I consider this conduct as disrespectful to the Senate, and, on the part of Glover, altogether inexcusable. Because, when the Senate were informed that Mr. Smith intended to attempt to discredit the evidence of Glover, they imposed a positive condition on him, that Glover should have reasonable notice of the time and place of taking all depositions for that purpose; thus manifesting a laudable tenderness for his reputation, which he has strangely repaid in this disrespectful attempt upon the fairness, justice, and candor, of their proceedings. I cannot forbear making one more observation on the conduct of Elias Glover; he appears, throughout the whole of the depositions taken by him and in his presence, to endeavor to cover his own misconduct by enlisting in his favor the party feelings which he presumes to attribute to the Senate; thus he has invariably asked, whether he was not a zealous Republican, and firm supporter of this Administration? I consider this conduct as an unjustifiable and indelicate attack upon the justice and candor of the Senate, whilst it furnishes a poor apology for his own aberrations from the truth; it has a tendency, and must have been intended, upon a question of guilt or innocence, to draw the Senate from the immutable principle of justice and truth, as the standard of trial; and to substitute, in their stead, the dangerous touchstone of party sensibility. I have had too long experience of the correct motives which actuate the Senate in all their deliberations, to feel any apprehensions, in the present case, from these unfortunate attempts; but it is time the world should know that they are improperly applied, when addressed to the Senate of the United States.
Having candidly stated the impressions upon my mind made by the portion of the papers just alluded to, and the observations of the gentleman from Massachusetts thereupon, I will now proceed to examine the other papers more relied on by him, and entitled to more respect as evidence. The course the gentleman pursued was fair and candid, and well calculated to give a correct view of the conduct and object of the accused; I shall, therefore, pursue the same course, which was to take the facts in their chronological order. The first fact, in relation to Mr. Smith’s conduct, to which our attention has been called, was on the 4th of September, 1806. On this day Burr, having previously addressed a note of invitation to Mr. Smith, presented himself at Mr. Smith’s house, where he was hospitably received and entertained, until the tenth of the same month. Burr had, before this time, been at Blannerhasset’s Island, where it is probable, in concert with Blannerhasset, certain pieces, under the signature of the Querist, were written; and, about the time of Burr’s leaving the island, were published. The object of these pieces evidently was to make an experiment upon the disposition of the Western people, as to the separation of the Union, then certainly in the contemplation of Burr. It was an object near his heart, and, no doubt, deemed all-important to the success of his ambitious views. Mr. Smith states that this subject was never mentioned by Burr to him during his stay at Mr. Smith’s house, from the 4th to the 10th of September. The observation made upon this part of the evidence is, that it is strange that Burr should not have mentioned this subject, under the peculiar circumstances of the case. I concur perfectly in the observation. I think it strange that Burr should not have mentioned the subject; but am I to infer that he did mention it, merely because it is strange that he should not have mentioned it? Is its being strange that it did not happen, evidence of the fact that it did happen; particularly, when there is no other evidence of the fact, but all the evidence upon that point is against the fact? I will here make an observation, of a general nature, which has had great weight with me in forming my opinion upon the whole merits of this case. It is, that it does not appear, from any part of the evidence, that Burr deemed it prudent, at any time, to disclose his illicit objects to Mr. Smith; or that he ever considered Mr. Smith as a safe depositary of his secrets. This want of confidence in Mr. Smith, for his illicit objects, is discernible in many parts of the evidence, and this consideration alone lessens the presumption of Burr’s making the separation of the Union a subject of conversation whilst at Mr. Smith’s house. Burr, also, would naturally be cautious and reserved upon that subject, until the experiment, then about to be made on the people, should disclose itself, and some certain estimate be formed of its effects. Again, sir, whilst Mr. Smith has solemnly sworn that such conversation did not take place, and there is no evidence whatever to show that it did—there are other circumstances strongly supporting his assertion. It is known that Burr generally disclosed his plans to persons unfriendly to the Administration, and feeling strong excitements and irritations against it. He considered such persons only fit for his purposes. In this, however, much to the honor of American citizens, he was mistaken. But he had no reason to believe Mr. Smith was a person of this description. Very far otherwise. For, independent of Mr. Smith’s general attachment to the Administration, he held the dignified station of Senator, and a profitable contract under the Government: Burr had no reasonable expectation that Mr. Smith was ready to abandon these certain advantages for the uncertain prospects arising from Burr’s wicked and visionary projects; and, of course, would be cautious of making such an unpromising attempt; one which, if it failed, would subject him to certain and instantaneous detection. Another strong circumstance in favor of this conclusion, is derived from Burr’s letter to Mr. Smith, of the 20th of October, 1806. One of the expressions alluded to, is the following: “I have never written or published a line on this subject, (the separation of the Union,) nor ever expressed any other sentiments than those which you have heard from me in public companies at Washington and elsewhere, and in which, I think, you concurred.” Here is a direct reference to this subject, but it is not intimated that any conversation took place at Smith’s house in relation to it, but “in public companies at Washington and elsewhere.” As far, therefore, as mentioning the conversation as happening at other places, and omitting it as having happened at Mr. Smith’s house, upon a recent visit there, can go, it serves to show that such conversation, in all probability, did not take place there, and leaves a very strong inference in favor of Mr. Smith’s statement. Am I, then, to infer a fact of guilt against all these circumstances in favor of innocence? My mind is incapable of making such an inference. It would be, to convert the rules of the evidence of facts into improbable grounds of inducing suspicions—error, not truth, must be the consequence of such substitution.
The next evidence in point of time from which some circumstances of suspicion are inferred against Mr. Smith, is the testimony of Colonel James Taylor. To this evidence I concur with the gentleman from Massachusetts in paying great respect, because it was given with intelligence, candor, and circumspection, highly honorable to Colonel Taylor. The substance of his testimony is, that some short time after the 10th September, and after the pieces under the signature of the Querist had been published, and become the subject of general conversation, being in company with Mr. Smith and others, in Cincinnati, the sentiments avowed in those pieces became the subject of a particular conversation, in which, according to the impressions made on his mind, Mr. Smith advocated a separation of the Union; and he thought, not only delivered this opinion, as an opinion recommended by the Querist, but as his own. I differ in several important respects with the gentleman from Massachusetts as to the true explanation of this testimony, taken in connection with other evidence, bearing irresistibly upon the same point. In the first place, it is to be ascertained whether Mr. Smith really did express this opinion in the sense imputed to him by Colonel Taylor, or whether Colonel Taylor is not mistaken in that respect? And, in the next place, whether, if he did so express himself, it was done with any mischievous intent?—both these circumstances being necessary to constitute a criminal act. I am strongly inclined to think, indeed I am almost perfectly satisfied, that Colonel Taylor is mistaken in this particular point of his evidence. There is part of Colonel Taylor’s own evidence, which furnishes strong considerations for caution in interpreting the rest. The candor and circumspection observed by the deponent, in this particular point of evidence, is so honorable to him, that I beg leave to present it to the Senate in his own words. After answering many questions put to him by Mr. Smith, Colonel Taylor concludes his evidence with the following voluntary observation: “I beg leave further to state, that Mr. Smith has generally been viewed as a friendly, benevolent, worthy man, and his family, (consisting of an amiable wife and daughter, and several very promising sons,) have been considered entitled to, and held a place in the first circles of society in our quarter.”
What could have induced Colonel Taylor to make this observation upon closing his evidence? There is no doubt, sir, it was intended as a caution to the Senate in the interpretation of other circumstances, although related by himself. It evidently arose from a consciousness that those circumstances were vague and uncertain, and that his impressions of them might be mistaken. It was the spontaneous conviction of an amiable mind, laboring under an impression that innocence might become the victim of its own honest misconceptions. I will now state my reasons for the conviction that Colonel Taylor was mistaken in supposing that Mr. Smith spoke of the separation of the Union as an opinion of his own, and not as the opinion inculcated by the Querist.
The opinions expressed in the Querist had not only become the subject of general conversation, but were the subject of that particular conversation. Mr. Smith probably recited these opinions in an unguarded manner; and from that circumstance, it was not unnatural that Colonel Taylor’s impressions might have been formed. This appears from the deposition of Doctor Sellman, who was present at the same conversation; and swears expressly that he was induced to put this question to Mr. Smith, most probably from the unguarded manner of expressing himself: Are these your own opinions, or those expressed from the Querist? To which Mr. Smith replied, they were the opinions of the Querist, and not his own opinions; and added, that he deprecated a separation of the Union, and hoped to God never to live to see the day when that event should take place. Here is the positive evidence of Doctor Sellman to the particular fact in question; whereas Colonel Taylor speaks of the impression made on his mind by the whole tenor of the conversation. Colonel Taylor must therefore be mistaken, or Doctor Sellman wilfully forsworn. Would it be proper to make this presumption against Doctor Sellman? Who is Doctor Sellman? A gentleman of irreproachable character; the friend and brother-in-law of Colonel Taylor; and, I believe, the friend of the Government and of the Administration. Doctor Sellman does not stop here; he swears that he is in habits of intimacy with Mr. Smith, and that he never did, before or since that period, hear Mr. Smith express any opinion in favor of a separation of the Union, but has often heard him express opinions directly and positively against it. Does Colonel Taylor contradict this statement? No, sir, but confirms it. He also swears that he never heard Mr. Smith express that opinion at any other time before or since. Now, sir, as Colonel Taylor himself states that the pieces signed the Querist, were the subject of the conversation in question, and that he never before or since that time, heard Mr. Smith express analogous opinions with those of the Querist; and when Doctor Sellman swears positively, that during that particular conversation, he put the identical question to Mr. Smith, Are you speaking your own opinions, or those of the Querist?—and that he unequivocally answered, not his own, but those of the Querist; and also swears positively that he never did, before or since that time, hear Mr. Smith express analogous opinions to those of the Querist, but often the reverse—would it not be a strange perversion of the rules of evidence to say, that on that particular occasion alone, he expressed opinions in direct hostility with those expressed during the whole course of his life, both before and afterwards? But this is not all. This case furnishes evidence still more conclusive, if possible, in favor of my interpretation.
If Mr. Smith had been in the habit of expressing this opinion, would not the zeal, the activity and the intelligence of Elias Glover and his associates, have discovered and communicated it? Men who, not content with the most inveterate accusations and persecutions against Mr. Smith, in their individual capacities, have formed clubs, and at length associated themselves in a corporate character under the imposing name of the Republican Society, for that and other purposes. After their profusion of other charges, which they could not substantiate, is it to be presumed that they would have omitted this charge, if it had been true, and thus could have substantiated it? Their not having made, is almost conclusive proof with me that it did not exist. But further, what does General Carberry say upon this subject? That he is in habits of intimacy with Mr. Smith, and that he never heard him express a sentiment in favor of the separation of the Union, but often the reverse. That he did, however, on one occasion, hear Colonel James Taylor express an opinion, in company with several persons, that a separation of the Union would take place at some distant time, say ten or twelve years. And upon his asking Colonel Taylor, after retiring from the company, if he did not think it imprudent to express that opinion, even speculatively, Colonel Taylor admitted that he thought it was, and made some patriotic observations on the occasion.
This leads me to examine the second question in relation to this point. Even admitting that Mr. Smith did express the opinion attributed to him by Colonel Taylor, as his own, was it done with any criminal intent? I am satisfied it was not.
I cannot help remarking here, that I do not concur with the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Hillhouse,) who seemed to intimate that there was nothing criminal in expressing speculative opinions in favor of a separation of the Union. In my opinion, if the expression of that speculative opinion be accompanied with an intent to gain proselytes, and thus to effect the object, it is highly criminal; because it is an opinion tending directly to subvert the Constitution and Government of the United States, and to attempt that object in any way, I deem highly criminal. What is treason but speculative opinions against the fundamental principles of the Government, accompanied with an attempt to carry such opinions into effect by force?
The only difference, therefore, between these offences, consists in this: that the criminal object in the one case is to be effected by force; in the other by persuasion. But I do not believe that Mr. Smith could have any such object in view. To whom was this conversation addressed? To gentlemen of the first respectability—known to be firm friends of the Government. To Colonel Taylor, to General Findley, to Dr. Sellman, &c., &c. Could Mr. Smith presume for a moment that he could make proselytes of gentlemen of this description? Could he suppose that they were fit objects to be used in illicit enterprises? Certainly not. Does either of them state that he made any attempts of this kind? Certainly not. Is there any other instance of his having expressed any opinion in favor of a separation of the Union during the whole course of his life? Certainly not. This is the only solitary instance of such an expression that has been adduced or pretended. Is there any criminal intent ascribed to Colonel Taylor for the expression of a similar opinion to General Carberry? Certainly not. What rule of evidence is applicable to Mr. Smith which is not applicable to Colonel Taylor? Is it just to condemn one man for the expression of an opinion, when the expression of the same opinion by another does not even subject him to suspicion? From all these circumstances I am satisfied, first, that Mr. Smith did not express the opinion in favor of the separation of the Union, in the sense attributed to him by Colonel Taylor; and, in the next place, if he did, it was not expressed with any criminal intent. The next evidence, in point of time, from which inferences are drawn injurious to Mr. Smith, is the testimony of Peter Taylor. It relates to circumstances which took place at Mr. Smith’s house on the 23d of October, and shortly afterwards. The first observation made in relation to this point is, that Mr. Smith, in his answer, states that Peter Taylor is a man unworthy of credit, for several reasons mentioned by him, and that he was incorrect in his evidence in the recital of several incidental circumstances; whereas it is said that Peter Taylor is a man of fair character, though ignorant and uninformed, and that his testimony is unimpeached. I readily admit that Mr. Smith’s impressions in relation to Peter Taylor’s character are more unfavorable than are warranted from the state of the evidence before the Senate; but this is not wonderful, when all circumstances are considered. When it is considered that a deadly wound to Mr. Smith’s character was apprehended by him to be about inflicted by Peter Taylor’s evidence, which consisted principally in the recital of incidental circumstances, in some of which he was evidently mistaken; when all the knowledge Mr. Smith had of him was, that he was one of Blannerhasset’s servants, and presumed to be both ignorant and uninformed, it is not wonderful that Mr. Smith should have entertained a worse opinion of him than he merited; but I see nothing criminal in this misconception. It was a perfectly innocent and natural one.
I readily also admit that, in general, Peter Taylor’s character for truth and veracity stands unimpeached, although it must at the same time be admitted that he was mistaken in some of the many incidents he relates; and in one very remarkable instance, to wit: forgetting the death of his wife, which happened about six weeks before, he mentions a circumstance of making a further provision for her support. I mention this, however, not for the purpose of having an injurious influence upon the general course of his evidence, but merely as a caution against paying too much respect to the episodes or the incidental circumstances mentioned by witnesses, and particularly by him. Inferences of guilt ought very cautiously to be drawn from such sources. But I see nothing in the material and substantial part of Peter Taylor’s evidence but what is perfectly consistent with Mr. Smith’s innocence, and, in my judgment, tends strongly to support it. As this evidence has been very much relied on to criminate Mr. Smith, let it now be critically examined in a spirit of justice and impartiality. Peter Taylor’s evidence is substantially as follows: During the month of October, Mrs. Blannerhasset having become very much alarmed for the safety of her husband, in consequence of the resentment of the people in the neighborhood against him, produced by the pieces under the signature of the Querist, which he acknowledged himself to be the author of; and believing that Burr had instigated him to that conduct, dispatched Peter Taylor, her gardener, in quest of Blannerhasset, with a letter, requesting that he would return to the island, and would prohibit Burr from again returning thither. Being uncertain where Blannerhasset might be, but presuming he would be found with Burr, she directed Peter Taylor to search for him, first at Chilicothe, and if he should not be found there, at Cincinnati, and to inquire at the house of John Smith, storekeeper. In pursuance of these instructions, Peter Taylor being unsuccessful in his search at Chilicothe, arrived at Mr. Smith’s house in Cincinnati on the 23d of October. When Mr. Smith came out to him, he inquired for Burr and Blannerhasset: his object, he states to be, to see if Mr. Smith could give any account of them. Mr. Smith first told him that he had mistaken the place; that they were not there, and he knew nothing of them. But upon telling Mr. Smith that he was one of Blannerhasset’s servants, and was sent in quest of him by Mrs. Blannerhasset, Mr. Smith took him up stairs to a chamber he was accustomed to write in, to write a letter to Mr. Blannerhasset, and told him they would probably be found at Mr. Jourdan’s in Lexington, Kentucky, where it appears from his evidence that Mrs. Blannerhasset originally intended that he should go, if he should not find Blannerhasset before he should arrive there, &c. From these circumstances, strong instances of guilt are deduced against Mr. Smith. Making allowances for the eccentricities of Peter Taylor’s recital, and the inaccuracies of some trivial incidents, which appear to me very obvious, I see nothing at all improper or unnatural in Mr. Smith’s conduct. Upon Peter Taylor’s first inquiry, Mr. Smith supposed he was mistaken in the place. Was not this supposition very natural, when probably Blannerhasset never was at Mr. Smith’s house at all, and Burr had left it the 10th of September preceding, nearly six weeks before that time, and certainly was both mysterious and rapid in his movements? But when Peter Taylor tells Mr. Smith that he was going in quest of Blannerhasset, with a letter from Mrs. Blannerhasset, to Lexington; then Mr. Smith tells him he will probably find them at Mr. Jourdan’s—the place where it is probable Burr told him he should take his lodgings—and proposed to send a letter to Blannerhasset by the witness, which he immediately wrote and gave to the witness; during which time there was some very common, and, in my judgment, very immaterial conversation, between Mr. Smith and the witness, perhaps not very accurately related. So far, certainly, this transaction cannot be deemed criminal; but the letter addressed to Blannerhasset covered one to Burr, and upon its being presented to Burr, who was found at Lexington before Blannerhasset was, Burr premising that it contained one addressed to him, opened it, and found that he was right in his conjecture. This circumstance is said to be extremely suspicious, and from it an improper connexion between Colonel Burr and Mr. Smith is inferred. I readily admit, that in itself it is a suspicious circumstance; and if the evidence stopped here, it might be difficult to account for it without some grounds for the inference of such connection. But I consider the evidence upon this point complete and positive, and that there is nothing left to inference. In the first place, it should be recollected that Peter Taylor was in quest of Blannerhasset with a letter for him from his wife; the presumption, therefore, was, that he would find Blannerhasset before he did Burr; and if so, he would not find Burr at all, because his object would be answered, and his journey at an end. This circumstance, no doubt, induced Mr. Smith to put his letter to Burr under cover to Blannerhasset; but as Burr, contrary to Mr. Smith’s expectation, was first found, why did he open the letter to Blannerhasset, upon the presumption that it contained one for him? Although I think this circumstance of no importance, as the letter itself is before us, I will yet state my impressions respecting it. Burr probably knew that Blannerhasset was an entire stranger to Mr. Smith; he therefore thought it improbable that Mr. S. would write to him; Burr could also discover, by feeling the letter, that it contained an enclosure, and as he had but recently abused Mr. Smith’s friendship and hospitality, and knew of the unfavorable impressions on the public mind against every one who had confided in him in any way whatever, it is but natural to conclude he conjectured that Mr. Smith had availed himself of the opportunity by Peter Taylor of writing to him upon that subject. But why are explanations of this circumstance called for? Why indulge suspicions respecting an object, when the object of such suspicions is itself before us? Why infer an improper connection, when the evidence of the real connection, or the object of the correspondence itself, is before us? This will be found in the identical letter written by Mr. Smith to Mr. Burr, and delivered by Peter Taylor. Let us discard inferences, and attend to the contents of the letter, and see if there is any thing criminal in them. The authenticity of this letter is admitted by all.