Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Mr. Randolph said he should vote against that report. He said it was no part of his intention to deliver any opinion on the merits of the claim, although he had devoted not a little of his time to the study of that question, for two reasons: first, that it would be a prejudicated opinion, inasmuch as that was not the question which the House were called upon to decide, even if it were competent to decide it. I am extremely sorry, said he that the law of 1807 has been brought into view of this House by my friends from North Carolina and Georgia, and for this reason: that that law has no bearing at all on the present question. Its object was wholly different from that to which it has been misapplied. What, sir, was the object of that law? To defend against a conspiracy, I may properly term it—against the lawless violence of confederated associations, a vast property. How has it been applied? Not to a great public property, but to a speck of land, to which, as I understand it, a single individual, or at most three or four, put in a claim. Such an application as that of the law in question was never intended by the Legislature; and, if applied to such a property as the batture, and to the case of a single individual, may be applied to the property of every man in society. What is the doctrine of my friend from Georgia? That the public are always supposed to be in possession of the national domain. True, sir, and it is also true that those who enter upon it and endeavor to appropriate it to themselves, are trespassers, and as such, may be resisted by force. But that is not the case in the present question—very far from it—for the public never had been in possession of the property in question.

Without attempting to enter into the merits of the real title to the land in question, let us take it on the ground of the right of the citizen. A citizen comes before this House, and complains that he is dispossessed of his common right by arbitrary power. If, after a cause has been heard by a court, and a citizen put in possession of a property, by a decree of that court, he is dispossessed of it by military violence, where, if not before this House, is he to prefer his claim for redress? There is no court before which he can go, because the court which is the last resort in this case has already unavailingly given its decision. There is no court of appeal, no superior tribunal, and if there were, and a decree of the Supreme Court obtained in his favor on the appeal, what is any decree to avail against armed men—against muskets and bayonets? But this is not the only reason why I am sorry that the act of 1807 has been brought in to apply to this case. It is because, if this House can be once prevailed upon to consider this case as analogous to the Yazoo case, many most injurious consequences must follow therefrom. The first is, that that odious and supremely infamous claim will be put upon a ground which it is by no means entitled to occupy; and I entreat my friend from Georgia, and those whose minds are unalterably made up on the Yazoo question, not to give their enemies such a prize as they must have on us, if we agree to confound the Yazoo claim with that before the House. There is no sort of analogy between them. On the other hand, sir, supposing the right to be in the United States, I beg gentlemen not to create so forcible an interest against the rights of the United States as will infallibly be embodied against it if we confound the two. I have no idea of giving the Yazoo men such a handle. Again, let us suppose, if we can suppose it, that the right is in the petitioner; may it not, supposing a great majority of the House to be against the Yazoo claim—we do not know how they are disposed—may it not create an unjust bias against the petitioner? So that in whatever aspect we view it, it is not only impolitic, but, what is worse, extremely unjust to attempt to identify the two cases. And, sir, it is a matter of curious speculation, that while the act of 1807 has been brought into operation in the case of a solitary individual and a little speck of property to which it was not intended to apply, even supposing the case in question to to have arisen subsequently to the passage of that act; that, although it has been misapplied in this case, it has not been applied to the case to which it was intended to apply, and for which it was enacted; for, if I understood my friend from Georgia a few days ago, some hundreds or thousands of intruders have set themselves down on the public lands, and the public force has never been employed against them. On the contrary, the artillery of Government has been brought into play against a single individual. It was, indeed, said that these intruders had agreed to remain as tenants at will; but, let them remain till they are sufficiently strong, and they will give you another chapter in the history of Wyoming; for, after they are sufficiently strong to hold territory, although the arm of Government has been applied successfully to oust a single individual put in possession by a decree of a court, you will find it nerveless to expel these men.

With regard to the doctrine nullum tempus occurrit reipublicæ, it is a dangerous doctrine, if carried to the extent to which I apprehend my friend from Georgia would carry it. I venture to say that the abuse of that doctrine in the celebrated case of Sir John Lowther and the Duke of Portland, which created one general sentiment of indignation in the British nation—an attempt under that maxim to deprive a subject, hostile to the Court, of property of which he had been long in possession, for the purpose of transferring it to a minion of the Court—that case, with all its aggravated enormities, does not come up to the case before the House; and I speak without reference to the question whether the petitioner has a right or not to the property in this case. The question of right is not before the House, and that question, decide which way you will, can have no sort of weight in the vote which the House ought to give. The question is this: Having been long in possession of a piece of land, the title deeds destroyed, records burnt, and possession the only title you have to show, an attempt is made to dispossess you of the property; a decree of court confirms your right; if the individual, under these circumstances, can be turned out of possession by main force and strength, and that, too, military force, there is an end in the right to property of every man in the country. Sir, I have been astonished, and grieved and mortified, to see so little sensation created in this nation by the procedure in question. It strikes at the root of every thing dear to freemen. There is an end of their rights.

What, then, is this case? An individual comes before us, and says, that after having been put in possession of a piece of land, (I speak not of the validity of his title; it is not concerned in this question,) he was dispossessed by military force of this property. These two facts I do not understand any member of this House to deny. And what does he claim? He claims of you, as the guardians of the rights of every man in society, justice. And where do you send him? To the Attorney-General. I will suppose that in the Lowther and Portland case, the Duke of Portland had been referred to the Attorney-General. Would the English nation have endured it? No, sir. Much less would they have endured, military as the nation is becoming by the introduction of large standing armies, that he should have been dispossessed of his property by an armed military force, at the fiat of the Crown. The question is, what should be done? Sir, what should not be done is perfectly clear. It ought not to be done that the petitioner should be sent to the Attorney-General, who has already given an opinion on his claim, though that is very immaterial, which opinion it seems we cannot find. If I understand any thing of this Government, however, it ought to be on record, and this return of non est inventus ought not to have been received. All that we have to do, it appears to me, is to make a provision, in the nature of a declaratory law, not amending the act of 1807, but, declaring what the law is; and we ought to quiet the rights, and the mind too, of every man in society, by declaring that, by the act of 1807, it was not intended to authorize the President of the United States to interpose the bayonet between the courts of justice and the individual. This power never has been given, never was intended to be given.

Mr. Gold said that this was one of the most important subjects that had ever been brought before the House. He did not mean to enter into the merits of the case. The gentleman from Virginia had very clearly expressed all those sentiments which every man must feel on hearing the history of this case; and as regarded the ground taken, of nullum tempus occurrit, the gentleman had repelled it very properly—and indeed in that country whence the maxim had been derived, whenever it was attempted to be put in force against ancient possessions, it had been executed with great difficulty. It is in the very teeth of Magna Charta, which says that a freeman shall not be dispossessed of his freehold without a better right is ascertained. There are a variety of forms by which the right is guarded. If I, said Mr. G., understood the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Troup,) he considers it a sacrifice of the rights of the United States to permit a decision on its property to pass into the hands of third persons. Even in England the prerogative is not carried so far. The Crown has frequently consented that the right of Government should pass into the hands of third persons, viz: of commissioners, for the purpose of investigation.

I will not trouble the House with lengthy remarks on this subject. I can hardly advert to it without feeling all that has been much more eloquently expressed by the gentleman from Virginia than it is in my power to express it. Let gentlemen look around and see if they can find a precedent for this transaction. And when we consider it, every man's feelings must be operated upon too strongly to permit him to argue. The course suggested by the gentleman from Virginia must prevail, or we no longer live under a Government of laws, and those principles on which it is founded are destroyed. The man ousted must be put in possession, must be restored to the possession of the property which the hand of violence has wrested from him; and I hope that a proposition to this effect in a proper shape will be presented.

Mr. Gholson said he thought it would better become the character of this assembly to discuss every subject with calmness and deliberation, and on its own merits, than to endeavor to influence the decision by an appeal to the passions. It was important that such a course should be pursued, whether with reference to a great political principle or to the interest of the individual whose rights were said to have been wantonly prostrated at the Executive will. I (said Mr. G.) have been early taught, and the doctrine has grown with my years, that the right of property is not one of the least consideration in a free constitution. It is of a nature so sacredly inviolable that, when clearly ascertained, I would never encroach upon it by any means but through the regular constituted authority. It would have been under this impression that, had I been a member of the Legislature when the law of 1807 was introduced into the statute book, I should have been opposed to it. But receiving all the sanctions of a law, and as such containing a rule of conduct in certain specified cases, what was the Executive to do? Was he to set at defiance the law of the land? A doctrine like this can never be contended for. It seems, however, that to satisfy gentlemen the President should have refused to carry this law into execution, which I acknowledge does usurp judicial authority.—[Mr. Randolph said that his ground was that the President had not executed the law. If a law were ever so unconstitutional, the President having signed it, it would become his duty to carry it into effect. But he denied that he had carried it into effect.] Upon that point, continued Mr. G., my colleague and I are at issue. I rise not to discuss the merits of the claim, which I have no disposition to do. I rise to defend the late President of the United States, to endeavor, to the extent of my feeble powers, to place this question in a proper point of view. If the President of the United States has gone beyond the letter of the law, which itself tends to encroach on the rights of the citizen, I would be the last person to justify him in thus trespassing on the dearest rights of a freeman. But it is very easy to show that he has not exceeded the express provisions of the law in question.

The act of 1807 contains two clauses having a bearing on the subject; the first ascertaining the character of the persons to be ousted, and the second providing the means of ousting them. The President is authorized to exercise this power, either where property was previously in possession, in which case he is to give notice, or where it was subsequently entered on, in which case he is not required to give notice. It is easy to show that this is one of the cases contemplated by that act. It is well known that the feudal law did exist in Louisiana, previous to its acquisition by the United States, and that by that law alluvion does accrue to the Crown. Now, if the feudal law did exist, and by that law alluvion did accrue to the Crown of France, does it not follow that the same right did accrue to the United States by the deed of cession from France, who owned the territory? If the claimant was in possession when this act passed, it became the duty of the President of the United States to give him three months' notice previous to his removal; if not, no such notice was necessary. On this point I need only refer to the fact that it was not so early as the passage of the act, indeed not till the 23d of May, that the claimants came into possession. They were quieted in possession, so far as the rights of the United States were not concerned, on the 23d of May, 1807.

The decision of the corporation court of New Orleans is relied on as giving a title to the petitioner. That that decision did at all affect, in the remotest possible degree, the right of the United States, is a position which no man acquainted with the principles of law will contend for. The decision cannot affect the right of the United States, because it was not contested or defended before that court.

It is said that the feudal law does not exist in France. From time immemorial it has existed all over Europe. That it exists at this time in this country there can be no doubt. The right to lands is allodial, but is inherent in the Government. Is it denied that the Government can take property from an individual, making him compensation therefor? If the right to land be indefeasible, could the Government run a road through it? It certainly could not. I wish it to be distinctly understood that I do not attempt to say where the real right to the property in question does reside. But I do say, that, according to the treaty of cession, it did become the Government of the United States to exercise the power which the President under the law of 1807 did make use of.