Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 2 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Mr. B. did not think it altogether in order to question in this place the regularity of the proceedings of a court of justice. According to the organization of this Government, the powers of it are distributed, and the Judiciary in its department is as sovereign as the Legislature; and it is as improper for the Legislature to question the proceedings of a court as it would be for a court in common cases, to question the obligation of a law. What has the fact been? The judgment of a court has decided, on the verdict of a jury given upon oath, that this case was within the law; and, after a judicial determination, is it for a member of this House to say that the case was not within the law?

But Mr. B. could conceive no idea more groundless than that of the gentleman from Virginia, that mere matters of opinion are not grounds of charges under this law. This the gentleman had made his alpha and omega. He wished to know how a distinction was to be made on this subject? If an opinion upon a fact be expressed, and that opinion is false, scandalous, and malicious, ought it not to be subject to prosecution? Does the gentleman say opinions cannot be false? Mr. B. said, he would put a case to the gentleman from Virginia, without any intention of personal reflection, but merely for the sake of the argument. Suppose any person were to say, that in his opinion, that gentleman was a rogue, or any other opinion casting a gross imputation, would the offence be less, because he had, instead of saying expressly he was a rogue, merely given it as his opinion? But if the gentleman insisted opinions could not be false, how would he get rid of the conclusion? This, Mr. B. conceived, might be sufficient to show that opinions may be false. Or, suppose a man were to say that, in his opinion, another was a traitor, ought he not to be punished as severely as if he had asserted the thing as a fact? The intention and wisdom of this law was, Mr. B. said, to caution men to be guarded in the publication of their opinions; since, by the expression of false opinions the minds of the people may be alienated from their Government. Suppose, for instance, that the gentleman from Virginia, or the member from Vermont, were to harangue the people, and say, in their opinion, this law is unconstitutional, and, therefore, not binding; that it ought not to be obeyed, but opposed by force; that it was made by men grasping after power, in defiance of the best interests of their country, in order to answer their own private views. Although this all might be mere matter of opinion, would it not come within the meaning of the law in question? No man on earth, Mr. B. said, would be more opposed to any measure for restraining the expression of honest and well-intentioned opinions, than himself. All that this law does, is to restrain false, malicious, and scandalous opinions. And will the gentleman from Virginia say, that the good of the country, or its liberty, will be promoted by indulging in an expression of what is false, scandalous, and malicious? Could this be liberty? He thought not. Every man, under this law, has the liberty of publishing what he pleases, taking the responsibility upon himself for the truth of what he writes. If he writes only what is true, he is not liable to punishment; if what is false, and that maliciously, it is only reasonable he should be punished for his falsehood and malice.

Suppose a common case, that a man were to say that, in his opinion, another was insolvent, a bankrupt, or a thief, would he not be answerable for this opinion? He certainly would. And ought a man to be permitted to slander the Government and not an individual? If the licentiousness of the press be allowed to go thus far, there will be nothing safe in character; it will always be in the power of a malicious person to rob the best men of their reputation with impunity. He presumed, therefore, that there was no ground for the distinction which the gentleman had attempted to draw.

The gentleman from Virginia had called upon the advocates of this resolution to show, that the member from Vermont could be punished a second time. Mr. B. did not know that the expulsion of a member from his seat could be considered in the light of a punishment. It was merely lopping off from the Legislative body a rotten member who contaminates the whole system. This was done without regard to the member himself, but with a view solely to the health and purity of the body of which he is a member. The constitution, however, left no doubt on the subject.

It is said that the member from Vermont has been re-elected, since his offences were known. He wished the gentleman from Virginia to say, how this fact was ascertained. At one moment he disputes the truth of the record, and says it cannot be considered as conclusive or creditable; yet, at another, he asserts a fact, upon the grounds of an extract of a letter, or a paragraph in a newspaper, of which this House could take no notice. The member was not re-elected to the present Congress, nor was any return made of his re-election to the next. Suppose he had a majority of votes at the late election, may it not hereafter appear that the election was carried by corruption or fraud, and that the member is not entitled to his seat?

It is suggested as a fact that the letter of the member from Vermont was written before the law passed; but the crime is not in the writing of the letter, but in the publication of it. There would have been no crime in scandalously writing, if he had not published the letter. The crime consisted not in the wickedness of his own heart, but the intention to corrupt others; the design to scatter firebrands through the community, with a view of exciting insurrections. If, therefore, he could have proved before the court and jury that he was not accessory to the publication after the passing of the law, he would doubtless have been acquitted; and though he did not think highly of the talents of that member, he supposed, if this had been the case, he would have had wit enough to have availed himself of it.

He would say a word with respect to the consequences of the crime upon a member. In England, a member of the House of Commons may be expelled for libellous matter. Such was the case with Mr. Wilkes; though in this case, the transaction was afterwards expunged from the journals, it was not done upon the principle that the original expulsion was not justifiable, but because he had been expelled for the same offence, after he had been re-elected to the same Parliament.

Believing, as he did, that the member in question disgraced the body to which at present he belonged, he hoped the resolution would be allowed to wash away the blot which marked and disfigured this branch of the Government.

Mr. Gallatin confessed that, though there were some reasons which diminished his surprise at seeing this resolution on the table, he did not expect to have heard it defended on the ground which the gentleman from Delaware had taken in his last speech. He did not expect that when a judgment, awarded under the sedition law, was under consideration, a gentleman should rise and tell the House that this law applies to the publication of opinions as well as to that of facts; and it was less to be expected from the very gentleman who introduced an amendment into that law, providing that the truth of a charge may be given in evidence. His present declaration amounted to this: that those words were introduced in order to deceive the public, since they could be of no real use.