This mode promises many advantages, and only two objections against it present themselves to my mind; one, that it is a departure from the elective principle; the other, that it will not always ensure the best talents. I should not have proposed this mode, if any other could have been devised, which would not convulse the whole body politic, set wide open the door to intrigue and cabal, and bring upon the nation incalculable evils; evils already felt, and growing more and more serious. Upon mature examination, those objections appear less formidable than at first view.
When Senators shall be chosen with an eye to this provision, every State will be anxious to make such a selection of persons as will not disgrace it in the eventual elevation of one of them to the Presidential chair. Every State Legislature would, in the choice of the Senator, consider itself as nominating a candidate for the Presidency. The effect of this arrangement would be, in reality, that, instead of the States appointing Electors to choose a President, the Legislatures themselves would become the Electors; with this advantage, that the nomination would be made when not under the influence of a Presidential electioneering fever. In the regular course of appointing Senators, only one nomination would be made at one time in each State; and in most cases, three years would elapse before he could be designated for the Presidency. The great caution in the selection of Senators, with a reference to that high office, would produce another excellent effect: it would ensure the continuance, in that body, of men of the most respectable talents and character—an object of the highest importance to the general welfare. In the mode directed by the constitution for choosing a President by the House of Representatives, there is almost as great a departure as in what I propose, from the pure elective principle; which requires perfect freedom of choice among all who are eligible; and that the ballot of each qualified voter shall have equal weight in making such choice. Whereas, by the constitution, the House are confined to three candidates, and must vote by States; so that a State having twenty-two members, has but one; and, consequently, no more weight than a State having only a single member. And those States whose members shall be equally divided, will have no vote. These circumstances considered, the present constitutional mode of choosing a President by the House of Representatives, when tested by the pure elective principle, may be deemed, as to the mode of choosing, and the object of the choice, as exceptionable as the appointment by lot; while it remains liable to all the evils of a contested election, from which the appointment by lot is wholly free.
In answer to the second objection, it may be fairly presumed that the Senate will always be composed of men possessed at least of decent talents. And such men, with honest views, long experience, and the aid of the Heads of Departments and other officers, would be able to do the public business correctly. It is not necessary, it is not desirable, that the President should command the armies in person; and all our foreign relations may be managed through the agency of able Ministers, whose appointments are to be approved both by the Senate and House of Representatives. The several Executives, ever since the adoption of the constitution, have been in the habit of calling to their aid a Cabinet Council, composed of the Heads of Departments; who ought to consist, as they probably will, of men of talents, integrity, and experience; and who, upon the plan proposed, being likely to continue long in office, will thereby give stability and system to the measures of Government.
If the appointment by lot will not always insure a President of the first rate talents, neither will the present mode of electing; for when party spirit runs high, and parties are nearly balanced, candidates will be set up, not for their talents, but because they are popular and can command votes. And there may be a possibility of having a President for four years, distinguished neither for talents nor integrity. A President appointed by lot will possess the advantage, and in practice it will be found a very great advantage, of coming into office free from party influence; which, under the present mode of electing, is seldom if ever to be expected; and it is to be feared that it will be too powerful to suffer even an honest man to do right.
Appointing a President by lot from the Senate, will give every State an equal and fair chance of participating in the dignity of that high office; will prevent the possibility of bargaining among the large States to the total exclusion of the middling and small States; and will thus remove one ground of State jealousy, which must inevitably grow out of our present mode. As it regards the sovereignty of the respective States, the appointment by lot is in exact conformity to the principles of the constitution; for in the event of an election of a President by the House of Representatives, each State has an equal vote, conformably with its equal rights as sovereign and independent; so that, in respect to peace and union, this mode of appointing a President would produce effects of great and lasting importance.
As the President is to be taken from the Senate, and, if worthy of the Senatorial office, must have experience, and be well informed of the affairs of the nation—and can also avail himself of the information and talents of every member of the Government—there can be no solid objection to reducing his term of service to one year. The President will always enter on his office at the close of the session of Congress; and during the recess have time to make himself more fully acquainted with the state of the nation, so as to present a proper view of it to the next Congress, as well as to conduct successfully the public business at the end of his term. No serious embarrassment or inconvenience, in conducting the public business, has been felt from the change of a President or the Head of a Department. There are and always must be subordinate officers around the Government, well acquainted with the routine of business; which will and must proceed in its usual course. If any example were necessary to show that no injury would arise to the nation from an annual appointment of a President, I might instance the ancient Republic of Rome—where, in the days of her greatest virtue, prosperity, and glory, her chief magistrates, or consuls, were chosen every year. But, being taken from the Senate, a body conversant with the management of their public affairs, as is our Senate, no evil accrued to the public.
The office of President is the only one in our Government clothed with such powers as might endanger liberty; and I am not without apprehension that, at some future period, they may be exerted to overthrow the liberties of our country. The change from four to ten years is small; the next step would be from ten years to life, and then to the nomination of a successor; from which the transition to an hereditary monarchy would almost follow of course. The exigencies of the country, the public safety, and the means of defence against foreign invasion, may place in the hands of an ambitious, daring President, an army, of which he would be the legitimate commander, and with which he might enforce his claim. This may not happen in my day; it probably will not; but I have children whom I love, and whom I expect to leave behind me, to share in the destinies of our common country. I cannot therefore feel indifferent to what may befall them and generations yet unborn.
I do not desire in the smallest degree to lessen the President’s power to do good; I only wish to place such salutary checks upon his power, as to prevent his doing harm. His power of nominating and appointing to office, and removing from office, will still be continued; with only the additional check of requiring the consent of the House of Representatives, in one case, and of the Senate and House in the other. All his other powers will remain the same as at present, and there will be but little danger of an abuse of those powers, if the term of Presidential office be reduced to one year, and the appointment be by lot: which will render it impossible to bring the high prerogatives of this office to aid in procuring it. An artful intriguer cannot then point to the various lucrative offices in the gift of the President, for the purpose of stimulating exertion in favor of his election: than which a more powerful engine could not have been devised.
Of the impropriety and impolicy of the present mode of electing a President, can there be stronger proof, can there be a more convincing evidence, than is now exhibiting in the United States? In whatever direction we turn our eyes, we behold the people arranging themselves under the banners of different candidates, for the purpose of commencing the electioneering campaign for the next President and Vice President. All the passions and feelings of the human heart are brought into the most active operation. The electioneering spirit finds its way to every fireside; pervades our domestic circles; and threatens to destroy the enjoyment of social harmony. The seeds of discord will be sown in families, among friends, and throughout the whole community. In saying this, I do not mean any thing to the disadvantage of either of the candidates. They may have no agency in the business; they may be the involuntary objects of such competition, without the power of directing or controlling the storm. The fault is in the mode of election; in setting the people to choose a King. In fact, a popular election, and the exercise of such powers and prerogatives as are by the constitution vested in the President, are incompatible. The evil is increasing, and will increase, until it shall terminate in civil war and despotism. The people, suffering under the scourge of party feuds and factions, and finding no refuge under the State, any more than in the General Government, from party persecution and oppression, may become impatient, and submit to the first tyrant who can protect them against the thousand tyrants.
I have dwelt so long on this amendment, because of the novelty, in this country, of appointing a Chief Magistrate by lot. The facility of appointing by lot was obvious; but it seemed necessary to exhibit, and to demonstrate the many and highly important advantages which will arise from this mode of appointing a President of the United States. The principal of these I will now present in one short view: