The gentleman from Delaware had said, that all the offences of Mr. Lyon were greatly aggravated from his being a member of this House. Mr. N. was of a different opinion. He thought it incumbent on a Representative to disclose his opinions on public affairs to his constituents; and this disclosure will become more necessary, in proportion as such opinions may be offensive to the administrators of the Government; as, when all goes on smoothly and well, there will be no necessity for calling the attention of the people to public concerns.
The gentleman has also said, that it would be out of order to contest the truth of any thing contained in this record. He thought differently, and that if it was proper to act upon the subject at all, it would be proper to assign a day to have a fair hearing of the business, to enable the House to judge of the facts. For gentlemen will not say, that courts and juries are so infallible, that there is no case in which the decision of a court ought to be revised. If the member from Vermont should think it necessary to demand this investigation, the House ought to submit to it.
There was something in that record, Mr. N. said, which was very singular indeed; something which requires investigation; for unless the fact is different from what his information made it, a most extraordinary circumstance was connected with the third count. It will be seen, from the showing of the record, that the letter upon which the charge is founded, was written before the passage of the law on which the offence was tried. If he was not misinformed, no evidence was adduced in court to show that Mr. Lyon did any act subsequent to the writing of his letter in the publication, and that though the thing appeared in print after the law took its effect, all that was done by the writer was done before the law was passed. He thought, therefore, before the House acted upon this subject, an inquiry ought to be had upon it. He did not know what were the wishes of the member from Vermont himself on this subject; he had not put the question to him, because he thought there was no offence contained in the record of which the House ought to take notice. He would say farther, that believing most religiously that the law against which the member from Vermont is said to have offended, is a violation of the constitution of this country, he could not without a breach of his oath, do any act to punish a breach of that law.
Mr. Lyon said, he did expect that if he was to have had a second trial, he should have been at liberty to have adduced the evidence upon which a jury had already decided. Gentlemen who have been able to obtain a copy of the record, which he, notwithstanding all his earnest desires to obtain it, had not been able to procure, might also have obtained a copy of the testimony on which this judgment was founded.
Mr. L. thought he had received an unjust trial and a hard sentence. He said unjust, because he was frowned upon by the Judge in a very abrupt manner when he challenged two of the jury, which he had a right to do by a law of the State. The Judge answered me, said Mr. L., "You are unacquainted with the laws of the State." Mr. L. observed that there is a law in the State of Vermont for punishing persons who speak against the public authorities, which gives to the accused the privilege of challenging six of his jury. This privilege, said Mr. L., I was denied, exclusive of the political packing of the jury who tried me. This is the kind of treatment I have received: but I shall submit to the decision of the House without occupying their time on my account, further than my enemies are desirous of so occupying it.
Mr. Allen said, nothing but the respect which he entertained for the character who presided at the trial of the member from Vermont would have drawn him from his seat on that occasion. But if he understood the member from Vermont, he said he was frowned upon by the court when he challenged two of his jury, and having been present at the trial, he was able to speak to that fact. He understood the member to make a challenge, and the Judge told him he did not know the laws of Vermont; but so far from any harshness being used towards the member, he must say he never saw a trial more fairly conducted. He thought it did honor to Judge Paterson, who presided. When the member persisted in his opinion, that a law of the State gave him a right to challenge his jury, the Judge replied, "if that was the law, it would require consideration;" and he inquired of the district judge if that was the law, who said it was not. As to the member's being precipitately tried, [Mr. Lyon observed, he did say so,] if ever there was a case deliberately tried, or in which unexampled indulgence was shown to the accused, it was this.
The member from Vermont had spoken of the jury being packed. He had seen this asserted in the papers, and the public ought to be informed that the charge is wholly untrue. The member from Vermont must know it is untrue. The jury was drawn from the boxes as is usual, in consequence of an order made by the court in May, which pointed out the particular towns from whence the jury were to be drawn. Mr. A. concluded by saying, he was sorry to find any man base enough to attack the gentleman who presided on this trial, as he believed his conduct to be unimpeachable.
Mr. Bayard said, considering the lateness of the hour, he should limit his reply to a few observations. He did not know what would bind the gentleman from Virginia; he denies the obligation of the law, and the credibility of the record. He could not expect, therefore, that he would be bound by the obligation of reason.
The gentleman from Virginia, in his defence of the member from Vermont, has gone upon the ground that mere matter of opinion cannot be construed into a libel. He begged leave to differ from that opinion, for which there was not the least ground. Four things, Mr. B. said, are necessary to constitute a crime under the law in question: it is necessary that a publication should be seditious, false, scandalous, and malicious. When these four things appear, whether the publication consists in the assertion of matter of opinion, or matter of fact, it will be within the law, which makes no discrimination on the subject.