"That each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; that they may compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties, as each House may provide; that they may determine the rules of their proceedings, punish the members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. That the members of both Houses shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the attendance at their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same, and, for any debate or speech in either House, shall not be questioned in any other place."
This is all that is said on the subject of privilege; and surely no words can be more explicit, nor any subject more clearly defined. The powers they are to exercise, and the persons and cases they are to operate upon, are all distinctly marked and named; nor is there a word or a sentence in the whole that can by any possible construction be made to mean that for any libels or printed attack on the public conduct or opinions of either House of Congress, or of any of its members, that their privilege shall extend to ordering the persons charged with the offence before them, and imprisoning them at their will. The constitution wisely determined, that they should possess all the powers necessary to their formation, and the undisturbed order of their proceedings, and the safety of their members from arrest, during their attendance, and going to, and returning from Congress; but it at the same time recollected, that it is the nature of our Government to invite examinations of public measures, that it is the duty of our citizens to make these inquiries, to watch over the proceedings of our public bodies, and if they find them departing from the constitution, or exceeding their authority, instantly to announce it. That our constitution supposes no man, or body of men, to be infallible, but considers them all as mere men, and subject to all the passions, and frailties, and crimes, that men generally are, and accordingly provides for the trial of such as ought to be tried, and leaves the members of the Legislature, for their proceedings, to be amenable to their constituents and to public opinion; it however particularly guards the right of the citizens to investigate their measures; and in case of a false or libellous attack, it intends, if the power of collecting juries is fairly exercised, to provide a just and impartial tribunal to decide between them, to act upon oath, and who ought not to be the particular friends or enemies of either. On this subject I shall hereafter more fully remark, and at present take some little notice of an observation that has been made, and which, with the subject of privileges, should be considered as preliminary to those that are necessary on the liberty of the press. It is, that if Congress possessed the power contemplated by this resolution, it was their duty to pass some legislative act respecting it, declaring the manner in which it should be executed, and designating the officer or officers who were to do so; that the people would then know the manner in which offenders were to be summoned or apprehended, or brought before them; but this should have been done when no particular case had occurred, and was before them, and that no proceeding of privileges in any case like the present, ought to be had until such act was passed, and the mode of proceedings clearly ascertained; that if the power was given by the constitution, until Congress had legislated upon it, in the manner above mentioned, it was extremely improper for either branch to attempt to exercise it; that a judiciary department was erected by the constitution, but that Congress was obliged to legislate upon it, and detail its duties, and provide for the appointment of officers to execute them, before the powers of that department could be properly exercised: and that if Congress possessed the power some gentlemen contend for on this point, they must previously legislate on it in the same manner. On this subject there can be no doubt of the propriety of this objection, if Congress possessed the power; and their never having passed such a law is a strong proof, that whatever opinions either branches may have entertained, that both did not suppose they possessed this power, or certainly they would have legislated upon it. If they did not doubt, or were not sure they did not possess this authority, why did they not legislate on it at the time they did on all such other parts of their privileges and powers as they conceived they had authority to act on. They (that is, Congress) passed an act on the subject of the election of members of the House of Representatives, of which that House are the sole judges; each House detailed, in a particular manner, their rules and modes of proceeding—this was all that was necessary to be detailed. The remainder of the clause respecting privileges is so express on the subjects of privilege from arrest, government of members, and expulsion, that every civil officer in the United States, and every man who has the least knowledge, cannot misunderstand them. I assert, that it was the design of the constitution, and that not only its spirit, but letter, warrant me in the assertion, that it never was intended to give Congress, or either branch, any but specified, and those very limited, privileges indeed. They well knew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had been exercised in Great Britain, and were determined no such authority should ever be exercised here. They knew that in free countries very few privileges were necessary to the undisturbed exercise of legislative duties, and those few only they determined that Congress should possess; they never meant that the body who ought to be the purest, and the least in want of shelter from the operation of laws equally affecting all their fellow-citizens, should be able to avoid them; they therefore not only intended, but did confine their privileges within the narrow limits mentioned in the constitution. And here, sir, let me ask, are not these privileges all that are necessary? They have complete authority to keep order and decorum within their own chamber, to clear the galleries if an audience are unruly, and to punish their own members, to take care that no arrests, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, shall keep their members from their duty, and for all libellous attacks or misrepresentations the laws are open to them; and if unjustly attacked, no doubt the juries of their countrymen, who are interested to preserve the dignity and independence of their Legislature, will give them the most ample satisfaction. But it is said, "each branch must possess this power to punish for breach of privileges, which they must judge of as circumstances may arise and require; that every legislative body, or branch of one, possesses an inherent right to protect itself, which must be exercised as their discretion directs, because it may frequently be necessary to exercise it immediately, when the public safety would make it impossible to wait for reference to other bodies, or tribunals," and, "that if a man was approaching to knock you down, it would be absurd, instead of defending yourself, to deliberate whether you were authorized to do so; that you must act instantly, as the occasion demands; and that as each individual in society possesses this inherent right to protect himself, so does each branch of the Legislature." This, as far I have been able to collect, is the sum of the reasoning on this subject; and it is said to be strengthened by the practice and proceedings of the British Parliament, and the Colonial Legislatures, before the Revolution, and most of the State Legislatures since, and is now universally received as the true doctrine on this subject.
That it is the doctrine and practice of the British Parliament, I will allow; but it was because the doctrines there held are utterly inadmissible in a free Government; and to prevent any influence from them, and their precedents, and the improper practice of the Colonial and State Legislatures, that this limitation of the privileges of Congress was here purposely introduced. Will any man undertake to say, that the privilege of the Parliament of Great Britain ought to be that of the Congress of this country? Do you suppose that all their members, and their property, and even their servants, should be protected from arrests during the whole time they are elected for, many of them for twenty years together, or during their lives? Would it be thought safe in this country that a small majority of a small body, or single branch of a Legislature, should claim and exercise the authority, whenever they please, to send and seize any man in your community, however important, and confine him in a loathsome dungeon, for six months together, merely because he has differed with them in politics, and criticised, as he had a right to do, on their legislative acts? Is it a pleasant sight to our citizens, to see sergeants-at-arms, with their rods, inquisitorially seizing freemen, and dragging them to your bar, and there exhibiting them as criminals, or spectacles to crowded audiences, merely because they thought they had a right to attack, by argument, proceedings which appeared to them unconstitutional? Can you have the most distant idea, that your constitution could have intended thus for ever to shut the door of inquiry, and make it so penal and dangerous to your citizens that none of them will dare to venture it? Is it possible for any man to read the constitution with attention, and then suppose that such could have been its design? So far from being so, I do assert that great pains were taken specially to guard against the exercise of any such power, and I have no doubt that the Congress of 1798 must have been of this opinion, or else why did they pass the 2d section of the sedition law? Why did they (improperly in my opinion, because it ought to belong to the State judicials)—why did they make the crime of writing, uttering, publishing, or printing any libel against the President, or either branch of Congress, triable, and punishable, in the federal courts, if either branch possessed this power themselves? If they have the right to punish libels, or false, or malicious attacks, why include them in this act? Their power extends over the whole of the Union, and can reach any inhabitant, in any State. Is it not therefore clear, that by giving this authority to the federal judges, to try and punish for written or printed attacks on either branch of Congress, that the Congress of 1798 did not suppose, for attacks of this kind, made in the papers, there was any other mode of punishment than by a trial, where the person charged would have the benefit of trial by jury? Surely this must have been their opinion, or they would not have had two different modes of trial and punishment for the same offence. They never would have erected a new jurisdiction to include a crime, when one sufficiently strong and energetic existed already; but to prove this still more clearly, let us inquire, why the constitution should have been so attentive to each branch of Congress, so jealous of their privileges, and have shown so little to the President of the United States in this respect. Why should the individual members of either branch, or either branch itself, have more privileges than him? He is himself, as far as his qualified negative goes, a branch of the Legislature; he is, besides, your Executive, he is the sword of the law, and does he possess any privileges like these? If a man meets him walking alone in the streets and insults him, or if one of ruffian manners should enter his house, and even abuse him there, has your President any privileges like these? Can he commit and imprison without a trial? No, sir, he must resort to the laws for satisfaction, where the person charged with the outrage will be heard, and where each party will have justice done them, by men who ought to be so impartially summoned as that no undue bias will be found, when they come to decide. No privilege of this kind was intended for your Executive, nor any except that which I have mentioned for your Legislature. The Convention which formed the constitution well knew that this was an important point, and no subject had been more abused than privilege. They therefore determined to set the example, in merely limiting privilege to what was necessary, and no more. Look into the constitutions of all the States which have been formed since the federal constitution, and see if they have not done the same. The Constitution of South Carolina is remarkably explicit and limited on this subject: It says, "that each House may punish by imprisonment, during its sitting, any person not a member, who shall be guilty of disrespect to the House, by any disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence, or who, during the time of its sitting, shall threaten harm to the body or estate of any member, for any thing said in either House; or who shall assault any of them therefor; or who shall assault or arrest any witness or other person, ordered to attend the House, in his going to or returning therefrom; or who shall rescue any person arrested by order of the House." These are all privileges, except privilege from arrest or seizure of estate, mentioned in that constitution; and the slightest inspection at once shows, that except for disrespect or contemptuous conduct, in its presence, or threatening or assaulting a member for his conduct in the House, that no other authority is given to punish—not a word is said about libels, or attacks by writing or printing, on their conduct. It is well known that our constitution intended the press to be free; to be the means of communicating the acts of the Government, and of commenting on them where necessary; that it supposes that majorities will sometimes exist, who may wish to overstep the boundaries they ought not to pass; and, therefore, it provides for them, in the hands of the people, this wholesome correction of the press, which those who resort to must use at their peril. If they use it properly, animadvert with propriety, and really point out defects or usurpations in the Government, the people will applaud their zeal, and the laws will support them in their exertions; but if they falsely or maliciously misrepresent, the law will become the avenger of the Government, and unprejudiced juries be the means of punishing calumniators. This is the true footing upon which legislative privilege should be put in every Government, and it is the one on which it is now placed in the United States. By this you give sufficient power to punish, for any improper thing done in their presence, which may disturb the order of either House, or violate the decorum of their proceedings; and for any supposed slanderous attack, the tenderness with which you ought to touch the constitutional right of the public to inquire into public affairs, and the delicate subject of trial by jury, will always necessarily oblige you to recur to the latter for redress and satisfaction.
If it was proper, on subjects like this, to refer to British precedents, I could mention a recent one, which is exactly in point; and shows, that even in the English House of Commons, the doctrine I contend for prevails; it is, that in all cases of libels against either House, the remedy must be by prosecution by the Attorney General, and trial by jury. In Stockdale's case, Doctor Logan published charges against the House of Commons, in which he stated, in a variety of ways, that they had been guilty of great cruelty to Mr. Hastings, Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, and all sides of the House agreed that it was a libel; but, instead of ordering him before the House, they entered into resolutions directing the Attorney General to prosecute. It appears to me so clear, that for all libels or attacks on either branch of the Legislature, in writing or in print, the mode must be by prosecution, that I do not know it is necessary to trouble you at this time with any further reasoning on that head; I will therefore only mention one more, and then conclude this part of my subject: it is, that from the nature of our Government, where our President is elective, and obliged to attend to public opinion, even if he wishes to do so, he will never venture on those bold measures, which hereditary Executives sometimes attempt. If, then, there should be some men, whose political talents he is afraid of, or whose inquiries into his administration give him uneasiness, an Executive, instead of venturing on any such measure himself, if he can obtain a majority in either branch, will easily discover some mode of having this man's political iniquities construed into breaches of privilege; and, under cover of his friends' influence, immure and silence, during a whole session, and for half a year, a man, whose arguments were perhaps unanswerable, and whose system may be the one which your councils may the next year adopt. I am far from supposing that we are yet so much advanced in the arts and intrigues of older Governments as to make this probable at present; it is not however impossible, and must be guarded against.
The next question is, that of the liberty of the press, as applying to these defined privileges; and as it is the first time this sacred subject has been before either House on a question of privilege, I shall expect your indulgence in making some remarks on it. I shall be very short; for however fruitful the subject is, yet so much has been said of it elsewhere, and you must be so well acquainted with it, that it will be necessary for me barely to state some general principles, as they apply to the question before you. I feel a pride in saying that in no country has the press ever been as free as in United America; however clouded or interrupted this freedom has, in my opinion, lately been, I entertain a hope that in a few months all its shackles will be removed, and that the emotions they have occasioned in the public mind will for ever forbid its being thus fettered again. To no subject have I ever more carefully applied, than what ought in a well regulated Government to be the freedom of the press. I well know that where the press is not free, liberty is but a name, and Government a mockery. I have therefore endeavored to form, in my own mind, what ought to be the true standard of the freedom of the press with us; and I have no doubt that it consists in this: That the printing press shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the Legislature, or any branch of the Government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof; that the free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most invaluable rights of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print, on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; that in prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels the Jury shall have a right to determine the law, and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases. This is the situation in which the Constitution of Pennsylvania has placed the press; and it is the true and safe one, upon which it ought to be placed in every free Government. Here the right to investigate the conduct of the Legislature, and of official men, is not only recognized and established, but the constitution seems to require it as a duty, from the citizens. It says to them, these are men periodically delegated by you to manage your public concerns—to you, and you alone, they are accountable for their conduct; nor can you know whether it is meritorious, or otherwise, but by having the right to examine into it, and by freely and frequently exercising that right. And would it not be the strangest thing in the world, when the constitution not only establishes the right, but calls upon the citizens to exercise it with alertness, and by no means to neglect it, that if they should happen to displease a branch of the Legislature, whose conduct they have censured, that they should be delivered immediately into the power of this branch, to be dealt with as they please; that the men they had accused, and whom they had, by the constitution, a right to accuse, should become their judges? Would not this be a most extraordinary doctrine? Would it not involve an inconsistency, that ought not certainly to be chargeable upon the framers of the constitution? In private cases of slander, or defamation, would you suffer the person abused, or any near connection of his, or person interested in the event of the suit, to be on the jury? Certainly not. How much more glaringly improper then would it be, in cases of a public nature, where the acts of a legislative branch are censured, and where the charge has been openly and honorably brought forward, to commit the person who produced it, at once, to the power of the body whose acts he has condemned! Let us suppose, that in the exercise of this invaluable right, some disinterested and independent man, urged by the most honorable and patriotic motives, should conceive a branch of the Legislature overstepping the bounds of the constitution, and going into measures destructive of our rights, or injurious to our interests; that this man should be an important member of your community, of known integrity and independence of situation and character, that he should have no private ends of his own to answer, or any thing in view but the public good; that he has embarked in the investigation at the entreaty of a numerous and respectable part of the community, who wished the public mind to be so fairly and fully possessed of facts, and reasonings on them, as to be able, at the next election, to determine with precision and fairness on the conduct of their Legislature; under these circumstances would it be proper to deliver this man into the power of a body whom he has charged with misbehavior, or a departure from constitutional principles? Or would it not be more fair, would it not wear more the appearance of impartiality in case an examination was necessary into the nature of his charges, or the manner in which he has made them, and the expressions he has used, to have a distinct and unprejudiced body, a jury acting under oath, to decide between them? As far as I know any thing of the principles of natural justice, I should suppose there was no question on the subject, and no other opinion ought to be entertained, and that without it there can be no such liberty of the press, or freedom of inquiry, as the constitution intends.
And here, sir, let it be asked, why should a Government that means well, or is confident in its uprightness and ability, ever fear the press? It should be to them a source of great pleasure, in reflecting that they had so excellent a mode of diffusing a knowledge of their acts, well knowing, if they were unjustly attacked, it gave them the most ample means of defence; and that if it became immoderate and licentious, the laws were always sufficiently energetic to punish it. How many individuals when attacked or slandered, have rejoiced that such a defence has been afforded them; and how indispensable is its free investigation to the removal of doubts which sometimes crowd about the characters of public bodies, or men, and which it is necessary to remove! Public bodies are public property; and so indeed are public men; who have in any degree rendered themselves conspicuous by their exertions: few of these, if ever there was one, can expect to be without personal enemies; these will be in proportion to the talents of the man they dislike, and his consequence with the people. Men who engage in public life, or are members of legislative bodies, must expect to be exposed to anonymous, and sometimes avowed attacks, on their principles and opinions. Their best shield will be an upright and able conduct. The best informed will sometimes err; but when their intentions are pure, an enlightened nation will easily discover it, and pardon the mistake. With the shield of conscious rectitude, a Government can never dread the press. It is only in States where the happiness of the people is not the end of Government, or where an individual or a few possess the whole authority, that the press is not agreeable to them. Hence, in despotisms, it is generally odious to the sovereign, and strictly limited. We have, however, found, even among them, a latitude which proves that in the most despotic countries, where the sovereign is conscious of using his power for the good of the people, he fears not the slanders of the malicious. It is remarked of Frederic of Prussia, that few princes were more libelled by their subjects; but that in no country were libels more disregarded: that few, if any, instances ever occurred of his endeavoring to discover the authors, or to crush, by punishment, the spirit of inquiry which literary pursuits had diffused among his subjects. A more remarkable instance is, that of the Empress of Russia; in giving her directions respecting libels, she says, "great care ought to be taken how we extend this crime; representing to ourselves the danger of debasing the human mind by restraint and oppression, which can produce nothing but ignorance, and must cramp and depress the rising efforts of genius." I did not expect to have been obliged ever to have introduced on this floor, Frederic or the Empress, as examples on the subject of the press. The love of liberty, or a wish to countenance the spirit of political inquiry, was not certainly among the reasons for allowing this latitude; but they at once discovered, that if they wished to govern an enlightened people, the spirit of inquiry must be unshackled, and an extensive range given to literary productions. Among the ancients we find Tiberius, and Trajan, and Titus, allowing absolute liberty of speech and writing, suppressing the laws against seditious words and writings, and punishing informers. But the most remarkable instances we have, that freedom of speech and writing are essential to the liberty and greatness of a people, are those of Athens and Rome, when republics: in speaking of them, a celebrated writer says, "that democracy is the nurse of genius, and the greatest encourager of sublimity." The fact is evident from these republics. In Greece, Athens was most democratical, and a state of the greatest liberty; and hence it was, according to Paterculus, "that eloquence flourished in greater force and plenty in that city alone than in all Greece besides; insomuch, (says he,) although the bodies of the people were dispersed into other cities, yet you would think their souls and their genius to have been pent up within the precincts of Athens." So the city of Rome was not only the seat of liberty and empire, but of true wit and exalted genius. The Roman power outlived, it is true, for a considerable time, its liberty, but the freedom of speech and writing was gone, and wit and genius could not long survive them.
How applicable, sir, are these instances, and how incumbent on us is it, if we mean to keep this country a Republic, to cherish the freedom of the press, to remember that without it seldom any thing great or noble can be produced, that to shackle it is to chain the mind, and stifle the seeds of every thing that is generous and amiable! That, in the words of a celebrated divine, "reason and freedom are our own, and given to continue so; we are to use, but cannot resign them, without rebelling against Him who gave them; that to invade them is to encroach on the privileges we receive from God, and traverse the designs of Infinite Goodness." We should remember the danger of precedents, and be careful, as this is the first discussion we have had on this subject, not to establish improper ones, or lay a foundation for that debasement of the mind, which always follows the depression of the press.
It is important here to remind you of the anxiety of the State Legislatures in insisting upon the doors of the Senate being thrown open, and their legislative proceedings exposed, like the other branch, to public view. It was done unquestionably with the intent, that minutes of your debates should be taken, and all your proceedings subject to the inspection of such of our citizens as choose to attend; but as, from the distance, very few of the States could have citizens attending, the great object certainly must have been to have notes taken of the debates, and printed in the gazettes; that through that channel information may be transmitted to every part of the Union, and thus the States become, in the best manner they are able, judges of the talents, as well as conduct and opinions of their members. That this is of infinite importance, in a representative government, no man will deny; but if a printer is to be seized, and dragged to your bar, and perhaps imprisoned for a mistake, that a law has passed when it is only its second reading, or that a member of a committee was not summoned to attend the meeting of the committee, when he was, and did attend, or for any mistake of this kind, I ask you what printer or reporter will take your debates? Who will venture on it; because, where will you draw the line? Will you require that each reporter shall give every word and observation with exactness, and that the smallest deviation from what was said on the orders or proceedings of the House, shall subject him to the odium, and perhaps expense, of a trial at your bar, which must accrue if he has counsel? If this is the case, no reporter will certainly attempt to take your debates, and your doors may just as well be shut again. But, say gentlemen, it is not only for those assertions which you have mentioned, but for the preceding and accompanying observations respecting the views and proceedings of the Senate, and of the members of that body in their official capacity, for which we think this examination requisite. I have already said, in the commencement of my argument, that no man can justify the licentiousness of the press, and that it is perhaps to be lamented that so much invective is used in the papers on both sides of the question; but that as most of these observations are on things that did not happen in the Senate room, and many of them are stated to have occurred near two years ago, and that as much more violent abuse against the Senate was published in the Federal paper styled the Gazette of the United States, on the 13th day of February, and no notice has been taken of it, that it was best, upon this occasion, to suffer the present to pass unnoticed likewise: that it is astonishing the honorable mover from Connecticut, who seems to feel so much for the dignity and character of the Senate on this occasion, did not, on that of the abuse which was heaped on it for consenting to stop the enlistment for the army, have similar feelings; and that as he consented to suffer those animadversions to pass, it would certainly be doing no great violence to his feelings to deal with the present in the same way: that perhaps the best mode to lessen the importance of a paper was, not to treat its observations with either too much notice or severity; that in politics, as in religion, persecution seldom made converts; that if I ever had the inclination to raise the importance of a press, and bring it into celebrity and notice, I would wish it persecuted, for I never saw a press in a free Government persecuted but it rose immediately. Attack a press for its political publications, you instantly convince the people that it is dreaded, and must be of great importance, and attract their attention. We can never forget the memorable cases of Sacheveral and Wilkes, or how much the English nation was agitated by them, and we ought to be convinced, that in every country having the least semblance of freedom, the same consequences will always flow from the same measures.
I request of you again to consider the importance of the question, how far, in the case of libels, or attacks in the papers, for their political opinions, any single branch ought to possess the power, perhaps in a moment of passion and resentment, to decide on what is to affect the personal liberty of a citizen? Whether it is consistent with the nature of our Government, that a single branch, without check or control, should become judges in their own case? Whether any citizen charged with a crime, for which he may be punished by the temporary loss of liberty, is not entitled, by the constitution, to "a speedy trial by an impartial jury?" And, whether to deny it, in this instance, would not be to interfere with that provision of the constitution? For my own part, I have no doubt of it; and, feeling as I always do, most jealous for the character of this branch, I am apprehensive, should we proceed in this measure, it may occasion unpleasant observations. Some of its enemies may perhaps say, that no power is so arbitrary as that of the unlimited authority of a single branch, acting in its own cause, revenging its own affronts, and deciding, perhaps more by its own passions and feelings, than by the justice of the case: that a power of this kind is worse than a despotism; because there the despot is in some measure checked by his individual responsibility; for the act being the official act of the body, is that sort of protection under which an individual despot cannot shelter himself from the public odium—should the measure be oppressive, he must alone meet the general censure, which, thus concentrated, strikes with force; but when divided among a number, must in a great measure lose its effect. That, in every view of the subject, we must be convinced that for libels, or printed attacks, on either branch, the constitution must have intended to give the person charged the right of trial by a jury, so collected that a cool and unprejudiced examination might take place, and justice be done to all parties; that this I had shown to be the case, in the instance I had mentioned, in the House of Commons of Great Britain; and we surely would not wish the press should be more free, or the freedom of inquiry into legislative conduct, more unshackled in England than with us. Look, sir, into the abuse that is daily poured by the papers of that country upon their Parliament and Administration, and upon Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, and all their leading members; and yet we see no proceedings of this kind. Indeed, if we were to believe Montesquieu, and the writers since him, it is to the freedom of the press alone England owes the portion of liberty she enjoys—it is the ladder by which she rose, and that which she will struggle most to preserve. I devoutly hope she will always keep it, and that we shall likewise maintain it for ever in its utmost purity.
Mr. P. concluded by adding, that if the Senate went into a consideration of his motion, instead of that of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Tracy,) they would probably avoid that part of the discussion which would be least agreeable, as the subject would be clear from that locality and personality which attached to the first, and a decision would take place without any reference to this or that particular printer; but if the gentleman would postpone the question, Mr. P. consented to let his motion lie on the table, with a view to its being printed for the use of the members, that so both propositions might be compared and considered with more attention than could be done in any other way.