I have been thus particular to draw the minds of gentlemen, distinctly, to the meaning of the terms used in the preamble; to the extent which "the United States" then included; and to the fact that neither New Orleans nor Louisiana were within the comprehension of the terms of this instrument. It is sufficient for the present branch of my argument to say, that there is nothing in the general nature of this compact from which the power contemplated to be exercised in this bill results. On the contrary, as the introduction of a new associate in political power implies, necessarily, a new division of power, and consequent diminution of the relative proportion of the former proprietors of it; there can, certainly, be nothing more obvious, than that from the general nature of the instrument no power can result to diminish and give away to strangers any proportion of the rights of the original partners. If such a power exists, it must be found, then, in the particular provisions in the constitution. The question now arising is, in which of these provisions is given the power to admit new States, to be created in territories, beyond the limits of the old United States. If it exists anywhere, it is either in the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, or in the treaty-making power. If it result from neither of these, it is not pretended to be found anywhere else.
That part of the third section of the fourth article, on which the advocates of this bill rely, is the following: "New States may be admitted, by the Congress, into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress." I know, Mr. Speaker, that the first clause of this paragraph has been read, with all the superciliousness of a grammarian's triumph. "New States may be admitted, by the Congress, into this Union." Accompanied with this most consequential inquiry: "Is not this a new State to be admitted? And is not here an express authority?" I have no doubt this is a full and satisfactory argument to every one, who is content with the mere colors and superficies of things. And if we were now at the bar of some stall-fed justice, the inquiry would insure victory to the maker of it, to the manifest delight of the constables and suitors of his court. But, sir, we are now before the tribunal of the whole American people; reasoning concerning their liberties, their rights, their constitution. These are not to be made the victims of the inevitable obscurity of general terms; nor the sport of verbal criticism. The question is concerning the intent of the American people, the proprietors of the old United States, when they agreed to this article. Dictionaries and spelling-books are, here, of no authority. Neither Johnson, nor Walker, nor Webster nor Dilworth, has any voice in this matter. Sir, the question concerns the proportion of power, reserved by this constitution, to every State in the Union. Have the three branches of this Government a right, at will, to weaken and outweigh the influence, respectively secured to each State, in this compact, by introducing, at pleasure, new partners, situate beyond the old limits of the United States? The question has not relation merely to New Orleans. The great objection is to the principle of the bill. If this bill be admitted, the whole space of Louisiana, greater, it is said, than the entire extent of the old United States, will be a mighty theatre, in which this Government assumes the right of exercising this unparalleled power. And it will be; there is no concealment, it is intended to be exercised. Nor will it stop, until the very name and nature of the old partners be overwhelmed by new comers into the Confederacy. Sir, the question goes to the very root of the power and influence of the present members of this Union. The real intent of this article is, therefore, an inquiry of most serious import; and is to be settled only by a recurrence to the known history and known relations of this people and their constitution. These, I maintain, support this position: that the terms "new States," in this article, do intend new political sovereignties, to be formed within the original limits of the United States; and do not intend new political sovereignties with territorial annexations, to be erected without the original limits of the United States. I undertake to support both branches of this position to the satisfaction of the people of these United States. As to any expectation of conviction on this floor, I know the nature of the ground and how hopeless any arguments are, which thwart a concerted course of measures.
I recur, in the first place, to the evidence of history. This furnishes the following leading fact: that before, and at the time of the adoption of this constitution, the creation of new political sovereignties within the limits of the old United States was contemplated. Among the records of the old Congress will be found a resolution, passed as long ago as the 10th day of October, 1780, contemplating the cession of unappropriated lands to the United States, accompanied by a provision that "they shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct Republican States, which shall become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other States." Afterward, on the 7th of July, 1786, the subject of "laying out and forming into States" the country lying northwest of the river Ohio, came under the consideration of the same body; and another resolution was passed recommending to the Legislature of Virginia to revise their act of cession, so as to permit a more eligible division of that portion of territory derived from her; "which States," it proceeds to declare, "shall hereafter become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the original States, in conformity with the resolution of Congress of the 10th of October, 1780." All the Territories to which these resolutions had reference, were undeniably within the ancient limits of the United States.
Here, then, is a leading fact, that the article in the constitution had a condition of things, notorious at the time when it was adopted, upon which it was to act, and to meet the exigency resulting from which, such an article was requisite. That is to say: new States, within the limits of the United States, were contemplated at the time when the foundations of the constitution were laid. But we have another authority upon this point, which is, in truth, a cotemporaneous exposition of this article of the constitution. I allude to the resolution, passed on the 3d of July, 1788, in the words following:
[Here the resolution was read.]
In this resolution of the old Congress, it is expressly declared, that the Constitution of the United States having been adopted by nine States, an act of the old Congress could have no effect to make Kentucky a separate member of the Union, and that, although they thought it expedient that it should be so admitted, yet that this could only be done under the provisions made in the new constitution. It is impossible to have a more direct contemporaneous evidence that the case contemplated in this article was that of the Territories within the limits of the United States; yet the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon,) for whose integrity and independence I have very great respect, told us the other day, that "if this article had not territories within the limits of the old United States to act upon, it would be wholly without meaning. Because the ordinance of the old Congress had secured the right to the States within the old United States, and a provision for that object, in the new constitution, was wholly unnecessary." Now, I will appeal to the gentleman's own candor, if the very reverse of the conclusion he draws is not the true one, after he has considered the following fact: That, by this ordinance of the old Congress, it was declared, that the boundaries of the contemplated States, and the terms of their admission, should be, in certain particulars, specified in the ordinance, subject to the control of Congress. Now, as by the new constitution the old Congress was about to be annihilated, it was absolutely necessary for the very fulfilment of this ordinance, that the new constitution should have this power for the admission of new States within the ancient limits, so that the ordinance of the old Congress, far from showing the inutility of such a provision for the Territories within the ancient limits, expressly proves the reverse, and is an evidence of its necessity to effect the object of the ordinance itself.
I think there can be no more satisfactory evidence adduced or required of the first part of the position, that the terms "new States" did intend new political sovereignties within the limits of the old United States. For it is here shown, that the creation of such States, within the territorial limits fixed by the treaty of 1783, had been contemplated; that the old Congress itself expressly asserts that the new constitution gave the power for that object; that the nature of the old ordinance required such a power, for the purpose of carrying its provisions into effect, and that it has been from the time of the adoption of the federal constitution, unto this hour, applied exclusively to the admission of States, within the limits of the old United States, and was never attempted to be extended to any other object.
Now, having shown a purpose, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, sufficient to occupy the whole scope of the terms of the article, ought not the evidence be very strong to satisfy the mind, that the terms really intended something else, besides this obvious purpose; that it may be fairly extended to the entire circle of the globe, wherever title can be obtained by purchase, or conquest, and the new partners in the political power may be admitted at the mere discretion of this Legislature, any where that it wills. A principle thus monstrous is asserted in this bill.
But I think it may be made satisfactorily to appear not only that the terms "new States" in this article did mean political sovereignties to be formed within the original limits of the United States, as has just been shown, but, also, negatively, that it did not intend new political sovereignties, with territorial annexations, to be created without those original limits. This appears first from the very tenor of the article. All its limitations have respect to the creation of States within the original limits. Two States shall not be joined; no new State shall be erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of Congress. Now, had foreign territories been contemplated, had the new habits, customs, manners, and language of other nations been in the idea of the framers of this constitution, would not some limitation have been devised, to guard against the abuse of a power, in its nature so enormous, and so obviously, when it occurred, calculated to excite just jealousy among the States, whose relative weight would be so essentially affected, by such an infusion at once of a mass of foreigners into their Councils, and into all the rights of the country? The want of all limitation of such power would be a strong evidence, were others wanting, that the powers, now about to be exercised, never entered into the imagination of those thoughtful and prescient men, who constructed the fabric. But there is another most powerful argument against the extension of this article to embrace the right to create States without the original limits of the United States, deducible from the utter silence of all debates at the period of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, touching the power here proposed to be usurped. If ever there was a time in which the ingenuity of the greatest men of an age was taxed to find arguments in favor of and against any political measure, it was at the time of the adoption of this constitution. All the faculties of the human mind were, on the one side and the other, put upon their utmost stretch, to find the real and imaginary blessings or evils, likely to result from the proposed measure. Now I call upon the advocates of this bill to point out, in all the debates of that period in any one publication, in any one newspaper of those times, a single intimation, by friend or foe to the constitution, approving or censuring it for containing the power here proposed to be usurped, or a single suggestion that it might be extended to such an object as is now proposed. I do not say that no such suggestion was ever made. But this I will say that I do not believe there is such a one any where to be found. Certain I am, I have never been able to meet the shadow of such a suggestion, and I have made no inconsiderable research upon the point. Such may exist—but until it be produced, we have a right to reason as though it had no existence. No, sir. The people of this country at that day had no idea of the territorial avidity of their successors. It was, on the contrary, an argument, urged against the success of the project, that the territory was too extensive for a republican form of government. But, now there is no limits to our ambitious hopes. We are about to cross the Mississippi. The Missouri and Red River are but roads, on which our imagination travels to new lands and new States to be raised and admitted (under the power, now first usurped) into this Union, among undiscovered lands in the west. But it has been suggested that the Convention had Canada in view, in this article, and the gentleman from North Carolina told this House, that a member of the Convention, as I understood him, either now, or lately a member of the Senate, informed him that the article had that reference. Sir, I have no doubt the gentleman from North Carolina has had a communication such as he intimates. But, for myself, I have no sort of faith in these convenient recollections, suited to serve a turn, to furnish an apology for a party, or give color to a project. I do not deny, on the contrary I believe it very probable, that among the coursings of some discursive and craving fancy, such thoughts might be started; but that is not the question. Was this an avowed object in the Convention when it formed this article? Did it enter into the conception of the people when its principles were discussed? Sir, it did not, it could not. The very intention would have been a disgrace both to this people and the Convention. What, sir! Shall it be intimated; shall it for a moment be admitted, that the noblest and purest band of patriots this or any other country ever could boast, were engaged in machinating means for the dismemberment of the territories of a power to which they had pledged friendship, and the observance of all the obligations which grow out of a strict and perfect amity? The honor of our country forbids and disdains such a suggestion.
But there is an argument stronger, even, than all those which have been produced, to be drawn from the nature of the power here proposed to be exercised. Is it possible that such a power, if it had been intended to be given by the people, should be left dependent upon the effect of general expressions; and such too, as were obviously applicable to another subject; to a particular exigency contemplated at the time? Sir, what is this power we propose now to usurp? Nothing less than a power, changing all the proportion of the weight and influence possessed by the potent sovereignties composing this Union. A stranger is to be introduced to an equal share, without their consent. Upon a principle, pretended to be deduced from the constitution—this Government, after this bill passes, may and will multiply foreign partners in power, at its own mere motion; at its irresponsible pleasure; in other words, as local interests, party passions, or ambitious views may suggest. It is a power that, from its nature, never could be delegated; never was delegated; and as it breaks down all the proportions of power guarantied by the constitution to the States, upon which their essential security depends, utterly annihilates the moral force of this political contract. Would this people, so wisely vigilant concerning their rights, have transferred to Congress a power to balance, at its will, the political weight of any one State, much more of all the States, by authorizing it to create new States at its pleasure, in foreign countries, not pretended to be within the scope of the constitution or the conception of the people, at the time of passing it?