As to the experience of the State, so often appealed to, he would state that of his own. The constitution of New York originally fixed the representation in one branch at three hundred, and in the other at one hundred and fifty. After suffering the inconveniences of so large a legislative body, a convention had been called, which reduced the one branch to one hundred and fifty, and the other to thirty-two members.
It was the opinion of some gentlemen that the essential principle of our Government was the equal representation of the States in the Senate. This was a mistaken opinion. The federalism of the Government might have been as well preserved by an unequal representation in the Senate. The feature was not the offspring of principle, but of concession. If we looked to antiquity, we would observe the smaller States of a Confederation always inferior to the larger; and he recollected one case of a Confederation, in which one State was entitled to three, another to two, and the third to one representative.
Mr. Smilie heartily concurred in opinion with the gentleman from New York, that we ought not to respect local feelings, but that we ought to go upon general grounds. Possessing these principles, we still know how difficult it is to do complete justice. For himself he would be satisfied with the ratio of thirty-three, if he could not obtain that of thirty thousand. He was in favor of a large representation, because he relied on that for safety and economy. For, when he considered the great powers of the other branches of the Government, (powers, in the opinion of some men, too great,) he thought it was their duty to impart to that House all the constitutional power that could be conferred. This would enable the House to resist all encroachments attempted to be made upon it.
Mr. Bacon said that, for himself, he was satisfied with the present ratio, as it stood in the bill. This was the ratio which had been adopted when our numbers were much less than they now are; that it did not appear but that it had given general satisfaction; and that no other inconveniences had accrued than such as might be expected to follow from the adoption of any other ratio whatever. It would seem to be rather unnatural, and the reverse of what was contemplated by those who enacted the constitution, as our numbers increase, to lessen the ratio of representation. He was, therefore, against striking out the number thirty-three, with a view to insert a lower number.
A divisor of thirty-three thousand would now give a House consisting of at least one hundred and forty members, which, even on the present ratio, must soon become not only too expensive, but unwieldy. It had been repeatedly urged that the present ratio leaves a very large fraction to the State of Delaware. This, it was admitted, was matter of regret; but that, let what ratio might be adopted, such fractional parts must be expected to fall somewhere; that such fractions would be likely to vary, from time to time, and shift from State to State, as the population may increase and vary in the several States. And Mr. B. did not conceive that the particular case of Delaware, hard as it might seem, furnished a sufficient reason for altering an entire system.
As to what had been urged of the disadvantage to which Electors were subjected in large districts, of not knowing the characters of their Representatives and candidates, Mr. B. observed that this was a disadvantage which was lessening with rapidity from year to year, and from one election to another; that to whatever inconvenience electors may heretofore have been subjected by the want of a knowledge of their candidate, from this inconvenience they are already in a great measure relieved; and it must, in a very short time, entirely cease to exist. If any inconvenience of this kind still remains, by an election or two more, it would be entirely removed. It had been urged that Delaware had but one Representative, and every State ought to have two. But, why two, Mr. B. queried, rather than three? It is true, that two are better than one; and three are better than either one or two; for, as we have long since been told, "a three-fold cord is not easily broken."
Mr. B. concluded by saying that, as thirty-three thousand was the ratio which had been adopted when our population was much less than it now is; and as it has been practised upon without any inconvenience or general dissatisfaction, he was unwilling to risk the uncertain consequences of an innovation at this particular time.
Mr. T. Morris was of opinion that the arguments drawn from the representation in the Senate had nothing to do with this question. The House had a constitutional duty to perform, that was highly interesting. The only question is, How it shall be performed? The people ought to be fully represented; that is, the number of their representatives should be increased until that number became inconvenient for the transaction of business. He had never been a friend to an enormous Legislature; such as that in France, a mob convention. He thought the idea incorrect that this House should acquire a weight that might cause it to bear down the other branch of the Legislature. He hoped, if any such attempt should be made, that body would have sufficient spirit to resist it; and he trusted there would always be firmness enough here to resist any encroachment attempted.
As to the present ratio guiding, he did not think that the House should be governed by any uniform rule. They ought, on the contrary, to be governed by the existing circumstances. Not believing that any inconvenience would arise from the augmented representation on the ratio of thirty thousand, he would be in favor of it from the reasons he had assigned.
Mr. Dennis did not rise to say any thing new on the subject; but merely, as he had altered his mind since the business was before the House, to assign some of the reasons which had influenced him. He was now in favor of the ratio of thirty thousand. His first impressions were against it from an apprehension that the increased numbers of the House would increase expense, and produce disorder. But he acknowledged himself convinced by the arguments which had fallen from the gentleman from Virginia, which he thought counterbalanced his previous apprehension. Mr. D. thought it all-important to preserve an equilibrium between the different departments of the Government, and he was convinced that this would be best effected by making the representation in this House as large as the constitution permitted, and convenience justified. If we expected to retain the confidence of the people, it was necessary to increase the Representative branch; for it would be in vain to look for that confidence necessary to give it a proper portion of energy, unless there existed a sympathy between the elector and the elected.