The first was carried: that relating to the appointment of a printer not carried; about twenty only rising in favor of it.
Apportionment Bill.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the second enumeration.
Mr. Macon (Speaker) moved to strike out "thirty-three," the ratio fixed by the bill, for the purpose of inserting "thirty."
Mr. M. observed that it did not appear, from the different ideas expressed by different gentlemen, that any material inconvenience would result from the increased number of members that would be created by the ratio of thirty thousand being adopted. Whereas on the ground of principle a great benefit would flow from it. In his opinion, to secure the confidence of the people in the Government, it was essential to lessen the districts as much as possible, that the elector might know the elected. At present, particularly in North Carolina, they were so large that a voter depended more upon the opinions of others than upon his own information. The ratio of thirty thousand would not introduce into the House more than one hundred and sixty members, which number did not equal that of the members in several of the State Legislatures, of which no complaints had been made, and from which no inconvenience had arisen. He felt particularly for Delaware, which would be severely affected by the ratio in the bill.
Mr. Giles hoped the motion would obtain. As far as respected the State of Virginia, he felt little or no anxiety. But he, on general principles, preferred the smallest ratio. It was an essential principle of a Republican Government that the people voting should know whom they vote for; that the elector should be well acquainted with the elected. To ensure this effect the districts should be small. He was aware of the impossibility of reaching this point precisely: but it was our duty to approach it as nearly as possible. Though, in relation to the situation of Delaware, he did not subscribe fully to the ideas of some gentlemen, as the case was an extreme one, and he knew the impropriety of relying upon such cases, as the reasoning from an extreme generally led to an extreme, yet he thought the relative circumstances of Delaware and Virginia, as stated, to be correct; for it was a fact that Virginia, entitled to twenty-two Representatives, was not so much affected by any given fraction, as Delaware, entitled to but one Representative.
But the reply to the inequality of her representation here is, that she has two Representatives in the Senate; and it is inferred that she will hence derive a larger weight in the Union. Such was the theory of the thing. But what was the result of experience? Mr. G. said, he had once supposed that the small States would have an undue advantage over the large States. His opinion had since altered. All the small States were surrounded and compressed by large States, and derived their political sympathies from them. It was true, the small States had each two votes in the Senate. Yet, what superior advantage have they in the Government generally? He was, therefore, clearly of opinion that the claims of the small States to the largest representation that could be constitutionally given them, ought not to be affected by their representation in the Senate. The fact was that this House was the basis of confidence in the Government. We had heard much about an alarm, about disorganization, and the disposition of large States to swallow up the rights of all the other States. He would ask, whether the adoption of a large ratio would lessen this clamor, promote the general confidence, and increase the stability of the Government?
Mr. Jones hoped the amendment would prevail. There was not a doubt but that the small States would be materially affected by the ratio in the bill. It was true, that, according to the theory of our Government, the members of that House did not represent the States. But, what was the fact? In truth, our representation was that of absolute locality. Can I, said Mr. J., represent as effectually Massachusetts, or Vermont, as Pennsylvania?
Mr. Van Ness declared himself to be uninfluenced by local considerations, or particular inconveniences. If we attempted to avoid them by the adoption of any ratio, we should be mistaken. The inequality of States could not be remedied. If a remedy was sought, it must be found in the Senate. The large States had not that exclusive weight which had been stated. If the number of the large States in this House should overbear the smaller States, they would find their protection in the Senate. The fractional loss, so much dwelt on, was not a loss to the State, it was only a loss to that part of the State which was unrepresented, and the loss would be the same to a larger State, if its unrepresented fraction was equally great.
Mr. V. N. said, it had always been his desire to consult the wishes of the people and to conform to them. He considered those wishes as solemnly expressed in the constitution, which had decided that the ratio should not be less than thirty thousand, and in the law passed immediately after the adoption of the constitution, fixing the ratio at thirty-three thousand.