This view of the subject is certainly sufficient to satisfy this House, that their security for this great privilege is, at least, uncertain; and is not this reason enough, for this Legislature to commence an inquiry into the nature of that security, and the additional provisions it requires? This at present is the only question.
But the gentlemen ask “What need of further penalties? If the judge refuses the writ, is there not impeachment? Against the person illegally imprisoning another, is not an action for damages?” I answer: Both these securities for the personal liberty of the citizen existed, and do still exist in England, as fully as they do here, yet was it ever before heard that these were reasons against enacting that celebrated statute of Charles, or were ever urged as evidence that its provisions were needless, or useless? The penalties of that statute are guarantees of the liberties of the citizen, additional to those which result from the law and the constitution. The principle of that statute is, to rest satisfied with nothing short of the actual liberation of the person from illegal imprisonment, in the shortest time possible. To this end all its provisions tend. It will not leave a citizen to languish in prison, in expectation of the result of the slow progress of legislative inquisition, or for the purpose of ultimately qualifying him to receive a heavy compensation in damages. Impeachment is always a dubious, and an action for false imprisonment often an inadequate security for the observance of the writ of habeas corpus. Great violations of the privilege of this writ can never happen, unless in times of great violence. In such times, what hope of an impeachment against a judge who abuses his authority in coincidence with the views of a prevailing party? And as to damages, is personal liberty to be estimated by money? And if it were, what certainty that the person guilty of the illegal arrest will be competent to pay the damages recovered? In the case of seizure by a military power, can it ever be expected, from the universal pecuniary deficiencies of the soldiers, that damages will be realized, even should the civil arm be competent to enforce an execution?
The penalties affixed by the statute of Charles, on the contrary, assure the obedience of the courts and officers of justice, independent of all party influences which may happen to prevail in the nation, and secure personal liberty by pecuniary perils, suspended over the heads of men, whose situation in society is such as, in general, makes the attainment of the penalty certain, should it be incurred. Upon the whole, those who oppose the present motion seem to me to be reduced to this dilemma; either they must acknowledge that they are content that the citizens of these United States should possess less security for their liberties than the subjects of the law of England enjoy for theirs, or they are reduced to the necessity of adopting the doctrine that the statute penalties of another country may by construction become the laws of this nation; than which, I can conceive nothing more monstrous or absurd.
In this discussion it has been my wish to avoid all notice of the party and personal invectives which have been uttered. The question is too important to be mingled with feelings and passions of these descriptions. And the circumstances of the times and of the nation, seem to me to claim from us a contempt for these local and ephemeral distinctions.
Mr. Newton.—I presume I may be permitted, notwithstanding the motion has been tried, to go fully into the subject before the House. I hope this House will not indefinitely postpone it. If ever there was a subject within the attention of an enlightened Legislature, it is the subject before us. Every subject that regards the liberty of the citizen should be received with reverence and respect by the votaries of liberty. If we can better the situation of the people of the United States, and keep from them, under all circumstances, the hand of oppression, it is our duty to do it, and to pay attention to whatever is likely to eventuate in such an issue. I shall not consider this case as the basis of an impeachment. The only true inquiry at present is, whether the writ of habeas corpus is sufficiently fortified by legislative provisions? I will not commit my understanding so far as to decide on the conduct of the Commander-in-chief. If he has done wrong, let him be answerable to the laws of his country; much less will I talk of indemnifying him. For this reason, because the jury before which the case may come, may, under such circumstances, have regard, not to his circumstances, but to the Treasury of the United States.
My friend and colleague, from Virginia, has offered a most important amendment to this resolution. The Supreme Court of the United States, after having this all-important case for a long time under advisement, and after an argument from the bar, are again afloat on the ocean of uncertainty, have started some new doubts, and have asked the gentlemen of the bar to come forward with a new argument. If this is the fact, does it not show the necessity of our attending to the subject; and of some new legislative provisions upon it? I am for defining the power of our courts. I wish to understand the extent of their prerogatives; and particularly whether they have appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases; before whom criminals are to be brought; who are to grant writs of habeas corpus, and admit to bail?
These are all considerations of importance, and constitute the reasons which induce me to vote for referring this resolution to a select committee. But, say gentlemen, we cannot mature this subject this session. Perhaps so; but is this a sufficient reason for not commencing the investigation, for comparing our ideas on the subject, and going forward as far as we can in our progress towards a decision? I, for one, shall always be in favor of an inquiry into subjects that have a reference to personal liberty.
This subject has been spread over an immense extent of ground. The single point, however, at issue, is, whether we will commit this resolution, in order merely to obtain correct facts and information, which shall present the subject in such a form as shall enable us to act understandingly upon it. I am not at present in favor of acting definitively upon it; but merely for inquiry. So circumstanced, I presume our proceedings cannot injure any individuals implicated in this business, as nothing we can do can have a retrospective effect. These are my reasons for voting in favor of the present motion.
Mr. J. Randolph.—There has been a dispute in the world from time immemorial between wit and dullness—between imagination and judgment. So we have been told, though some who cultivate the sceptical philosophy dispute it. But this impression has been so long attempted to be made, that there is not a precise or formal coxcomb that does not on the score of dullness arrogate to himself judgment and profound wisdom. While I am willing to allow that declamation, or the powers of an effervescent imagination, are no evidences of wisdom, the House must admit that the mere dullness of a special pleader without his accuracy does not imply any pretensions to knowledge. The truth is, that on this as on other subjects, it has been my misfortune to come to the House too unprepared. I knew nothing of the subject until it was brought under discussion. I got up yesterday, as I have to-day, to say what first came into my head, and in this way I hope I shall be permitted to go on.
I consider the whole of this business as one of the most unfortunate kind that could have happened to the United States. If we had acquired Louisiana by force of arms or conquest, we could scarcely have inspired the people of that country with greater indignation than by these events—in which it is yet to be seen whether these people are at all concerned; or whether they are not standing like sheep, suffering the wolves to pass without disturbance—events which must sow the seeds of lasting misfortune, unless healed by a timely interposition of the Government. And nothing can have a more fatal effect than any thing done by this House, or the other part of the Government, to sanction the conduct of the Commander-in-chief, taking it to be such as is ascribed to him. As a member of this House I am free to give my opinion of what would restore peace to that country—though out of doors I might not do it. The first step ought to be the immediate recall of every man directly or indirectly concerned in this business. You can hardly suppose, sir, that I look forward to be made their Governor, or desire on my recommendation to introduce a friend to that place. But I have no hesitation in saying that unless some such step be taken, the attachment of that country to the United States is lost for ever. I would take such a step boldly—I would know nothing of their little disputes; I would act with the authority of a venerable parent, who, on returning home, found his children by the ears. I would correct them all, I would discountenance at once all such intrigues—I would recall every man who has directly or indirectly participated, or is suspected of having participated in them—I would, in short, rub out and begin again. It is an extremely unfortunate thing that the people of New Orleans, for the most part speaking the French language, a great part of them attached to the Crown of Spain—transferred to the United States by an honorable purchase—told they were about to taste the sweets of a Government of laws—told that arbitrary notions and lettres de cachet were to be proscribed—that the constitution was not to be departed from, but that they were to enjoy all the blessings of citizens of the United States—it is extremely unfortunate that New Orleans should be the first place in which a lesson of military despotism should be taught. I deem it extremely unfortunate—it cannot tend to attach those people to the United States; it will, however, have another tendency—it will prevent every man of character from emigrating to that country, and instead of mixing the Americans with the French, the latter will be kept as a distinct class. For will any man, having the least regard to his rights, go to a place where he will be seized by a military commandant? Suppose, Mr. Speaker, such a thing had taken place in your country or mine. The military would not at this period be before the court—the spirit of the country would have long since settled the question. I recollect in 1798 or 1799, when the officers of the army were following their legal avocation of enlisting recruits, such was the spirit of detestation in which a standing army was held in my district, that these men were obliged to break up and move off. That spirit would scarcely endure the legal act of a man acting under legal authority, and yet we have now an apology for men acting in direct contravention of legal authority. Will any man point out a good cause for this change?