The House proceeded to consider the resolution submitted by Mr. Macon, on the sixteenth instant, in the words following, to wit:
"Resolved, That so much of the message of the President of the United States of the seventh of March, one thousand eight hundred and eight, as relates to the batture in the suburbs of St. Mary's, adjoining New Orleans, and the documents accompanying it, together with the petitions of Edward Livingston, and the petitions of the citizens of New Orleans on the same subject, and the documents which accompanied the same, be referred to the Attorney-General of the United States, and that he be instructed to receive and collect such other testimony as may be necessary to ascertain the title of the United States to the before-mentioned batture, and that he be directed to report to this House, at the next session of Congress, his opinion as to the validity of the claim of the United States to the said batture."
Mr. Burwell thought that this was not the proper course to pursue; but that the course recommended at the last session was the one, viz: to give the petitioners the right of appeal from the decision of the Orleans court to the Supreme Court, or to give the United States the same right, should the decision be against them. He could see no advantage in the procrastination now proposed, nor any injury to the United States or the city of New Orleans, in the course which he advocated. He doubted, although the letter of the law of 1807 might cover this case, whether it was ever intended that that law should operate as this had done. My intention, said he, in voting for it, was that it should apply exclusively to the Western lands, commonly called the Yazoo lands, and such other lands as were occupied by hundreds who might be formidable from their numbers. To undertake jurisdiction on questions of property is taking upon ourselves the functions of another department of the Judiciary. The case involves important points of law—and let me ask, whether the gentlemen in this House are so well read in law as to be able to decide such an important point as this? It does appear to me that on all the questions of private property arising in the United States, where the question of right is not to be brought before this House, we ought to consult the convenience of the parties by promoting dispatch. On the question whether this property belong to the United States or to the petitioners I am completely ignorant. Nor would I have it inferred that I believe the petitioner to have a right to the property; I take it that the claim of the United States must be good, or the inhabitants of Orleans would not be so zealous in the support of it.
Mr. Poydras asked for the reading of a letter which he had received from the Governor of Orleans Territory, which was accordingly read. The letter states, that if it were possible that the committee to whom Mr. Livingston's claim was referred could now visit New Orleans, they would be convinced that the batture, now covered with water, was in fact the bed of the river, and, therefore, could not be private property. Mr. P. stated the history of this piece of alluvion at some length, and the circumstances under which it had always been deemed public property.
Mr. Sheffey said that before passing this resolution, gentlemen ought to ascertain what the Attorney-General could do in this case. He could not compel the attendance of witnesses, or collect testimony of circumstances which occurred a hundred years ago; and unless he could do this, it was impossible he could examine the title, for testimony as to facts was essential to enable him to form a correct opinion. What influence could the opinion of the Attorney-General have? Was the right of the citizen to fall prostrate before such an ex parte opinion or statement as that might be? If it was not to have influence, why thus evade a decision on the prayer of the petitioner? If it was to have any influence, it must be a pernicious one, because founded on ex parte testimony. Would the House go into the merits of the case on this opinion, when obtained without affording an opportunity to the party interested to prove that the law was not correctly expounded nor the facts correctly stated? Surely not. If they did not, if they heard opinions on both sides, they converted this House into a judiciary tribunal. Was this body calculated for that branch of Government? No; this, Mr. S. said, is a Government of departments, each of which ought to be kept separate. What, sir! is this a question of right between the United States and an individual, and we are about to take it into our own hands, to wrest it from the constitutional authority, and decide it ourselves? I hope we shall not; and, therefore, I am against this proposition. What does the Attorney-General state in his report? Aware of the impropriety of his deciding, he tells you—what? That the usual course, where the rights of the United States have been involved, has been to appoint commissioners to hear and decide. Here the Attorney-General tells you it is not proper for him to decide. And I should never wish to see the case in which the Attorney-General's opinion is to give authority for dispossessing an individual of his property; for if it can be done in one case it may be in every case. Any individual may be driven from his property by military force, and then his title be decided by an ill-shapen, one-sided statement and opinion of the Attorney-General. Against such a decision I do protest. Is it because you have power on your side, sir, that you will not submit to a judicial decision of this question? If there be a controversy about a right, there ought to be a judicial decision.
I, sir, have been unable to see how an individual having property, in which he was put in possession in 1804 or '5 by a judicial decision, could be disposed of it by the act of 1807, the operation of which was limited to acts done hereafter, that is, after the passing of that act in 1807. That law too speaks of "lands ceded to the United States." Was the batture ceded to the United States? I say not, because it was private property before the United States possessed the sovereignty of the country. By the treaty of 1803 with the Government of the United States, the rights and property of the inhabitants of Louisiana was secured to them. What then is the inference from this state of the case? That the United States got possession illegally, in defiance of judicial authority. I am sorry to see that the judicial authority has been set at defiance, and the Presidential mandate carried into effect at the point of the bayonet, right or wrong. This was the case. Those who were put in possession were ousted by military force. Let me not be understood as throwing odium on the Executive; far from it. I believe the Executive acted conscientiously, but upon an ex parte statement. The President was never told that the case had been judicially investigated. Those facts were taken for granted, on the other hand, which did not exist, and those which formed the foundation of the true merits of the case, were withheld.
Mr. Poydras spoke at some length in reply to Mr. Sheffey, and in defence of the title of the United States. The batture had many years ago been considered as public property, and no one who examined the circumstances of the case could for a moment doubt it. He said that it had never been claimed as private property until after it came into the possession of the United States. He hoped the rights of the public and of the people of New Orleans would not be trampled upon to grant the petitioner his prayer.
Mr. Macon said that he was himself in favor of giving the right of the United States to the property to the people or corporation of New Orleans, and letting them and the individual contest it. There was nothing new, however, in the reference of a subject to the Head of a Department, whose opinion would have no more weight than reason, and so far only ought it to have weight. Mr. M. said he had no more desire to interfere with the judiciary than either of the gentlemen who had spoken. If provision was made for trying this case, must it not be extended to all others? In order to do justice, it must be done to all. Had not a special court been refused in relation to a property of much greater value than this? Before Congress made a special court for a certain case, they ought to look at the consequences. It was departing from the general system of the nation to appoint a court for a special case. Perhaps there was something in this case which differed from other cases: but he doubted whether it would warrant the appointment of a special court. Mr. M. said he saw no other way of treating this subject but by letting it go before the courts already organized. If the right was in the petitioner, be the consequences what it might, the city of New Orleans had no right to take it away from him.
Mr. Troup observed that this case was probably one which would fall under the old maxim, nullum tempus occurrit regi or reipublicæ. It appeared to him that there was a constitutional difficulty in this case, which did not appear to have suggested itself to the mind of any gentleman. First, has the United States a claim, either real or disputed, to this territory? Whether disputed or otherwise, provided the claim be asserted on its part, the question is, has the Congress of the United States a power to decide the validity of that claim? And if it has, is it proper so to decide it? What is the subject-matter in dispute? Public property; and what species? Landed. Then the question results, has Congress a right, in order to determine its title, to refer it to any tribunal whatever? I contend not; the right to public property was originally in the people of this country; they could never be divested of their great public right to the landed property of the nation, but by their express consent. They did give that right to the Congress of the United States, in declaring that it should have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations concerning public territory. Would it have had that power, if this right had not been expressly delegated? I know that, under the old Articles of Confederation, Congress did undertake to legislate as to property; but it was always questionable whether they had a right to do so—and this was not the only point on which Congress did exercise powers which were brought into question. The right to determine claims to public property is not only guarantied exclusively to Congress by the constitution, but the practice has been invariably pursuant to it; it was so in 1807. The Government not only asserted its right in the first instance, but asserted its power to enforce the right at the point of the bayonet. If the public have always been in possession of a certain property, the man who enters on it without their consent is a trespasser on that property. Upon this view of the subject, there is a constitutional difficulty on which the House should decide, before it entertains a motion for delegating a power to decide this question to any tribunal or commission whatever.
Mr. Boyd said, admitting all the gentleman had said to be true, his observations did not apply to this case. He had spoken of the right to public property. The question now was, whether this was public property or not; if it were certainly public property, on which ground the gentleman rested his argument, there could be no question on the subject. It was asked only before they decided between the individual and the United States on the right to land, not confessedly public property, but claimed as such, that fair investigation should be had. Mr. B. disclaimed the power of deciding judicially upon the subject; it was a right which he had never thought of this House claiming. A delay of justice was a denial of it. The individual petitioning had been in possession of the property; it had been taken from him by force, and he now asked a trial of his title before a competent court—and this opportunity, Mr. B. said, he ought to have as speedily as possible.