The writ of habeas corpus is the only writ sanctioned by the constitution. It is guarded from every approach except by the two Houses of Congress; and yet this writ, thus acknowledged, thus specially designated, this second Magna Charta, as it has been called, is to be put on the footing of a common trespass. Really, when a man tells me that if imprisoned I may get damages, it requires no ghost to come and tell us that this may be done even without the writ of habeas corpus. But will gentlemen point to any legislative sanction by which the execution of this writ is guarded? Perhaps action on the case might be sustained for disobeying it; but suppose a judge should deny it. Impeach him, say gentlemen. But will gentlemen rely on that? That affords no certain punishment, and an uncertain punishment is inadequate. We want a certain and adequate remedy.
I stated that I would make a military officer, acting under his own responsibility, acting as commander-in-chief, punishable with death for such an infraction. Did I, in saying so, also say that I would punish an inferior officer with death? Will any man deny that a military character arraying himself against the constitution of his country is worthy of death? I say he is a traitor. A commander-in-chief of an army, who, on his own responsibility, puts the constitution and laws of his country at defiance, is a traitor; and, supposing the case stated at New Orleans to be correctly stated, the Commander-in-chief is as much a traitor as any other man concerned in the conspiracy. Who are these traitors? Burr & Co. What are they about to do? To put down the civil authority by military force; and is there any substantial difference whether the civil authority is trampled under foot by Burr and his banditti, or by a commander-in-chief and his regular army? I will go farther. Suppose these measures for putting down Burr shall eventually prove to have been measures for putting up somebody else, in what will these men differ? In nothing. If the commander of an army, to give himself a false eclat, shall trample the constitution under foot, shall go a certain length with conspirators, and finding his ground no longer tenable, shall determine to make up in zeal what he wanted in fidelity, he is guilty of treachery to the constitution and laws—he is guilty of more—he is guilty of violating the principle respected by knaves—the principle of fidelity to each other.
The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Quincy) has stated the difference that exists between the right of the writ of habeas corpus and the remedy. He has correctly stated that it is not intended as a remedy—not to allow an action for false imprisonment—but to prevent false imprisonment, and therefore that it ought to be guarded by sanctions. But the gentleman has omitted to mention one circumstance, which is, that in England the writ of habeas corpus is secured by the sanction of death. And is our attachment to liberty less than that of England? I say that a Chief Justice of England for refusing to issue a writ of habeas corpus, may be impeached, taken to Tower Hill and decollated. If there had existed the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in England at the time of the impeachment of Strafford, could there have been a charge more strong than a settled design to do away that privilege? In England also it is guarded by the power of attainder. Thank God! we have not that feature in our constitution. But if the same spirit pervades that country now which once did, nothing would sooner pass a bill of attainder, through the two Houses of Parliament, than a known and wanton invasion of this privilege. But fortunately our constitution has denied to us this power; and it is because we cannot pass bills of attainder, and because judgments on impeachments do not affect the life, that it behooves us to guard this important principle with some more solemn sanctions than it now possesses.
Mr. J. Clay said, before the question was taken, he would mention one or two points that went to show the necessity of a reference. He understood that one of the persons arrested by General Wilkinson had been landed on an island near Charleston, and, on the issuing a writ, the officer had refused to obey it. He would ask whether this was not a violation of the writ of habeas corpus that required a remedy by law? Mr. C. said he always viewed it as a matter of regret, that questions of this kind should be taken up on party ground. He considered such a suggestion, on the present occasion, as a mere trap to get a few votes. They were told of the dark times when alien and sedition laws were passed. If, however, under the alien law, men might be deported, gentlemen should recollect that it was according to law—that there was an express statute that justified the measure. Mr. C. said he considered the kidnapping alluded to by gentlemen as a gross violation of the habeas corpus, and would be glad to know whether sending a man to Baltimore from Orleans, was not as gross a violation of principle as sending him from this place to Orleans? Mr. C. concluded by observing that he considered it a very unfortunate thing for any gentleman of talents to be educated at the bar. So many distinctions were there taken, that a man of his plain mind could scarcely see any thing. He should, however, adhere to the constitution, and would ask whether a military arrest was not a gross violation of it; and whether there ought not to be some exemplary punishment to guard against it?
Mr. Elmer said he should vote for the postponement of the resolution. It had been under discussion for three days, and he did not perceive they were nearer a result than on the first day. Was it discreet to refer this resolution to a select committee, when it was manifest they could not go through the business without neglecting important business already before them? He should also vote for the postponement, as, although three days had been taken up in the discussion, he had not heard any one gentleman urge a single reason to show the necessity of any additional provisions. This very transaction, he believed, would ultimately turn out beneficial to the United States, notwithstanding the arts of ambitious men. It would display such a striking regard of the people to the government of their choice, as to prevent any like attempts in future. Mr. E. said he did not know whether General Wilkinson was a conspirator, but in this case he did not see that the constitution had been so flagrantly violated. Take the case of a conspiracy against the constitution, to level and destroy the constitution altogether, and directed towards the garrison which General Wilkinson commanded, in a remote part of the United States, and distant from any strength to support him. If we consider the question in this view, that the lives and property of the citizens were at stake, and even the judges engaged with the conspirators, was it improper to take up these men and send them to a place where they could be impartially tried? Let gentlemen, said Mr. E., pass as sanguinary laws as they please, if I considered the judges concerned, and were satisfied there were conspirators within, I would arrest them, though death were the consequence, and I am persuaded every officer faithful to his trust, would do the same thing. I admit that in all cases, except of the greatest emergency, the military ought to give way to the civil power. With regard, however, to what gentlemen call the audacity of sending these people here, in the face of the legislative body, I confess I entertain a different opinion. In cases of military arrest, I am most afraid of secrecy. Does not publicity, as far as it goes, show a good conscience? Does it not show the wish of the Commander-in-chief that his conduct should be examined in the face of the nation, conscious that, on a full examination, he will appear to have acted as a good officer and an honest man? As I have said before, I do not know that he is honest. I know that he has been charged with being a conspirator, but on this point we have no proof before us.
Mr. Kelly said, in order to obtain a right understanding of the subject, it is necessary to inquire how this inestimable privilege was secured to the subjects of Great Britain by Magna Charta, the great charter of their privileges, which was extorted sword in hand by the Lords and Barons, from King John at Runnymede, and how far the privilege thus secured, was made more effectual by the statute of Charles II., which was called the second great charter of their liberties. This writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which was secured by this charter, became a writ of right, not less secured to the subjects of that kingdom than the same is secured to our citizens by our constitution.
We are informed by Sir William Blackstone, in his famous commentaries on the English law, that the inestimable privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was of early date in Great Britain, almost coëval with the first rudiments of their constitution. The liberty of the subject could not be abridged in any case without special permission of law, although sometimes impaired by the usurpation of princes and the ferocity of particular times. It was, however, established on the firmest basis by the provisions of Magna Charta, and a long succession of statutes under Edward III., and was recognized by the Crown in several after reigns. And it will hardly be contended that this privilege is better secured to the citizens of the United States by our constitution, than the same was secured to the subjects of the British Crown by the provisions of Magna Charta. Yet abuses had crept into daily practice in England, which had in a great measure defeated this great constitutional remedy. The flagrant abuse of power by the Crown, generally, produced a struggle which discovered the exercise of that power to be contrary to law, or restrained it for the future. An obscure individual gave birth to the famous habeas corpus act in the reign of Charles II., which was justly called another Magna Charta of the kingdom. Francis Jenkes was committed by the Council Board for a turbulent speech made at a common hall assembled at Guildhall, for the purpose of choosing officers. He applied to the then Lord Chief Justice Kaimsford for a habeas corpus, who alleged that he could not grant the writ in vacation. The friends of the prisoner afterwards applied to the Lord Chancellor, who said the king would not grant it without a petition; application was afterwards made to the court of quarter sessions to have him bailed; the court said, there was no such name in the calendar; upon application to the jailer, he said he never returned any man committed by the Council Board. When a copy of the commitment was obtained, the jailer evaded making proof of it by going away, as was believed with the privity of the court; at length, the commitment being established, the court doubted their power to act, when the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor had refused, the court took time to consider of the application until next term. A petition was afterwards presented to the Lord Chancellor, who also took further time to consider; at length the Lord Chief Justice, upon the matter being suggested to the King, issued a habeas corpus, and the prisoner was discharged. To prevent similar abuses in future was the famous habeas corpus act passed, which regulated the mode of proceeding upon writs of habeas corpus, and fully ensured its benefits and provisions to the subject.
The question on indefinite postponement was then taken by yeas and nays, and carried—yeas 60, nays 58.