The motion was disagreed to—ayes 41, noes 56; when the bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading without a division.
The motion to read the bill a third time on Saturday was carried—ayes 55, when the following motion, made by Mr. D. R. Williams, was agreed to without a division:
Resolved, That the Secretary of the Navy be directed to lay before this House an estimate of the respective sums necessary to be appropriated for repair of vessels, store rent, pay of armorers, freight, and contingent expenses of the Navy for the year 1806.
Friday, April 11.
Exclusion of Military and Naval Officers from Civil Employment.
The bill to prohibit officers of the Army and Navy of the United States from holding or exercising any civil office, was read a third time.
Mr. Gregg said he never found himself involved in greater difficulty. He was in favor of the principle involved in the bill, and yet he could not vote for its passage. He believed that it was a correct principle that civil and military offices should be kept distinct, and he wished the constitution had prohibited the union. In relation to the individual on whom it was mentioned yesterday this law was to operate, he was satisfied it would be best if he could be removed from one of the offices he held; and if such a course had been pursued, he should have been in favor of destroying the office of brigadier-general to get rid of the officer. The effect of this resolution would be to take from a man an office which he held under the constitution. This power they did not possess. The only constitutional way to effect the object was to destroy the office. He would agree likewise to amend the constitution, so as to declare the union of civil and military office incompatible, or to a law providing that after a certain time no person should hold two such offices; and he should, if practicable, be for doing away the office of Governor of Louisiana, because he believed the person holding that office was, by his course of proceedings, producing a disturbance in the Territory. But although he entertained a favorable opinion of the principle of the bill, and would wish to remove that gentleman from one of the offices he held, yet he must vote against the bill, as it went to the unconstitutional removal of an officer.
Mr. Smilie thought the passage of this bill involved a principle of a very serious nature. As to the abstract principle involved in the bill, he did not dispute its correctness, or that it ought to have been a part of the constitution. But the question was, whether they had a right by a legislative act, to prejudice any other branch of the Government. They were not in his opinion warranted in travelling out of their own sphere to remove existing evils. There was but one way in which the constitution provided for the removal of a public officer. It says “the President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” Here was the true and only sphere in which the House could move. If the constitution did not give the right of removal in any other way, it did not exist; and if they undertook by a legislative act to remove a man constitutionally appointed, who would pretend to say what mischief might not result from it? For these reasons he should vote against the bill.
Mr. Quincy said it appeared to him that one of the arguments urged by gentlemen against this bill was fallacious—that which considered it an invasion of the rights of the Executive. This argument went on the assumption that the President would necessarily sign the bill sent to him, which might or might not be the fact. If he accedes to it, the argument of gentlemen falls to the ground; and if it shall be returned, it will then be time enough to discuss the constitutional principle. With regard to the general expediency of passing such a bill, the strongest arguments would be found in favor of it on the page of history. If history proved any thing, it was that the condition of those was most degraded who lived under the colonial governments of Republics. This was amply proved by the annals of the Carthaginian and Roman Republics. The territory under contemplation was a kind of colonial government, and might in the course of time be a powerful engine in the hands of the Executive. He wished, therefore, for a separation of the civil and military powers which might arise under it.
Mr. Smilie said if the question was what was most convenient or best, he should have no difficulty in agreeing with the gentleman from Massachusetts. But it rested on higher ground—on what was constitutional. If he had a right to make the constitution, he would have no hesitation in separating the civil and military powers. But he could not forget the occurrences which had taken place in the State he had the honor to represent in part. In that State there had been but a single branch of the Legislature without any Executive veto on the passage of the laws. He had seen that Government destroyed by sweeping away the Executive power before the irresistible authority of the Legislature, and he had seen the people obliged, from this circumstance, to give up that constitution and frame a new one. The measure under consideration was of the same kind. The constitutional powers of the Executive ought not to be encroached upon, unless the object was to produce confusion. He had seen the effects of such measures, and deprecated them. You may, said Mr. S., abolish the office, and the officer falls with it; but in no other way, while the office continues, can you remove the officer except by impeachment. Shall we, then, in order to get rid of a man who may not have done right (and as for myself I am ready to answer I have no affection for the man) go into a new scene, the length of which we cannot foresee? This principle once established may lead to any thing; it may lead to a destruction of the powers of the Executive altogether. I am as tenacious of the powers of the Legislature as any man, but I believe the powers of the Executive to be equally necessary. Indeed, I think there is more danger to be apprehended from the overwhelming power of the Legislature, than from the powers of the Executive. For the Legislature is so powerful that there can be little danger of the Executive encroaching upon it.