After these remarks, he would only state his own idea of what ought to be done. He thought they should first provide gunboats; secondly, erect fortifications and land batteries; thirdly, pass a law providing for arming the militia—for, unless men were armed, they could not prevent an enemy from landing, destroying, and laying waste the country. Mr. S. hoped everything would be done which was requisite for protection. Gentlemen had said that our resources were not sufficient to meet these objects. Mr. S. would observe that there was, in the Treasury, money sufficient to answer all these purposes; if not, the country had resources within itself, fully adequate to every measure of protection and defence. He would not go, as some gentlemen had, into calculations of dollars and cents. If the nation was embroiled in war, its expense would be incalculable. It was impossible to form even an idea of the enormous expense that would accrue from war. But, Mr. S. would withdraw all the money out of the Treasury; he would not leave a cent; he would even drain the blood from his own veins, if it were necessary, for the defence of his country. If the nation was involved in war, life, liberty, and property, every thing, was at stake; and all their energies should be exerted to repel the invader.
Mr. Key said he conceived he possessed the right to give his sentiments on this subject; and he felt it a duty to assign those reasons which would induce him to vote for the bill under consideration.
Mr. K. had no doubt but, in forming a general system of defence, some few frigates would be found necessary; but he strongly feared they could neither construct line of battle ships or frigates before it would be necessary to use them. Some gentlemen had asserted that the nation was at war; he would not combat this position, though it was not tenable. Some gentlemen said we were on the eve of war, with whom he thought. If they were engaged in war, it would not be upon any other part of the frontier than that accessible by water. Of course the most vulnerable points of the country were upon the seashore. He therefore thought that every species of defence competent to the protection of these points should be adopted, and of this description were fortifications and batteries, aided by gunboats; not that they composed the best possible means of defence, but the best that could be constructed within a given time.
There were, as far as Mr. K. knew, in modern times, but two instances, and but one that was remarkable, of the efficacy of gunboats as a part of a system. One case was the defence of Cadiz, when Nelson, with his whole fleet, anchored in the bay of Cadiz, and was repulsed, principally, he believed, by the instrumentality, but certainly by the assistance of gunboats. In case of attack, made on our ports, gunboats being locomotive, would, in such circumstances, be advantageous. Another case of the success of gunboats occurs in the bay of Gibraltar; they are there secured from attack, until, like spiders darting upon flies, they spring out in calm weather, and always capture their prey.
These gunboats took their origin in an early part of this century, when Gibraltar was surprised by the enemy. Gunboats were then introduced into the Gut of Gibraltar, and from the time that Britain captured Gibraltar, to the present day, such has been the effect of these boats, that the British were always obliged to send supplies and provisions to Gibraltar under convoy. He had mentioned this circumstance, to show that gunboats had acted offensively as well as defensively. If gentlemen, however, considered them as alone a sufficient defence for this country, they were most miserably mistaken; they were merely eligible as a means of defence in aid of fortifications. Mr. K. agreed with the gentleman who had yesterday said that these boats would be no protection against ships of war, with wind and tide in their favor, in Chesapeake Bay; but, as offensive weapons, they might be placed at points where they might lie in readiness till a proper time should arrive in which they could act with advantage. A number of frigates had been, for some time, lying in the Chesapeake. Mr. K. did religiously believe, if the nation had been in a state of war, (and a contrary situation alone had prevented the experiment being made,) that twelve gunboats, stationed at Norfolk, could have driven them away from their anchorage. And why did he believe so? Because they could have chosen their time, when the weather was calm, and large ships could not be worked. It was in this way that gunboats could greatly injure ships of war, and, if not destroy them, could injure them so much as to render them unmanageable. He did not conceive that gunboats should be considered as incapable of rendering essential services, because they had not hitherto driven the British squadron out of the Chesapeake, for the measures taken by the Executive had not warranted such a step. We are not at war, said he; when, by the shameless impressment of our seamen and other injuries, and when consummating her folly and wickedness by the attack on the Chesapeake, the English nation gave cause for war, we did not go to war. In his judgment, and he was reluctant to withhold praise where it was due, a much wiser course was taken; he meant the call upon that Government for reparation before a resort was had to war. Had they gone to war, on the spur of the occasion, they would have committed to the mercy of the British navy twenty millions of American property, afloat on the ocean; it would have fallen a sacrifice to the superior naval force of our opponents. If honorable reparation be made, the course which had been pursued would have been wise; at all events, whether reparation be made or not, time had been given to our citizens to save a great portion of their property. A measure of immediate war would have brought bankruptcy on our cities, and ruin on our citizens. It was well, for this reason, to put the event off as long as possible—the longer it was put off, the better we should be prepared for it when it did arrive.
Friday, December 11.
The Gunboat Bill.
Mr. Johnson said, although he should not pretend to propose measures of great national defence, he considered it a prudent exercise of his right as a member, to express his sentiments upon subjects proposed by others, upon which it became his duty to vote. He was in favor of the passage of the bill. He believed that they had arrived at a crisis; a crisis which had marked the maritime annals of Great Britain with the blood of American citizens; the period had arrived when this nation must receive a satisfaction for injuries inflicted, and a security from future wrong; or the sword must again be drawn to defend that liberty which was the boast of all, and which had cost so much. They had before them evidence sufficient to demonstrate the probability of war, an event which could not be long protracted but by an honorable accommodation. While America mourned the loss of her sons, she had wisely forborne to strike a blow which her wrongs had justified. New instructions had been despatched to our Minister at the Court of St. James since the outrage upon the Chesapeake, and a last appeal made to the reason and justice of that Government by whom they had been so much injured. The negotiation had terminated in England, and even now a special Minister was expected from Great Britain to attempt a settlement here. The door to reconciliation had not been closed, and he hoped it would not be barred so long as a real desire could be traced in Great Britain to make an honorable settlement of all important differences. But every thing they could hear or see proved the propriety of making preparations for the worst event. Our Government had been the injured party, and must have redress.
The conduct of the Administration had been arraigned. Mr. J. did not hesitate to approve the conduct of the Executive, and particularly in this late and important transaction, it had acted with prudence, wisdom, and firmness. If feeling had not been governed by prudence, the nation might have been in a state of actual war. Perhaps our wrongs might have justified it; but while there remained a hope for honorable peace, negotiation was the proper course. We fear no nation, but let the time for shedding human blood be protracted, when consistent with our safety. If our claims upon the justice of England should be disregarded, there would be time enough for human butchery. He looked around him, and saw many who had witnessed the calamities and miseries of the American Revolution. But if war could not be avoided, accumulated horrors would not induce the American people to endanger their independence. They would say, like the immortal Washington, the former victorious leader of their armies, “I will conquer or die with my countrymen.” Unanimity, in times of public exigency, was all-important; any other course than that which had been pursued by the Administration, might and would have created division; but if they should now be driven into war by the injustice of Great Britain, where was the man who would not be with them, who would not approve the conduct of the Administration, pronounce our cause just, and appeal to Heaven for victory.