It has been asserted that this was an electioneering scheme, and that as soon as our Spring elections were over, no more would be thought of it until the next election. I wish, sir, to put this question to eternal rest, by stating the plain matter of fact. Why, sir, it has been considered of so serious a nature in its consequences, and of so much importance, that the Legislature of the State of New York, in their last session, did enter into formal resolutions, instructing their delegation, in both branches of the Legislature of the United States, to use their utmost endeavors for the defence and protection of the port and harbor of New York: the whole State is alive on this subject—and the memorials now lying on your table from the Mayor and Corporation of that city, together with the petitions from the citizens of all political parties, tend to one and the same object, protection to their persons and to their property; there is not, there cannot be any dissenting voice with them on this subject.
Mr. J. Randolph was too unwell to go far into the subject, but he would ask the House whether they were acting with their accustomed caution and distrust, where the expenditure of public money was involved? He thought not. If he were convinced that the expenditure of $150,000 or even $1,500,000 would answer the proposed end, he would cheerfully give it. But, as had been observed, the system of gunboats was matter of experiment, and if they should eventually turn out good for nothing, the House would be of opinion that they had vested as large a capital in a worthless project as would be deemed necessary. He would not undertake to say that they were good for nothing—far from it. But there was no information before the House which entitled him to say they were good for much. When you compare, said Mr. R., the lavish appropriation made on this subject in Committee of the Whole, and view the economy this House always practises on every branch of expenditure, relative to the regular army and navy, looking with an eagle eye on every dollar before they part with it—it surprises me to see them voting away hundreds of thousands of dollars for a species of vessel, which, in all human probability, may be used for river craft in a few years. One thing has been ascertained. Ships of war are defensive and offensive, too, but the House will vote no money for an addition to them. I do not censure them for it; but if they will not appropriate for objects, the physical powers of which are ascertained, why vote the public treasure by handfuls for vessels, the powers of which have never been tried? Let the experiment be made, and, if it succeeds, let us appropriate liberally; but, till then, let us not vote more money than has been already appropriated. I believe there is one situation in which they may be useful—in the Mississippi. I wish, however, not to be understood as speaking as a man of science on this business. I only wish some evidence of the value of this machine, before I vest so large a capital in it. I hope, therefore, that the blank will not be filled with $150,000. As it has been stated, I think it will be extremely disproportionate to vote $20,000 for the fortification of all our harbors, and $150,000 for gunboats.
Mr. Elmer said that, under existing circumstances, he was opposed to appropriating 150,000 dollars to building additional gunboats. The House had determined that they would not authorize the President to man those already built. It appeared to him very bad economy to suffer the public vessels to lie in dock, and to build other vessels, the utility of which was not ascertained. There might be situations in which gunboats would be useful, but had they not enough of them already? If it should be ascertained that thirty or forty gunboats should be wanted for any particular purpose, Mr. E. said it might be prudent to authorize their erection. He said he had been in favor of giving authority to the President to man and equip the armed vessels and gunboats. The House had, however, refused this. If, then, they would not authorize the President, whatever the emergency, to man the present vessels, why build additional vessels?
Mr. Holland was opposed to filling the blank with so large a sum. He was also opposed to giving authority to man the armed vessels. The nation was in a state of profound peace, and he did not see that these vessels would have any thing to do. He was opposed to this appropriation on another ground. He believed, whenever the necessity should occur, they would be able, in one, two, or three months, to build as many gunboats as would be wanted.
Mr. Gregg said, from the discussions which had taken place, and the votes of the House, there might be a propriety in postponing the business for the purpose of obtaining information. For his own part, he was willing to acknowledge that he was altogether in the dark. He did not know in what situation gunboats would be useful, or the number of men required to man them; nor did he know whether land fortifications were necessary, in connection with them, to defend the port of New York. Before he could act understandingly on the subject, it was necessary for him to have this information. Some gentlemen say that gunboats will answer valuable purposes, while there are others of opinion that there are so few places, on the coast of the United States, where they will answer, that a small number of them will be sufficient. I believe, said Mr. G., under these circumstances, that it will be best to postpone the further consideration of the subject, and, in the mean time, call on the Secretary of the Navy to say at what points gunboats will answer, together with the number of them necessary, and on the Secretary at War to say whether he is in possession of any plan for the protection of New York, together with its expense and the number of men required. It will be next to madness to erect fortifications without putting in them sufficient men to keep them in repair. Many fortifications, commenced some years ago, for want of this provision, are now as useless as if they never had been begun. Mr. G. said he was particularly desirous to obtain information from the Executive as to the practicability of defending the port of New York. If it could be defended, he would not be backward on the subject.
Mr. Fisk hoped the motion would prevail. Experience had proved gunboats to be useful. In their late war with Tripoli, they had been obliged to borrow a number of them, which had proved not only an instrument of defence, but likewise of offence. It was true, also, that, in other cases, they would be useful. Indeed, they appeared to be peculiarly adapted to the United States, who had a large extent of seacoast and numbers of shoals, enabling them to act with effect; that they would rot in time was true; it was also equally true that other shipping would rot; and that the loss of fifty or sixty gunboats would not be equal to that of a single frigate. It was also equally true that gunboats did not require the same expense in manning and equipping as other vessels; they were also so situated as to be capable of being instantly manned, which was not the case in regard to other vessels. The Secretary of the Navy had stated the number of men necessary for each gunboat at twenty-seven. Take three hundred and fifty men as necessary for a frigate; of course thirteen gunboats will not require more men than one frigate. Mr. F. said he thought gunboats, in every point of view, the preferable defence. The Secretary of the Navy had stated sixty gunboats to be requisite. For the purpose, however, of accommodation, it is proposed to lessen the number of gunboats to thirty, and to apply the remaining sum to fortifications. He hoped this motion would prevail.
Mr. Early moved to postpone the further consideration of the second resolution to Monday week. In common with other members, he felt the necessity of information, before he agreed to carry further the system of gunboat defence. It appeared from the report of the Secretary of the Navy, that there were built, or on the stocks, seventy gunboats. He, for one, was of the opinion that this was a number amply sufficient to justify the requiring at least some information on the subject, either as to the ports capable of being defended by them, or their general capability of yielding defence to the United States.
The motion to postpone was disagreed to—ayes 49, noes 58.
Mr. G. W. Campbell said he was in favor of filling the blank with $150,000, as from all the official information before the House this appeared to be the best mode of defence which had been devised. He observed that some time since a majority of the House had considered the gunboat system as the best means of defence. He would ask gentlemen who were then in favor of this system, and were now opposed to it, what reasons they had for their change of opinion. If the President and Heads of Departments were of opinion that such a number of gunboats was necessary as had been named, he would ask them what reasons they had for thinking a smaller number sufficient, and whether the mere ipse dixit of a member of this House ought to stand in competition with the deliberate opinion of the heads of departments? They were peculiarly responsible to the nation, and must be considered as having taken more pains to inform themselves on such a subject than an individual member of the House.