where is the man, exclaimed he, who will not defend his country and his fellow-citizens against such a decree?
Mr. P. said he would take the liberty of quoting the authority, on the subject of a navy, of a gentleman who deservedly ranked high in public estimation, and whom he was proud to call his countryman. The authority he referred to was Mr. Jefferson's Notes on Virginia. He read the following extract.
"But the actual habits of our countrymen attach them to commerce. They will exercise it for themselves. Wars, then, must sometimes be our lot; and all the wise can do, will be to avoid that half of them which would be produced by our own follies, and our own acts of injustice; and to make for the other half the best preparations we can. Of what nature should these be? A land army would be useless for offence, and not the best nor safest instrument of defence. For either of these purposes, the sea is the field on which we should meet an European enemy. On that element it is necessary we should possess some power. To aim at such a navy as the greater nations of Europe possess, would be a foolish and wicked waste of the energies of our countrymen; it would be to pull on our own heads that load of military expense which makes the European laborer go supperless to bed, and moistens his bread with the sweat of his brow. It will be enough if we enable ourselves to prevent insults from those nations of Europe which are weak on the sea, because circumstances exist which render even the stronger ones weak as to us. Providence has placed their richest and most defenceless possessions at our door—has obliged their most precious commerce to pass, as it were, in review before us. To protect this, or to assail us, a small part only of their naval force will ever be risked across the Atlantic. The danger to which the elements expose them here are too well known, and the greater danger to which they would be exposed at home, were any general calamity to involve their whole fleet. They can attack us by detachment only; and it will suffice to make ourselves equal to what they may detach. Even a smaller force than what they may detach will be rendered equal or superior by the quickness with which any check may be repaired with us, while losses with them will be irreparable till too late. A small naval force, then, is sufficient for us, and a small one is necessary. What this should be, I will not undertake to say. I will only say, it should by no means be so great as we are able to make it."