This is not so much a question concerning the exercise of sovereignty, as it is who shall be sovereign. Whether the proprietors of the good old United States shall manage their own affairs in their own way; or whether they, and their constitution, and their political rights, shall be trampled under foot by foreigners introduced through a breach of the constitution. The proportion of the political weight of each sovereign State, constituting this Union, depends upon the number of the States which have a voice under the compact. This number the constitution permits us to multiply at pleasure, within the limits of the original United States; observing only the expressed limitations in the constitution. But when in order to increase your power of augmenting this number you pass the old limits, you are guilty of a violation of the constitution in a fundamental point; and in one, also, which is totally inconsistent with the intent of the contract, and the safety of the States which established the association. What is the practical difference to the old partners, whether they hold their liberties at the will of a master, or whether, by admitting exterior States on an equal footing with the original States, arbiters are constituted, who by availing themselves of the contrariety of interests and views which in such a confederacy necessarily will arise, hold the balance among the parties which exist and govern us, by throwing themselves into the scale most conformable to their purposes? In both cases there is an effective despotism. But the last is the more galling, as we carry the chain in the name and gait of freemen.
I have thus shown, and whether fairly, I am willing to be judged by the sound discretion of the American people, that the power, proposed to be usurped, in this bill, results neither from the general nature, nor the particular provisions, of the Federal Constitution; and that it is a palpable violation of it in a fundamental point; whence flow all the consequences I have intimated.
The present President of the United States, when a member of the Virginia Convention for adopting the constitution, expressly declares that the treaty-making power has limitations; and he states this as one, "that it cannot alienate any essential right." Now, is not here an essential right to be alienated? The right to that proportion of political power which the constitution has secured to every State, modified only by such internal increase of States as the existing limits of the Territories at the time of the adoption of the constitution permitted. The debates of that period chiefly turned upon the competency of this power to bargain away any of the old States. It was agreed, at that time, that by this power old States within the ancient limits could not be sold from us. And I maintain that, by it, new States without the ancient limits cannot be saddled upon us. It was agreed, at that time, that the treaty-making power "could not cut off a limb." And I maintain, that neither has it the competency to clap a hump upon our shoulders. The fair proportions devised by the constitution are in both cases marred, and the fate and felicity of the political being, in material particulars, related to the essence of his constitution, affected. It was never pretended, by the most enthusiastic advocates for the extent of the treaty-making power, that it exceeded that of the King of Great Britain. Yet, I ask, suppose that monarch should make a treaty, stipulating that Hanover or Hindostan should have a right of representation on the floor of Parliament, would such a treaty be binding? No, sir; not, as I believe, if a House of Commons and of Lords could be found venal enough to agree to it. But although in that country the three branches of its legislature are called omnipotent, and the people might not deem themselves justified in resistance, yet here there is no apology of this kind; the limits of our power are distinctly marked; and when the three branches of this Government usurp upon this constitution in particulars vital to the liberties of this people, the deed is at their peril.
I have done with the constitutional argument. Whether I have been able to convince any member of this House, I am ignorant—I had almost said indifferent. But this I will not say, because I am, indeed, deeply anxious to prevent the passage of this bill. Of this I am certain, however, that when the dissension of this day is passed away, when party spirit shall no longer prevent the people of the United States from looking at the principle assumed in it, independent of gross and deceptive attachments and antipathies, that the ground here defended will be acknowledged as a high constitutional bulwark, and that the principles here advanced will be appreciated.
I will add one word, touching the situation of New Orleans. The provision of the treaty of 1803, which stipulates that it shall be "admitted as soon as possible," does not therefore imply a violation of the constitution. There are ways in which this may constitutionally be effected—by an amendment of the constitution, or by reference to conventions of the people in the States. And I do suppose, that, in relation to the objects of the present bill, (with the people of New Orleans,) no great difficulty would arise. Considered as an important accommodation to the Western States, there would be no violent objection to the measure. But this would not answer all the projects to which the principle of this bill, when once admitted, leads, and is intended to be applied. The whole extent of Louisiana is to be cut up into independent States, to counterbalance and to paralyze whatever there is of influence in other quarters of the Union. Such a power, I am well aware that the people of the States would never grant you. And therefore, if you get it, the only way is by the mode adopted in this bill—by usurpation.
The objection here urged is not a new one. I refer with great delicacy to the course pursued by any member of the other branch of the Legislature; yet I have it from such authority that I have an entire belief of the fact, that our present Minister in Russia, then a member of that body, when the Louisiana treaty was under the consideration of the Senate, although he was in favor of the treaty, yet expressed great doubts on the ground of constitutionality, in relation to our control over the destinies of that people, and the manner and the principles on which they could be admitted into the Union. And it does appear that he made two several motions in that body, having for their object, as avowed, and as gathered from their nature, an alteration in the constitution, to enable us to comply with the stipulations of that convention.
I will add only a few words in relation to the moral and political consequences of usurping this power. I have said, that it would be a virtual dissolution of the Union; and gentlemen express great sensibility at the expression. But the true source of terror is not the declaration I have made, but the deed you propose. Is there a moral principle of public law better settled, or more conformable to the plainest suggestions of reason, than that the violation of a contract by one of the parties may be considered as exempting the other from its obligations? Suppose, in private life, thirteen form a partnership, and ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without the concurrence of the other three, would it not be at their option to abandon the partnership, after so palpable an infringement of their rights? How much more, in the political partnership, where the admission of new associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant with obvious dangers and evils! Again: it is settled as a principle of morality, among writers on public law, that no person can be obliged, beyond his intent at the time of the contract. Now, who believes, who dare assert, that it was the intention of the people, when they adopted this constitution, to assign, eventually, to New Orleans and Louisiana, a portion of their political power, and to invest all the people those extensive regions might hereafter contain with an authority over themselves and their descendants? When you throw the weight of Louisiana into the scale, you destroy the political equipoise contemplated at the time of forming the contract. Can any man venture to affirm that the people did intend such a comprehension as you now, by construction, give it; or can it be concealed that, beyond its fair and acknowledged intent, such a compact has no moral force? If gentlemen are so alarmed at the bare mention of the consequences, let them abandon a measure which sooner or later will produce them. How long before the seeds of discontent will ripen, no man can foretell; but it is the part of wisdom not to multiply or scatter them. Do you suppose the people of the Northern and Atlantic States will, or ought to, look on with patience and see Representatives and Senators from the Red river and Missouri pouring themselves upon this and the other floor, managing the concerns of a seaboard fifteen hundred miles at least from their residence, and having a preponderancy in councils, into which, constitutionally, they could never have been admitted? I have no hesitation upon this point. They neither will see it, nor ought to see it, with content. It is the part of a wise man to foresee danger, and to hide himself. This great usurpation, which creeps into this House under the plausible appearance of giving content to that important point, New Orleans, starts up a gigantic power to control the nation. Upon the actual condition of things, there is, there can be, no need of concealment. It is apparent to the blindest vision. By the course of nature, and conformable to the acknowledged principles of the constitution, the sceptre of power in this country is passing towards the Northwest. Sir, there is to this no objection. The right belongs to that quarter of the country; enjoy it; it is yours. Use the powers granted as you please; but take care, in your haste after effectual dominion, not to overload the scales by heaping it with these new acquisitions. Grasp not too eagerly at your purpose. In your speed after uncontrolled sway, trample not down this constitution. Already the old States sink in the estimation of members, when brought into comparison with these new countries. We have been told that "New Orleans was the most important point in the Union." A place out of the Union the most important place within it! We have been asked, "What are some of the small States when compared with the Mississippi Territory?" The gentleman from that Territory (Mr. Poindexter) spoke the other day of the Mississippi as "of a high road between" ——. Good heavens, between what, Mr. Speaker? Why, "the Eastern and Western States." So that all the Northwestern Territories, all the countries once the extreme western boundary of our Union, are hereafter to be denominated Eastern States.
[Mr. Poindexter explained. He said that he had not said that the Mississippi was to be the boundary between the Eastern and Western States. He had merely thrown out a hint, that, in erecting new States, it might be a good high-road between the States on its waters. His idea had not extended beyond the new States, on the waters of the Mississippi.]
I make no great point of this matter. The gentleman will find, in the National Intelligencer, the terms to which I refer. There will be seen, I presume, what he has said, and what he has not said. The argument is not affected by the explanation. New States are intended to be formed beyond the Mississippi. There is no limit to men's imaginations, on this subject, short of California and Columbia river. When I said that the bill would justify a revolution, and would produce it, I spoke of its principle and its practical consequences. To this principle and those consequences, I would call the attention of this House and nation. If it be about to introduce a condition of things absolutely insupportable, it becomes wise and honest men to anticipate the evil, and to warn and prepare the people against the event. I have no hesitation on the subject. The extension of this principle to the States, contemplated beyond the Mississippi, cannot, will not, and ought not to be borne. And the sooner the people contemplate the unavoidable result, the better; the more likely that convulsions may be prevented; the more hope that the evils may be palliated or removed.
Mr. Speaker: What is this liberty of which so much is said? Is it to walk about this earth, to breathe this air, and to partake the common blessings of God's providence? The beasts of the field and the birds of the air unite with us in such privileges as these. But man boasts a purer and more ethereal temperature. His mind grasps in its view the past and the future, as well as the present. We live not for ourselves alone. That which we call liberty, is that principle on which the essential security of our political condition depends. It results from the limitations of our political system, prescribed in the constitution. These limitations, so long as they are faithfully observed, maintain order, peace, and safety. When they are violated in essential particulars, all the concurrent spheres of authority rush against each other, and disorder, derangement, and convulsion are, sooner or later, the necessary consequences.