Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 2 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

[Mr. Dana having read Mr. Griswold's resolution proceeded.]

What is there here that implicates the character of Spain? If there is any fault in mentioning the cession, if that is calculated to irritate Spain, the fault lies with the President; for he first mentioned it. This argument, then, must be abandoned. There is nothing in this resolution that can impede negotiations; it is not my intention that this House should take any measures to impede, but that we should take measures to give additional force to negotiation. If I understand what will give most efficacy to Executive negotiations, it is when the world are assured that this House will support the President in all proper and necessary measures for vindicating our rights. But, say the gentlemen, is it possible that we can be for vindicating the rights of the citizens when we have withdrawn our confidence from the Executive? It is true we could not agree with gentlemen in their terms when they avowed "a perfect confidence in the vigilance and wisdom of the Executive." The gentleman from Virginia represented this as the theory of the Government. We could not agree with him. We voted for striking this out. It is unnecessary to mention our motives for this in detail. This might be to imitate. What! "relying with perfect confidence in the Executive"—is this the language of the constitution, as it respects any man? The resolution does not limit the confidence reposed to any degree, but ascribes a perfection of wisdom and vigor, which ought not to be reposed in any being subject to the ordinary frailties of human nature. Besides, there is an expression of confidence resulting from the constitutional powers of the Executive, which may be correct. But it will be recollected that the powers of the Executive are not competent to ulterior measures. He has only the power of negotiation; he has no other. Though he may prevent an aggression by employing force, he cannot enforce compensation for injuries received. It was, therefore, improper to agree to a resolution that pledged ourselves to abstain from doing any thing.

The allusion to the case with Great Britain was not correct. Will it be said that less success attended the measures of our negotiation then, because the House manifested a disposition to adopt spirited measures? Or, that there were in that case no measures adopted? Measures were adopted. But here, not a single measure had been.

Mr. Randolph said it was extremely painful to him to be obliged so often to explain what appeared to him almost self-evident. The journals have been quoted, sir, to show that I have cast an imputation on the Spanish Court more injurious than that contained in the resolution of the gentleman from Connecticut. I am perfectly willing that the decision of the question before us should depend upon that fact. The resolution, sir, which I had the honor to submit to you, spoke of a fact notorious to the whole world, of a breach of compact, of a violation of treaty, on the part of Spain, which could be neither denied nor justified. It contained an inquiry into this circumstance, and, information having been received respecting it, was followed by a declaration of our willingness to ascribe it to the unauthorized misconduct of their agents rather than to the Court of Spain. The resolution of the gentleman from Connecticut implies a fact highly dishonorable to the Spanish nation—that the Government, and not subordinate, unauthorized persons, has secretly entered into stipulations repugnant to its engagements with us. Put the case between two individuals; suppose a gentleman of this House to receive an injury from either of the gentlemen from Connecticut. In an open and manly manner he speaks of this injury, and in undignified terms of resentment. He inquires into it; having found that it was the act of a subordinate agent, and, no proof being exhibited that it was at the instigation of the principal, he frankly says: There is a violation on your part of your engagements with me, but I am willing to ascribe it to the unauthorized misconduct of your agent. On the contrary, suppose him to insinuate strongly that his opponent has covertly taken steps to injure him by treacherously entering into engagements incompatible with those previously made with him. Sir, that honor which would feel itself wounded by the first of these proceedings, while it was insensible to the other, is very little allied to the Castilian.

But, sir, it seems that this unfortunate resolution betrays so entire an ignorance of the distribution of the powers of our Government as to clothe the Executive with an authority not only not devolved upon it by the constitution, but which is the peculiar province of this and the other branch of the Legislature. The gentleman (Mr. Dana) denies the power of the Executive to redress injuries received from foreign nations. The resolution, however, speaks only of a disposition to redress those injuries. But let us examine into the fact. Have I, indeed, so far mistaken, and, contrary to my own avowed principles, am so disposed to augment the Executive powers at the expense of the other departments of the Government? Suppose, on the representations of the Executive to the Court of Spain, that Court, which is more than probable, should restore the rights of navigation and deposit, disavow the conduct of their officers in violating those rights, and moreover, punish them for it? Would any person deny that, through the agency of the Executive, constitutionally exercised, the injury was redressed? There were other criticisms of the gentleman which I well remember, and to which he seems willing to call the recollection of the House. They were chiefly of a verbal nature. The gentleman objected to the expression "vindicating the injuries," which he contended implied the justifying, and not the redressing, of them. I could only reply, that I had been in the habit of hearing that word used in the sense in which I applied it as well as in that contended for by the gentleman. That the meaning of terms in our copious and flexible language should not be settled by provincial acceptation; and that by the only authority then accessible to us (knowing the disposition of the gentleman to bow to authority) it was decided that the word "vindicate" extended as well to the avenging of an injury as to the assertion of a right. I am, however, willing to confess that I have never attended to the technical structure of language with a precision so minute as that of the gentleman from Connecticut; and if the House are again to go to school to become acquainted with it, if again we are to be subjected to the lash of the pedagogue, no man shall have my vote for that high office so soon as the gentleman from Connecticut.

When the resolution which I submitted to you was under consideration, I did defend the expression contained in it, of confidence in the Executive, on the theory of our Government. I am still ready to defend it on the same principle. By the Constitution of the United States, the Executive is the representative of the United States to foreign nations. It is furnished with organs by which to receive their propositions, and to communicate our own. The constitution, therefore, presumes that to this department may be entirely confided our negotiations with foreign States. To this House is given the sole power to originate money bills, and the constitution supposes that a perfect reliance may be had upon it for executing this all-important trust. On the Senate, in like manner, is devolved the right of trying impeachments, and perfect confidence is placed in the wisdom and justice of their decision. The same confidence is reposed in the Executive with respect to exterior relations. Without adverting, therefore, to the character of the individual, we had the same right to presume that the constituted authority would take the proper steps in relation to his department, that he has to presume that we will raise the necessary revenue and pass the proper laws. Until, then, it could be shown that some specific act of the Executive had rendered that department unworthy of our confidence, we might consistently express it: and, even if proof of such misconduct could be established, it would not alter the tenor of the constitution, however the individual might be affected by it. For your constitution, sir, is not of that precarious nature which depends on the fluctuating characters of particular men. Mr. R. concluded by declaring his reluctance, then increased by indisposition, to be so frequently called upon the floor, but he felt himself in honor bound to defend a motion made by himself, and which had called forth such repeated animadversions from the other side of the House.

Mr. Goddard.—The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has complained so much of the objections to which his secret resolution was exposed, that I feel myself called upon to sustain a part of that complaint which he has seen fit to place to the account of my colleague. The motion, sir, to strike out the word "vindicating," which gave the gentleman the trouble of producing his pocket dictionary, came from me. He attempted to show, by the authority of his dictionary, that the word is sometimes used to signify revenge. Admitting it, I asked then, and I ask now, with what propriety it could be used, even in that sense, in the resolution referred to? We were then speaking of measures which had before that time been taken by the President, regarding the subject to which the resolution referred. Were we to suppose that the President had already taken measures to revenge the injuries of the United States? I had heard of no such intimation. Besides, has he the power to do so, in the manner then suggested by the gentleman from Virginia by taking possession of New Orleans? I believe not, without the concurrence of Congress. It was therefore absurd, in the highest degree, to use the expression in that resolution; and we had more than one reason for striking out that part of the resolution which contained it.

But this, as well as every other word and letter of this favorite resolution, was pertinaciously adhered to. The gentleman who framed the resolution seemed determined to compel us to eulogize the President—to extort from us a little praise of the man—or reduce us to the necessity of voting against the principle of the resolution, which asserted our right to the free navigation of the Mississippi. This part of the resolution could have been introduced for no other purpose. It also called upon us to pledge ourselves to wait the issue of such measures as the President might have taken, without any knowledge of the nature of those measures, if any had been taken. And this, the gentleman (Mr. Randolph) now tells us, we might well enough have done, on the ground of the theory of our Government. I did not know, sir, that it belonged to the theory of Government to eulogize the President on all occasions, or express a confidence we do not feel. Nor does it make a part of the theory of our Government, that the President, without the concurrence of Congress, should avenge the injuries of the country. But, sir, we determined not to express a confidence we did not feel, or vote against the principle of a resolution which was agreeable to us; and the rules of the House, notwithstanding all the efforts to the contrary, protected us in carrying that determination into effect. We recorded our votes in favor of such parts of the resolution as we liked, and against that which we deemed exceptionable; and the final vote which was given upon the whole resolution was sufficiently explained by those upon its different parts. But, sir, because we did not vote that we had "perfect confidence" in the Executive, are we now to be told that we are not entitled to the information called for by the resolution on your table? Are those who do not express entire approbation of all the measures of the Administration to be refused all information respecting the most important interests of the country?

Another objection is raised to agreeing to this resolution. Gentlemen say it will offend foreign nations. What does the resolution call for? It calls for information of a fact which we are told in the President's Message exists. Louisiana, says the President, has been ceded by Spain to France. We ask for such documents as he may possess in evidence of that fact. We wish to know the terms and conditions upon which that province is to be delivered up. When this is asked, by the resolution on your table, the right is at the same time reserved to the President to withhold such parts of it (if any such there be) as, in his opinion, ought not to be communicated. And the passage of this resolution is to offend France or Spain! For fear of offending foreign nations we are not to ask or know what is our relative situation with such nations? If, sir, we hold this language, we may indeed avoid the anger of foreign nations, but we shall merit their contempt. But when, in answer to the suggestion that we may offend Spain, the gentleman from Virginia is reminded of his resolution, which charges Spain directly with a violation of treaty, he replies that this language is palliated by our saying that we are "willing to ascribe this violation to the unauthorized conduct of certain individuals rather than to the want of good faith on the part of His Catholic Majesty." But, in making out this apology, the gentleman has blended two resolutions together. The one to which my colleague referred passed early in the session. In that, Spain was charged directly with a violation of treaty. Nothing was then said about unauthorized conduct of individuals. This reluctance at charging Spain with this violation of treaty was not expressed until a long time after, and is found in the resolution which passed in secret. Indeed, this, as well as all the objections which have been offered to the passage of the resolution on your table, appear to me equally fallacious.

Mr. Huger said, that having, on a former occasion, had an opportunity of delivering his sentiments in favor of the present resolution, "requesting the Executive to direct the proper officer to lay before the House such official documents, as were in possession of the Government, relative to the cession of Louisiana to France," he felt no disposition to enter at this time into a further discussion of the merits of that resolution, nor should he have again troubled the House on the subject, but for the assertion repeated more than once by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) that those gentlemen who thought and voted with himself in the secret committee, had recorded, on the journals of the House, their solemn determination (however sensibly they might feel the injuries inflicted on the rights and interests of these States) to refuse all co-operation in support of those rights and interests so long as the direction of the Government should remain in the hands of the present Chief Magistrate. This imputation had already, it was true, been very properly repelled by his friend from Connecticut, and it had been triumphantly shown from the journals themselves, with how little justice the insinuation had been made against those who agreed and voted with him on the different parts of the resolution lately adopted in the secret committee. The gentleman from Virginia had, nevertheless, thought proper again to make the assertion; Mr. H. must, therefore, beg leave again to meet it, and to declare that it was neither authorized by a fair construction of the different votes given on the occasion by yeas and nays, nor to be inferred from any thing which had fallen in debate either from himself or any of his political friends. The very contrary, continued Mr. H., is in truth the fact; and had the resolution in question been debated with open doors, it would have been very evident to every one, that the utmost pains had been taken by the other side of the House to place us in this very predicament, and by availing themselves of a point of order, to oblige us by our votes, not only to declare an implicit and entire confidence in the present Chief Magistrate, but to tie up our hands and bind ourselves not to take a single step in this important business until the Executive was graciously pleased to authorize us to do so. If the doors had been allowed, I say, to remain open during the debate, it would have been evident to every one how much pains were taken to oblige us to commit ourselves on these two points, or to submit to be presented to the world as unwilling to co-operate in any way in the support of the just rights of the nation, and be deprived of an opportunity of showing, as we were anxious to do, our approbation of, and concurrence in, other parts of the resolution; the last sentence in particular, which holds forth our unalterable determination to maintain, in every event, the boundaries and right of commerce and navigation through the Mississippi, as established by existing treaties. Fortunately, however, the point of order was determined in our favor, and we have had an opportunity to show, and did actually show, by our votes, in the most unequivocal manner, that we were, as well as our political opponents, decidedly in favor of every other part of the resolution, save only that which called on us so unnecessarily to declare ourselves the blind and passive tools of the Executive. Nay, more, he recollected to have declared himself, again and again, in the course of the debate, that, although he was not willing at the present moment unnecessarily to express an entire and implicit confidence in the political infallibility of the Executive, yet he certainly had not the smallest hesitation in saying, that he was as ready as any gentleman on the other side, to devote his life and fortune, even under the auspices of the present Chief Magistrate, to the defence of our common country against any and every foreign aggression whatever. He was not, it was true, one of the warm and enthusiastic devotees of the present Administration, and he must honestly acknowledge that he should greatly prefer seeing the reins of Government, at this critical juncture, in the hands of a Washington! He, nevertheless, recollected that the present Chief Magistrate was placed at the head of affairs by the constitutional voice of the majority of the American people. He acquiesced, therefore, in their decision, and hoped he might be permitted to avail himself of the advantage of having the doors now open, to repeat again, in the most unequivocal language, that he was as ready as any of the most devoted friends of the Administration, to risk his life and his all, (even under its auspices,) in asserting the rights and vindicating the injuries of the United States.