A prominent feature of the amendments is, to shorten the term of service of the President, Senators, and Representatives; observation and experience having convinced me, that in an elective Government, long terms of office and high compensations do not tend to make independent public servants, while they produce an anxious solicitude in the incumbents to keep their places; and render seekers of office more eager to obtain them, and more regardless of the means.
My first amendment goes to reduce the term of service of the members of the House of Representatives to one year.
No inconvenience can arise from this arrangement; because there is a constitutional provision that Congress shall assemble once in every year. That body, composed of the immediate representatives of the people, ought to exhibit a fair representation of their sentiments and will; and, coming fresh from the people to the Congress of each year, will, it may be presumed, fairly express such sentiments and will. And if, in an interval from one session of Congress to another, there be a real change of public sentiment, why should not that change be expressed? Will an attempt in their Representatives to resist it, tend to tranquillize the public mind? or will it not, like persecution in religion, tend to make proselytes to their sentiments?
Constitutions, except so far as they are necessary to organize the several departments of Government, and bring the public functionaries into a situation to deliberate and act; and, in the General Government, to draw the line of demarcation between that and the State governments, to prevent interference and collision, are of little avail; and present but feeble barriers against the public will. Whenever a measure is understood and believed to be necessary to promote the general welfare, the people will not fail to effect it. If they cannot, by construction, get round the constitution, they will, by an amendment, go directly to their object. Of the truth of this, experience has furnished ample proof. The danger is, that by attempting to extend constitutional restrictions too far, unnatural and mischievous exertions of power may be produced.
By the second amendment, the term of service of the Senators is to be reduced to three years; one-third to be chosen each year.
The Senate, I am aware, may be surprised, and perhaps feel some displeasure, that one of their own body should propose an amendment, which, in the estimation of some, may tend to lessen their dignity, and destroy their independence. Did I believe this, I should be the last to offer it. If the Senate will hear me patiently, I think I can show that it will produce no such effect.
Senators represent the rights and interests of States in respect to their sovereignty. In them, therefore, the States ought to feel a confidence. And this confidence will rather be increased than lessened by shortening the term of service to three years. Shall I be told that the Legislatures of the States are not to be relied on for their stability and patriotism? that it would be unsafe, every third year, to trust them with the appointment of their Senators? No, surely. The several States are the pillars on which the Constitution of the United States rests, and must rest. If these pillars are not sound, if they are composed of feeble, frail materials, then must the General Government moulder into ruin. This, however, is not my belief. I have confidence in the State Governments. I am for keeping them in their full vigor and strength. For if any disaster befalls the General Government, the States, having within their respective spheres all the power of independent Governments, will be the arks of safety to which the citizens can flee for protection from anarchy, and the horrid evils which follow its train. I have therefore uniformly been opposed to measures which had the remotest tendency to their consolidation.
When I shall have stated the next amendment, it will be found that my plan, instead of lessening the dignity and importance of Senators, will magnify their office, and make it the object of desire and laudable ambition to the best characters and greatest talents of our country; for, from the Senate I propose that the President of the United States shall always be taken; and in a manner that will exclude all cabal and undue influence in obtaining that high office—a mode in which the man of modest merit shall have an equal chance of success with the most daring and artful intriguer.
The third amendment provides for the appointment of a President. He is to be taken by lot from the Senate, and is to hold his office for one year.