Mr. Eppes.—If I took the same view of the operation of this law with the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I should certainly give it my negative. As, however, I voted for the resolution on which it is founded, and consider the law in conformity with the resolution, I will assign, in a few words, the reasons which will govern my vote.
We have been told that all the departments of Government are independent of each other. No man denies the correctness of this principle. Let us not interfere with the constitutional rights of the other departments, nor abandon our own. The Executive has by the constitution the right of nominating for office any citizen of the United States, whether an officer of the Army and Navy, or not. This being a constitutional right, he certainly cannot be deprived of it by law; the right remains, and may be exercised if the law passes; the law merely severs the civil and military offices, and leaves the military officer to decide whether he will vacate his military command by holding or accepting a civil office; the Executive will have the same right to appoint—the individual will have the same right to accept the civil office as heretofore, but the acceptance vacates his command in the Army or Navy. If, then, the Executive right to appoint, and the right of the officer to accept, remains after the passage of this law, how can gentlemen contend that the constitutional right of appointment is narrowed? All the difficulty on the present occasion arises from the law being made to bear on the constitutional right of appointment. It is intended to operate only on offices in the Army or Navy which are created by law, to the tenure of which we may annex such conditions as the public good may require. Under the constitution we have a right to prescribe rules for the government of the Army or Navy. In passing this law we add a new clause to the articles of war, viz: That an officer of the Army or Navy shall not hold or accept a civil office. Do gentlemen really suppose that we have no right to make this rule? If we can say that an officer shall not get drunk, that he shall have short hair, a coat of a certain form; that he shall not absent himself from his duty; or if we can in fact annex any other condition calculated to ensure to the public his services, why may we not declare by law that he shall not hold or accept a civil office, he shall forfeit his military command? The public welfare is the basis of the rules for the government of the Army and Navy; we have a right to prescribe such rules as the public good requires, and it is our duty to establish such as will ensure to us the services of our military officers in that station to which they are appointed.
But we are told we are about to remove from office a civil officer by law. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has read the clause of the constitution which provides for the removal of civil officers by impeachment. This law is not to operate on civil but on military officers; civil officers, it is true, are removed by impeachment—military officers by such forms as we think proper to prescribe by law; the operation of this law will be precisely the same with any other new rule prescribed for the government of the Army or Navy. Suppose we were to pass a law that any officer found drunk after the 1st of July next shall forfeit his office—his having been drunk before would not subject him to the penalty of the law—but his being drunk after the first of July next would deprive him of his office. Apply this to the case of a civil officer. An officer of the Army or Navy having accepted a civil office, or holding a civil office, does not at present vacate his military office; the reason is obvious—there is no law against it. If, however, after the first of July next, he accepts or continues to hold a civil office, he forfeits his military command under the new article of war which this law establishes. The law severs the two offices, declares them incompatible with each other, and leaves the individual free to make his election. As to the general principle that the civil and military ought to be separate and distinct, I have no doubt. If the principle is correct, the law ought to extend to all cases, not only such as may hereafter arise, but to those which at present exist.
Mr. Stanford supported, and Messrs. Findlay and Sloan opposed the bill; when the question was taken by yeas and nays on the passage of the bill—yeas 64, nays 34, as follows:
Yeas.—Willis Alston, Isaac Anderson, Burwell Bassett, George M. Bedinger, Silas Betton, John Blake, jr., Thomas Blount, William Butler, Levi Casey, John Claiborne, Christopher Clark, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay, John Dawson, Elias Earle, Peter Early, James Elliot, Caleb Ellis, William Ely, John W. Eppes, James M. Garnett, Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Seth Hastings, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, Michael Leib, Matthew Lyon, Duncan McFarland, Robert Marion, Josiah Masters, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, John Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Thomas Newton, jr., Gideon Olin, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, Jacob Richards, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Martin G. Schuneman, John Cotton Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Thomas Spalding, Richard Stanford, Lewis B. Sturges, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Philip R. Thompson, Thomas W. Thompson, Uri Tracy, Abram Trigg, Robert Whitehill, David R. Williams, Alexander Wilson, Richard Wynn, and Joseph Winston.
Nays.—David Bard, Joseph Barker, Barnabas Bidwell, John Chandler, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, Ezra Darby, Ebenezer Elmer, William Findlay, John Fowler, Andrew Gregg, Isaiah L. Green, James Kelly, William McCreery, Jeremiah Nelson, Timothy Pitkin, jr., John Pugh, John Rea of Tennessee, John Russell, Peter Sailly, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, Henry Southard, Joseph Stanton, David Thomas, Philip Van Cortlandt, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Joseph B. Varnum, Peleg Wadsworth, John Whitehill, Eliphalet Wickes, Marmaduke Williams, and Nathan Williams.
Saturday, April 12.
Naval Appropriations.
The bill making appropriations for the support of the Navy was read the third time.
Mr. J. C. Smith moved to recommit it, for the purpose of restoring the provision for completing the marine barracks at the city of Washington, the amount of expense attending which, he understood, had been already partly expended.