The gentleman from Delaware had constantly confounded matter of fact expressed, not positively, but only as the belief of the writer, and opinions or deduction from facts. If a man, with a view of defaming the government, publishes that, in his opinion, according to his belief, a certain fact does exist, which is susceptible of proof, and is found to be false, the publication, by the law, is undoubtedly a libel. Thus, if a man says that, in his opinion, a man is a thief, a bankrupt, or insolvent, it is not less a libel, than if he said such a person was positively so, because these things are susceptible of proof. But, when we speak of opinion, as distinct from fact, we speak of opinions not susceptible of proof, because they depend upon reasoning, and different opinions may be deduced from the same facts; therefore, we say that such opinions are not matter for prosecution even under this law. But, the gentleman from Delaware says that all opinions are liable to be prosecuted, provided that they can be proved to be false, scandalous, and malicious. Proved false! And who are the judges? To be sure, twelve jurymen, who are sworn to give a verdict according to evidence. And how can the truth of things which cannot be proved by evidence, be determined by evidence? An opinion may be incorrect; and, if judged incorrect by the gentleman from Delaware, it is, according to his reasoning, to be deemed false, and liable to prosecution.
The House had been told by the gentleman from Delaware, that it has nothing to do with this trial, any further than the record; that it ought to be taken as complete evidence of the facts which it contains, which ought not to be disputed. He also tells the House that courts of justice are as independent of the Legislature, as the Legislature of them; that this House has nothing to do with the crime; that it is the conviction only which they ought to take cognizance of. If, said Mr. G., the gentleman from Delaware had not brought forward the resolution now under discussion, we would have had nothing to do with the business. We did not bring forward the subject; we have nothing to do with it. Mr. G. added, I believe I go too far when I say we have nothing to do with it; for I believe it was the duty of the House to have sent the Sergeant-at-Arms for the member from Vermont, and demanded him from confinement, that he might have attended to his duty in this House.
[The Speaker said this was not now the question.]
Mr. G. knew this was not the question; he mentioned this to show that the House might have had something to do with the business. But we did not, said he, bring the subject before the House; and, if we have nothing to do with the decision of a court, that decision has nothing to do with us. If the member from Vermont is to be expelled, he ought to be expelled, not because he has been convicted, but because he has committed a crime which renders him unfit to retain his seat. What is that crime? It is stated in the record: and, stated as it is, he did not believe it was sufficient to ground a motion of this kind upon. Whatever is contained in these charges, which is capable of proof, ought to be taken into consideration, but not what is mere matter of opinion. It was generally allowed, he believed, that the paragraphs from what is called Barlow's letter, are of this last description. With respect to the other part of the charge, viz: the extract from a letter said to be written by the member from Vermont himself, to which he meant to confine his observations, he would beg leave to state it. [Mr. G. read it.]
Mr. G. said, the whole of the paragraph was hypothetical; but, supposing that the member from Vermont had declared it as his opinion "that the efforts of the Executive power were not bent on the promotion of the comfort, the happiness, and the accommodation of the people," he wished to know whether this could be considered as a declaration of fact or opinion? There is, perhaps, no measure passed by Congress, which one or other may not think will be contrary to the happiness, comfort, and accommodation of the people of the United States. We had, said he, the other day, the question of a navy before us, the establishment of which many believe is necessary for the promotion of the comfort, happiness, and accommodation of the people; whereas, in my opinion, and in the opinion of many others, it will produce the very reverse. How is this question to be decided? And yet it is known that the President, in his writings and speaking, has recommended the establishment of a navy; and persons writing and speaking against this system, which they ought to do, if they believe the system inimical to the United States, might be charged with bringing the Congress and President into contempt. But, doubtless, this is a mere matter of opinion, and not susceptible of proof by evidence. In order to prove the truth of either assertion, you must bring forward a dissertation pro and con.
The next part of the paragraph, viz: "when I shall see every consideration of the public welfare swallowed up," &c. So far as relates to the first member of this sentence, he did not see how it could be proved. He was not of opinion that every consideration of the public welfare was swallowed up in a continual grasp for power; but he did believe that there was a constant disposition, not only in the Executive, but in many gentlemen on this floor, to increase the power of the Executive.
[The Speaker said, neither this remark, nor the observations on the Navy, were in order.]
Mr. G. said, that he always wished strictly to adhere to order, and in order to avoid committing any further mistake, he desired to be informed why it was out of order? Was the argument not in point; or was it the declaration of his own opinion, as he went along, that was out of order? He wished to know, as he meant to be guided by the rule adopted by the Chair.
[The Speaker repeated that the gentleman from Pennsylvania had been out of order.]
Mr. G. proceeded. With respect to that part of the paragraph which says, "when I shall see men of firmness, &c., discarded on their application for office," &c. This, said Mr. G., is, in some degree, matter of fact, and in some degree, matter of opinion. It is a matter of fact, so far as that men of firmness, experience, &c., have been turned out of office; and matter of opinion as to what is said of men of meanness being preferred in their place. I do believe, said Mr. G., that the first assertion is true; and what is here written is no more than an illustration of what has been declared upon this floor, that men of certain political opinions, however capable, experienced, firm, and virtuous they might be, were unfit to hold offices. This, Mr. G. said, was the only fact which could be brought under the law, and he thought it a fact capable of being proved to be true. Mr. G. adduced, as evidence of the fact, the cases of the late Commissioner of Revenue for the United States, and of the Commissioner of Loans for the State of New Hampshire, who, he said, it was evident, were turned out of office on account of their political opinions. And he read, in support of his assertion, the publication of the late Commissioner of Loans of New Hampshire.