But the gentleman does not rest himself on this ground alone. He does not embark his whole treasure in a single bottom. Granting that the United States are not destitute of capacity to acquire territory, he denies that this acquisition has been made in a regular way—Congress, says he, alone is competent to such an act. In this transaction he scents at a distance Executive encroachment, and we are called upon to assert our rights, and to repel it. If any usurpation of the privileges of Congress, or of this House, be made to appear, I pledge myself to that gentleman to join him in resisting it. But let us inquire into the fact. No gentleman will deny the right of the President to initiate business here, by message, recommending particular subjects to our attention. If the Government of the United States possess the constitutional power to acquire territory from foreign States, the Executive, as the organ by which we communicate with such States, must be the prime agent in negotiating such an acquisition. Conceding, then, that the power of confirming this act, and annexing to the United States the territory thus acquired, ultimately rests with Congress, where has been the invasion of the privileges of that body? Does not the President of the United States submit this subject to Congress for their sanction? Does he not recognize the principle, which I trust we will never give up, that no treaty is binding until we pass the laws for executing it—that the powers conferred by the constitution on Congress cannot be modified, or abridged, by any treaty whatever—that the subjects of which they have cognizance cannot be taken, in any way, out of their jurisdiction? In this procedure nothing is to be seen but a respect, on the part of the Executive, for our rights; a recognition of a discretion on our part to accord or refuse our sanction. Where, then, is the violation of our rights? As to the initiative, in a matter like this, it necessarily devolved on the Executive.
Mr. R. said, that he would not dilate upon the importance of the navigation of the Mississippi, which had been the theme of every tongue, which we now possessed unfettered by the equal claim of the nation holding the west bank, a fruitful source of quarrel; but he would call the attention of the committee to a report which had been made at the last session and to which publicity had lately been given.
I am not surprised, Mr. Chairman, that in a performance so replete with information, a single error should be discovered, especially as it does not affect the soundness of its conclusion. As long ago as the year 1673, the inhabitants of the French province of Canada explored the country on the Mississippi. A few years afterwards (1685) La Salle, with emigrants from old France, made a settlement on the Bay of St. Bernard, and at the close of the 17th century, previous to the existence of Pensacola, another French settlement was made by the Governor, D’Ibberville, at Mobile, and on the Isle Dauphin, or Massacre, at the mouth of that bay. In 1712, a short time previous to the peace of Utrecht, Louis XIV. described the extent of the colony of Louisiana (by the settlements) in his grant of its exclusive commerce to Crozat. Three years subsequent to this, the Spanish establishment at Pensacola was formed, as well as the settlement of the Adais on the river Mexicana. After various conflicting efforts, on both sides, the bay and river Perdido was established, (from the peace of 1719,) as the boundary between the French province of Louisiana on the one side and the Spanish province of Florida on the other: this river being nearly equi-distant between Mobile and Pensacola. Near the close of the war between England and France, rendered memorable for the unexampled success with which it was conducted by that unrivalled statesman, the great Lord Chatham, Spain became a party on the side of France. The loss of the Havana, and other important dependencies, was the immediate consequence. In 1762, France, by a secret treaty of cotemporaneous date with the preliminary Treaty of Peace, relinquished Louisiana to Spain, as an indemnity for her losses, sustained by advocating the cause of France. By the definitive Treaty of 1763, France ceded to England all that part of Louisiana which lies east of the Mississippi, except the island of New Orleans—the rest of the province to Spain. It is to be observed that although France ostensibly ceded this country to England, virtually the cession was on the part of Spain; because France was no longer interested in the business, but as the friend of Spain, (having previously relinquished the whole to her,) and because in 1783 restitution was made by England, not to France, but to Spain, England having acquired this portion of Louisiana, together with the Spanish province of Florida, annexed to the former that part of Florida which lies west of the Apalachicola and east of the Perdido; thereby forming the province of West Florida.
It is only in English geography, and during this period, from 1763 to 1783, that such a country as West Florida is known. For Spain, having acquired both the Floridas in 1783, re-annexed to Louisiana the country west of the Perdido subject to the government of New Orleans, and established the ancient boundaries of Florida; the country between the Perdido and Apalachicola being subject to the Governor of St. Augustine. By the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, Spain cedes to France “the province of Louisiana with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain:” viz: to the Perdido, “and that it had when France possessed it to the Perdido—and such as it should be after treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other powers;” that is, saving to the United States the country given up by the Treaty of San Lorenzo. We have succeeded to all the right of France. If the navigation of the Mississippi alone were of sufficient importance to justify war, surely the possession of every drop of water which runs into it—the exclusion of European nations from its banks, who would have with us the same causes of quarrel, did we possess New Orleans only, which we have had with the former possessors of that key of the river; the entire command of the Mobile and its widely extended branches, scarcely inferior in consequence to the Mississippi itself—watering the finest country and affording the best navigation in the United States—surely these would be acknowledged to be inestimably valuable.
Mr. Purviance.—I am clearly and decidedly in favor of the resolution on your table, premising the appropriations for carrying the treaty between France and this country into effect; and I sincerely regret, that in doing so, I shall act adversely to the general sentiment of the gentlemen with whom it is my pleasure and my pride to confess I have hitherto politically officiated.
It is true I am, and always have been, opposed to the general tenor of the present Administration. It has not appeared to me to possess that bold commanding aspect—that erect and resolute front—which ought to be assumed by the Executive of a free people, when claiming satisfaction for a wrong sustained. It has not shown that strong, muscular, athletic shape, which is calculated to intimidate aggression, or which is enabled to resist it; nor do I think that it has manifested that firm, dignified, manly tone of virtue and of spirit, which, resting on the love of a free people, and conscious of their strength, can ask for the prompt, direct, and unequivocal satisfaction to which it is entitled, and, being denied, can take it. It has not appeared like the veteran chief, ready to gird his loins in defence of his country’s rights; but, if I may be allowed to use the magna componere parvis, it has, to my mind, somewhat resembled a militia subaltern, who, in time of war, directed his men not to fire on the enemy, lest the enemy might fire again.
Under such an Administration, I have thought that it would be better to have the ceded territory on any terms than not to have it at all. If we have not the spirit or the means of doing ourselves justice, would it not be better that we bribe those who might be in a situation to molest us, and thus put it out of their power to do us any injury, which we cannot or which we will not avenge? There are but two ways of maintaining our national independence—men and money. Since we did not use the first, we must have recourse to the last. One of these two we should be compelled to resort to if France gained possession of Louisiana, and we had better resort to it now. I deny that they have as yet gained possession: they have not received a delivery of the four redoubts which garrison and command the country, nor have they a single armed soldier there, except those which are particularly attached to the equipage of the Colonial Prefect. If, sir, we were obliged to resort to the necessity of purchasing their friendship, after they had procured an establishment, it would not be confined to one instance of humiliation and acknowledgment on our part, or one instance of insult only on theirs. If we purchase this friendship once, we should be compelled to make annual contributions to their avarice, and be annually subjected to their insolence. Repeated concessions would only produce a repetition of injury, and, at last, when we had completely compromitted our national dignity, and offered up our last cent as an oblation to Gallic rapacity, we would then be further from conciliation than ever. The spirit of universal domination, instead of being allayed by those measures which had been intended for its abatement, would rage with redoubled fury. Elated by those sacrifices which had been intended to appease it, it would still grow more fierce; it would soon stride across the Mississippi, and every encroachment which conquest or cunning could effect might be expected. The tomahawk of the savage and the knife of the negro would confederate in the league, and there would be no interval of peace, until we should either be able to drive them from their location altogether, or else offer up our sovereignty as a homage of our respect, and permit the name of our country to be blotted out of the list of nations for ever.
I confess there are many gentlemen of that nation for whom I entertain the sincerest esteem; but although I love some of them as friends, they will pardon me when I say that I do not like all of them as neighbors. Blood, havoc, and devastation, have for some years past encircled their proximity, and circumstances equally disastrous and equally improbable have already taken place. Do we want any evidences of this? We can find them in Switzerland, in Italy, in Egypt, in Hanover, in France itself. We have seen the ancient throne of the Capets tumbled from its base; we have seen the tide of succession which had flowed on uninterruptedly for ages dammed up for ever; we have seen the sources of the life blood royal drained dry. And by whom? By the pert younglings of the day.
“An eagle towering in his pride of flight
Was, by a mousing owl, hawkt at and killed.”