The principal argument, although this does not seem to be openly avowed, in favor of the present measure, is the supposed predilection of the Executive for this system of defence. Indeed, this is but a new edition, or rather a new volume, of the celebrated proclamation and gunboat system, which, instead of elevating us in the scale of nations, has greatly sunk the national character. The objects in view are to protect the commerce of the Union to a certain extent, and to protect our coasts and seaports. Of course this measure is to constitute a material, if not the principal part of a general system of national defence and protection. The object is proper and patriotic, and it is a subject of deep regret that the means are inefficient. But history and human experience have settled the true character of these machines, and as we have nothing else to hope for, we can expect nothing like an energetic and effectual system.
The President shall recommend. The voice of the constitution is imperative. It makes it the duty of the Chief Executive Magistrate to take upon himself the responsibility of explicitly recommending to the Legislature such measures as he deems the public welfare to require. In making the inquiry, in what manner has this great and solemn duty been performed at the present moment? the transition is easy to the Message of the President at the commencement of this session. These messages, as public documents, and addressed exclusively to the Legislature, are certainly fair subjects of criticism; and whoever shall be impelled by duty to speak unpleasantly of the present system of administration, will have an abundant source of rich consolation in the reflection, that, when gunboats are the subject of discussion, it is impossible to be out of order. The present system begins and ends with gunboats. In the Message to which allusion has been made, which should have been as a polar star to guide us at this dark season, not a single measure is explicitly and unequivocally recommended. I will read that part of it which relates to the Naval Establishment:
“The gunboats already provided have been chiefly assigned to New York, New Orleans, and the Chesapeake. Whether our movable force on the water, so material in aid of the defensive works on the land, should be augmented in this or any other form, is left to the wisdom of the Legislature. For the purpose of manning these vessels, in sudden attacks on our harbors, it is a matter for consideration whether the seamen of the United States may not justly be formed into a special militia, to be called on for tours of duty, in defence of the harbors where they shall happen to be; the ordinary militia of the place furnishing that portion which may consist of landsmen.”
Here the Executive submits certain matters for consideration, without assuming to himself the responsibility of expressly recommending them. In relation to the Naval Establishment, he only talks of a movable force on the water; and if we should build our flotilla of two hundred and fifty-seven gunboats, at an expense which will be shown to be enormous, and, in the event of a war with Great Britain, two or three British ships of the line, and as many frigates, should come upon our coast, and blow them all to atoms, as would infallibly be the case if they were to come in contact with them, we shall no doubt be told that a wise and prudent Executive never recommended such an ill-judged, degrading, and disastrous measure. But for what purpose are gunboats to be built? To protect commerce and the coast. Every one knows that we cannot protect our commerce in every clime and on every sea against the naval power of Great Britain. It would be unwise, therefore, at present, to exhaust our resources by building a navy of ships of the line. It does not follow, however, that nothing can be done; that we cannot support our own jurisdiction. Nothing effectual, it is certain, can be done by gunboats. They have never been of use but as auxiliaries to more extensive and substantial establishments; and they have always been of so little comparative use, as to render it impossible to ascertain the amount of the service they have rendered. We may safely challenge their advocates to produce a single instance in which, alone and unconnected with works of more consequence, they have been of any essential use at all, for purposes either of offence or defence. In my researches into their history I have met with no instance of the kind. Here I shall advert to a document, the reading of which has been called for by the honorable chairman of the committee on that part of the President’s Message relative to aggressions committed within our waters, and with which I should not otherwise have troubled the House. I do it at this time, because I find my voice failing so fast that I shall be unable to go so fully into the subject as I originally contemplated. This I shall not regret myself, and still less will the House regret it. In the message of February 10, 1807, communicating the information requested by the House of Representatives in relation to the utility and efficacy of gunboats, we find, indeed, that gunboats apparently constitute but a subordinate species of defence, and yet they are spoken of as competent to almost all the purposes of national protection. A flotilla of no less than two hundred is contemplated.
Annexed to the Message are the opinions of several military and naval officers, some of them celebrated and some of them obscure. General Gates, whose memory we all venerate, has been mentioned. He merely gives his opinion, and furnishes no particular information upon the subject. He is followed by General Wilkinson, the hero of the Sabine and New Orleans, the man who violates your constitution at the point of the bayonet in order to preserve it inviolate; the idol of popular delusion for the moment, but the object of a very different homage from the wise and good. Unfortunately, the letter of this great character conveys no information. Commodore Barron says: “Ten or twelve of these boats will probably be sufficient to compel to remove from her position a frigate, and so on in proportion to the size and number of the enemy’s ships. To do more than annoy would be difficult. With those vessels a great number and a long time would be necessary to capture a ship of war; but few commanders would feel secure while open to the attack of an enemy, which, however inferior, he could not destroy.” This is all very candid and very strong reasoning against the cause it is produced to support. It is matter of regret, however, if it ever has been ascertained that gunboats have been able to remove a ship of war from her position, that we have not been put in possession of that information. The following remarks are taken from the communication of Captain Tingey: “The efficacy of gunboats in the defence of coasts, ports, and harbors, must be obvious to every person capable of reflection; when it is considered with what celerity they can generally change their position and mode of attack, extending it widely to as many different directions as their number consists of, or concentrating nearly to one line of direction. Such, indeed, is believed to be the great utility of gunboats for defence, that, notwithstanding the gigantic power of the British Navy, in its present state, a judicious writer in the British Naval Chronicle, after advising a plan for raising a fleet of 150 or 200 gunboats to assist in repelling the threatened invasion of that country, says, ‘a gunboat has this advantage over a battery on shore, that it can be removed at pleasure from place to place, as occasion may require, and a few such vessels, carrying heavy guns, would make prodigious havoc among the enemy’s flat-bottomed boats crowded with soldiers.’” Surely we do not expect the British will come to invade us in flat-bottomed boats. If they should do so, we may array this miserable machinery against them, and shall probably be victorious.
But it is a popular system—the people are in favor of it—and this is an overwhelming answer to every argument that can be urged against it.
With whom is it popular? Certainly not with the people in the Northern States, for a very great majority of them are opposed to it. Within two or three years we have received addresses from the Legislature of New York and Rhode Island, passed, I believe unanimously, in both States, in favor of an enlarged and more efficient system of naval defence. Those two States, of course, may be considered as opposed to this project. No one will set down Connecticut as friendly to gunboats. Is it popular in Massachusetts? One gentleman from that State (Mr. Bacon) protests against being considered as the Representative of a people hostile to this mode of defence. But that gentleman will not tell us that a very large majority of his constituents are attached to the system, or that among those who are, one in fifty has any practical or even historical information upon the subject. Are your constituents, Mr. Speaker, in favor of this mode of defence? I presume not. When, two or three years ago, you opposed this establishment in its infancy, you undoubtedly represented their sentiments and feelings, as most certainly you supported their true interest. The Representatives from New Hampshire, and others from the Eastern States, ask you to excuse them from accepting their proportion of these boats, and to give them a few frigates in exchange. You refuse their request.—They ask for frigates, and you give them gunboats. As it respects my own constituents, I have not been able to find any gunboat men among them. It is probable, however, that there are some, as there may be men in that quarter, as in others, willing to believe whatever the Executive believes; but I trust there are fewer of these miserable minions in that district than in some others in the Union.
Mr. Crowninshield said he regretted that the present had been represented as a local question, applicable to the South; and it had been stated that the defence of the North was not at all in the question. Mr. C. viewed it in a very different light. He considered the whole seaboard of the United States, that every inhabitant on the coast, was deeply interested in the bill now about to pass. Gunboats would as well assist to protect the passage leading into Boston harbor, as the mouth of the Chesapeake. They were certainly fit to aid in the protection of any of the Northern ports. He was astonished when he heard a doubt expressed upon the subject. He was glad to hear a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) say he should vote for the bill. He would rather have his vote than his speech on the subject, as well also the vote of one of his colleagues (Mr. Upham) who followed him in debate, and took the same course. Both these gentlemen said they should vote for the bill on the table, and yet they observed they could not approve of this mode of defence. It would thus appear that their votes were vastly more reasonable than their arguments. He trusted that on this bill the House would give a unanimous vote. What was the proposition? To put our ports and harbors in some state of defence. Was the measure embraced by this bill all the defence proposed? No; but it was all proposed to be decided on at present, because it could be almost immediately accomplished. And who knew when this force might be wanted? He did not say it would be wanted to-day, to-morrow, or the next day; but possibly the return of Spring might bring an occasion for its service to repel an invader; and, where the risk was deemed even probable, procrastination in preparing for the worst would be the height of imprudence.
In regard to the utility of gunboats, gentlemen differed; and well and honestly they might, because their use had not in this country been sufficiently confirmed by experience. Mr. C. would, however, quote an instance or two in which they had been eminently useful, even in our own country. He had learnt, from a very correct source, that in the war between Great Britain and France, in 1760, when the American colonies took a part, there was an instance on record which proved that these gunboats were employed with success in the river St. Lawrence—that four gunboats, carrying one 18 pound cannon and 20 men each, did attack and capture a brig of 16 guns and 180 men, killing 60 or 70 men in the brig, while the gunboats lost but a single man, and received little or no other injury. If any gentleman doubted, Mr. C. would give the respectable authority of the Vice President of the United States for the fact. Mr. C. had understood he was an officer actually employed by the Colonial Government in that service. Another instance had been given to him by a naval gentleman of eminence, who was not now in the service of the United States, but who, he believed, if called upon, would do himself great honor. Mr. C. then read the statement made by that gentleman, to this effect: “In 1776, the Roebuck and Liverpool, two British frigates—one of them mounting 44 guns on two decks—lay in the river Delaware, below Philadelphia. A flotilla of American gunboats attacked them with spirit. The engagement was severe, and victory terminated in favor of the gunboats. One of the frigates (the Roebuck) was crippled and driven on shore, and would have been taken possession of, if the ammunition in the boats had held out. As it was, after the Roebuck floated off into deeper water, both frigates abandoned their station, and left the gunboats masters of the river.” It was probable that there might be some gentleman of the Revolution near him who might have known of the fact; if so, would it have no impression on the House? He presumed it would have a favorable impression, as it deservedly ought. He could cite other instances—he could say, that in the neighborhood of Gibraltar, at Algeziras, the Spanish gunboats had in many cases attacked British frigates, and sometimes 74-gun ships, and very much annoyed them. He knew of no instance of their capture, because it often happened, that a new wind springing up, carried the vessels out of the reach of their fire. It was also believed to be a fact, that the British naval commanders in the mouth of the Straits of Gibraltar had always been alarmed in moderate and calm weather when they saw the gunboats of Algeziras coming out to attack their ships of war. Engagements with them were not uncommon, and the boats frequently had the advantage, and captured merchant vessels under their convoy, and carried them off, in spite of all the efforts to save them which could be made by the men of war.
Mr. Southard was in hopes this bill would have met with very little opposition, especially when it was considered that it was but a part of a system of defence, of which the other parts would be decided in progression. Various objections had been made to the bill. Some gentlemen supposed that gunboats were altogether insufficient for defence, and that the scheme was merely ideal and visionary; and some had attempted to prove that gunboats had never been used. A gentleman from Massachusetts had just disproved this by circumstantial accounts of two engagements; one on the river St. Lawrence, and one in the river Delaware. In the last instance, about twelve gunboats engaged two British ships of war. Mr. S. would state, from good authority, that the reason why these vessels were not made a prize, was, that the gunboats were not supplied with a sufficient quantity of powder and ammunition. This statement and fact would go far to do away the impressions of those gentlemen who suppose that gunboats are of no efficiency as a defence, or that their utility was ideal. In the progress towards the passage of this bill, every day new difficulties had been discovered, and new objections raised to its passage. Some gentlemen told them if they passed this bill, and appropriated a sum of money sufficient for the object proposed by it, that they would not leave money in the Treasury adequate to the expense of building land batteries, &c. Another objection was, that if they appropriated money for building gunboats, fortifications, and batteries for the seaports, there would be no money left wherewith to provide arms for the militia. If these remarks were even correct, they possessed no weight, because gunboats, fortifications, and land batteries, and arming the militia, were but three several parts of one great system.