Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

The question was taken on Mr. Randolph’s motion, and carried—yeas 60, nays 55. When the committee rose.

And on motion, the House adjourned.

Tuesday, October 25.

Louisiana Treaty.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the Message from the President of the United States, of the twenty-first instant, enclosing a treaty and conventions entered into and ratified by the United States and the French Republic; to which Committee of the whole House was also referred a motion for carrying the same into effect.

Mr. G. Griswold said he had hoped that some gentleman, in favor of the resolution under consideration, would have risen to assign his reasons in favor of it. But no gentleman friendly to its adoption having risen, and feeling himself embarrassed, he would take the liberty of suggesting his doubts as to the propriety of the resolution. He hoped the committee would have the candor to believe that, in stating those doubts which hung upon his mind, his object was not to delay the progress of the measures contemplated, but to gain information.

In reflecting, for the short time during which the subject had been before him, he had not been able to pursue it in all its bearings, nor to solve all the difficulties it presented. He had first asked himself where was to be found the constitutional power of the Government to incorporate the territory, with the inhabitants thereof, in the Union of the United States, with the privileges of citizens of the United States—is there any such power? And if there is, where is it lodged? In giving his opinion on the constitutional right of making treaties, he would say that it was vested in the President and Senate, and that a treaty made by them on a subject constitutionally in their treaty-making power, was valid without the assent of this House. This House had, to be sure, the physical power of refusing the necessary means to carry treaties into effect; but this power was essentially different from that conferred by the constitution. But if the treaty-making power should be exceeded, if it should be undertaken to make it operate upon subjects not constitutionally vested, he had a right to say that it was his duty not to carry it into effect. Even should its provisions be highly beneficial, it was no less their constitutional duty to resist it. He would not undertake to say that his mind was perfectly fixed, but he entertained doubts—serious doubts; and he hoped gentlemen would candidly give them answers.

Mr. Randolph rose for the purpose of satisfying, so far as was in his power, the doubts expressed by the gentleman from New York (Mr. G. Griswold). He had listened with great pleasure to the candid exposition which the gentleman had given of his objections, and from the temper which he had manifested, Mr. R. relied on being able to satisfy some of his scruples on this subject. The objections which have been urged to the motion before the committee, resolved themselves into arguments against the constitutionality, and arguments against the expediency of the treaty proposed to be carried into effect. As it would be needless to repel objections of this last kind, unless those of the first description could be satisfactorily answered, he should first reply to the observations which had been made on the constitutional doctrine.

He understood the gentleman from New York as denying that there existed in the United States, as such, a capacity to acquire territory; that, by the constitution, they were restricted to the limits which existed at the time of its adoption. If this position be correct, it undeniably follows that those limits must have been accurately defined and generally known at the time when the Government took effect. Either they have been particularly described in the constitutional compact, or are referred to as settled beyond dispute, and universally acknowledged. But this was not the fact, in either case. The constitution not only did not describe any particular boundary, beyond which the United States could not extend, but our boundary was unsettled on our north-eastern, southern, and north-western frontier, at the time of its adoption. But perhaps we shall be told, that, although our limits were in dispute with our English and Spanish neighbors, still there were certain boundaries specified in the Treaty of Paris, of 1783, which were the actual boundaries of the United States. It was, however, a well attested fact—one of which we possessed official information from the Executive—that the limits assigned us by that treaty were incapable of being established. A line running west, from the Lake of the Woods, not touching the Mississippi at all—it followed that the United States were without limits beyond the source of the Mississippi. It will not be denied, that, among the powers which the Government possesses under the constitution, there exists that of settling disputes concerning our limits with the neighboring nations. This power was not only necessary in relation to the disputed boundaries on the side of Canada and Florida, but was indispensable to a government over a country of indefinite extent. The existence of this power will not be denied: it has been exercised in ascertaining our north-eastern and southern frontier, and it involves in it the power of extending the limits of the Confederacy. Let us suppose that the Commissioners, under the Treaty of London, had determined the river St. John or St. Lawrence to be the true St. Croix—would not that part of the province of New Brunswick or Quebec which lies on this side of those rivers at this time have been a part of the United States? Suppose the northern boundary of Florida had been fixed, under the Treaty of San Lorenzo, to extend from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf; would not all the country north of this line and east of the Mississippi—part of the very country conveyed by the treaty lately negotiated, and which gentlemen conceived we could not constitutionally hold—would not that country, at this time, compose a part of the United States? That the constitution should tie us down to particular limits, without expressing those limits; that we should be restrained to the then boundaries of the United States, when it is in proof to the committee that no such bounds existed, or do now exist, was altogether incomprehensible and inadmissible. For, if the constitution meant the practical limits of the United States, the extent of country which we then possessed—our recent acquisitions, on the side of Canada and the Natchez, could not be defended. But, sir, said Mr. R., my position is not only maintainable by the reason of the constitution, but by the practice under it. Congress have expressed, in their own acts, a solemn recognition of the principle, that the United States, in their federative capacity, may acquire, and have acquired, territory. It will be recollected, that adverse claims once existed between the United States and the State of Georgia, in relation to a certain tract of country between the northern boundary of the Spanish possessions and what we contended was the southern limit of Georgia—the United States asserting that the country in question was the property of the United States, in their confederate capacity, and the State of Georgia claiming it as hers. Although I have always advocated the claim of that State, it never was on the principle of an incapacity in the United States to acquire territory, or any other which affects the question now before us. It is true, sir, we appointed commissioners to settle the matter in dispute, amicably, with Georgia; but in the mean time we assumed the jurisdiction, erected a government over the country, and thereby established the principle that the United States, as such, could acquire territory; the country in question, as we contended, never having been included within the limits of any particular States, and being ceded to the Confederacy by the Treaty of 1783. But perhaps it may be answered, that this acquisition, being made anterior to the date of the present constitution, cannot affect any limitation or restriction, which it may have provided in relation to this subject; and that to prove that the old confederation could acquire territory, is not to prove the same capacity in the present system of Government. To this I reply, that the constitution contains no such expressed limitation, nor can any be fairly inferred from it: and that if the old confederation—a mere government of States—a loosely connected league—all of whose powers, with many more, are possessed by the present Federal Government—if this mere alliance of States could rightfully acquire territory in their allied capacity, much more is the existing Government competent to make such an acquisition. To me the inference is irresistible.