“——Trifles, light as air,
Are, to the jealous, confirmations strong
As proofs of holy writ.”
The truth of this is remarkably verified in the case before us. Is there not some reasons to apprehend that there has been too great a disposition to convert suspicion into proof? Ought we not to be on our guard when it is proved that there has been a powerful combination of men, calling themselves a republican society, to ruin Mr. Smith, the individuals of which, when called before a magistrate to testify, declare that they are bound to secrecy by a solemn obligation to the society, which is paramount to their oath, when sworn as witnesses, and which will not admit of their disclosing any facts, or their proceedings, any farther than they are permitted to be made public by the society? And in sundry of the depositions on your table they have accordingly refused to answer questions, and in some instances to testify at all. Such a society disgraces the name of Republican, by acting on principles tyrannical and oppressive.
Mr. Giles.—Mr. President: I am called upon as a member of this Senate to pronounce an opinion upon the following resolution:
“Resolved, That John Smith, a Senator from the State of Ohio, by his participation in the conspiracy of Aaron Burr, against the peace, union, and liberties of the people of the United States, has been guilty of conduct incompatible with his duty and station as a Senator of the United States, and that he be therefor, and hereby is, expelled from the Senate of the United States.”
A declaration upon this subject ought not to be made but upon the most attentive examination of the evidence produced in the case, and the most mature deliberation thereupon. The sentence to be pronounced is important to the justice of the United States; but more particularly so to the reputation of the person accused; it will have also an inseparable influence upon that of his family. To him and them its effects are all-important. The resolution solemnly and unequivocally asserts, that John Smith, &c., participated in the conspiracy of Aaron Burr. Before I can make this assertion, I must have some evidence of the fact. I must acknowledge, that upon the most attentive examination of all the papers, and the most respectful attention to all the arguments in the case, I have not been able to discover any satisfactory evidence of that fact. Yesterday I paid great attention to the eloquent, dignified and candid observations of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Adams), both as to the jurisdiction of the Senate to inquire into this case, and the evidence exhibited in support of the charges against the accused. The gentleman from Massachusetts, I am perfectly convinced, has been influenced in the whole course of this inquiry by the purest and most laudable motives; and I think he is justly entitled to the thanks of the Senate for the judicious conduct he has recommended to be pursued. I perfectly concur with that gentleman in opinion, on the point of jurisdiction; and upon a retrospect of the whole proceedings of the Senate, I am happy to say, that it appears to me the best course for the purposes of justice has been pursued that could have been devised in the novel and difficult case presented for consideration. A liberal indulgence has been given to the accused to procure testimony in his defence; and the witnesses implicated have been protected from injury, by requiring that they should have notice of the time and place of taking all depositions affecting their credibility. The only ground of difference in opinion between the gentleman from Massachusetts and myself is, in the interpretation of the evidence in the case. I shall state the points of difference between us upon this subject, without any other argument than what may be necessary to explain the reasons of this difference.
The first point of difference relates to the declarations of Aaron Burr. From these declarations, although general in their nature, and in no instance made in relation to the accused, inferences of guilt are attached to him. In almost every case, to apply the declarations of one man to the condemnation of another, would not be a just rule of evidence; in this case, it would be peculiarly unjust. Because it is well known that Burr was in the constant habit of making misrepresentations in relation to other persons, and that he was influenced by a particular motive in doing so. He appeared to consider that as one of the most effectual means to enhance the importance and promote the success of his enterprise. If his declarations are to be admitted as evidence against other persons, they would apply to some of the most respectable citizens of the United States as well as to the accused, which it is not pretended would be just or correct in relation to them; and I can see nothing in his observations bearing on the case of Mr. Smith, that would not apply with a greater force against others, who are neither implicated nor suspected. I therefore put Burr’s declarations entirely out of the case, and disregard all inferences drawn from them.
The next point of difference between the gentleman and myself, arises from a suggested inconsistency between the letters, the affidavits, and the answer of Mr. Smith. I have paid particular attention to these papers, connected with the remark made by the gentleman, and am unable to discover the inconsistency suggested. They appear to me to be substantially the same. The remark was, that in one of these papers Mr. Smith states, that Burr did not disclose to him any of his objects; in another he admitted that he did disclose to him his object of settling his Washita lands. The remark which occurs to me in reply is, that Mr. Smith merely states an immaterial fact in one paper, which he omits in another, as unnecessary. In this I see neither contradiction nor inconsistency. But the real explanation of this incidental circumstance will be found in the papers themselves. The one omitting the fact in question, in speaking of the objects of Burr, evidently alludes to the unlawful objects of which he has since been accused, and which did not comprehend the settlement of the Washita lands. This circumstance, therefore, must in any point of view be deemed trivial unless connected with some other of more importance; and according to my explanation of it of no consequence at all. I would here remark, that the fact asserted in the resolution, is susceptible of the clearest and most certain proof, and is of such a nature, that if Mr. Smith had committed it, it would be scarcely possible for him to escape detection by positive proof. I am therefore not satisfied to form my opinion on trivial circumstances, particularly when so easily and naturally susceptible of explanation, consistently with innocence. Mr. Smith’s own conduct is the sole criterion by which he ought to be judged. If this standard should once be departed from, and questionable incidents resorted to, instead of obtaining truth, we shall probably fall into error.
The gentleman from Massachusetts and myself, in our consideration of this case, concur in the entire exclusion of the testimony of Elias Glover and all the papers connected with it. We, in one respect, however, differ on this part of the subject. He read and relied upon the deposition of Major Riddle forwarded by Glover, which I exclude from all consideration—not because I know any thing injurious to the character of that gentleman; nor because I conceive the contents of the deposition incapable of explanation, consistently with the innocence of Mr. Smith; but on account of the manner of taking, and presenting it to the Senate. This deposition with others appears to have been taken and forwarded by Elias Glover, for the purpose of implicating Mr. Smith. They were taken without notice, and in the absence of Mr. Smith, although I believe he was at the time of taking them in the same town where they were taken. Some of these witnesses had been summoned to testify in his favor and in his presence—part of them refused to attend, part of them attended and refused to answer all questions put to them by Mr. Smith. I consider this conduct as such a departure from every thing that is just, fair, and honorable, and an evidence of such an incorrect state of mind in relation to Mr. Smith, that I do not think they are entitled to the respect of evidence in the examination of his case; I therefore exclude them altogether.