Thursday, December 17.
Increase of the Navy.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to increase the Navy of the United States.
Mr. Seybert moved to amend the first section of the bill by striking out "four seventy-fours and," so as to erase the provision for building vessels of that description.
Mr. Gold.—The provision in the bill to introduce ships-of-the-line into the Navy, I consider, Mr. Chairman, as fixing the great policy of a navy under this Government. Frigates we have had, but in common with petty nations; for the Barbary Powers have frigates; the provision now offered rises higher and promises something worthy of the constitution, something honorable to the Government. I rejoice, Mr. Chairman, at the favorable circumstances, and hail the auspices under which we now meet this question; we are no longer left to erring speculations, to uncertain reasoning, but have under our eyes the sure and infallible test of experience, of practice in war with a naval force. Within a few weeks our tars have thrice grappled with the enemy, and thrice have they triumphed in combat; the success has swelled the American bosom with joy from Orleans to Maine—all without exception of party, vie in demonstrations of joy and in the bestowment of honors upon the victors.
While such a scene is presented here, gloom and dissatisfaction prevail in the metropolis of Great Britain—those who have been so long accustomed to conquer, receive the capture of the Guerriere with as much astonishment as they would behold a suspension of the laws of nature. A strange event to Britons!
How often, sir, has it been echoed and re-echoed within these walls, that it would be in vain to attempt any thing with a navy against Great Britain, unless we could bring ship to ship and man to man—could equal our enemy on the ocean. How much mistaken have gentlemen been; how vain is human reason! The earliest stage of the first war under the Government has yielded a clear, full, and incontestable refutation of the argument. While the American arms have suffered disgrace upon disgrace on what was deemed the natural and proper theatre for the display of our power; while by land all is gloomy and comfortless, and the heart sickens under the past, our little Navy, a handful of men, has nobly sustained us upon the ocean, and banished that despondency which our disasters by land must have otherwise produced.
If, sir, under such auspices, such overwhelming evidence of the efficiency of a navy, this question is to be put by, I shall despair of a navy; we may rank with Algiers in a force of frigates, but shall do nothing worthy of a community of eight millions of souls, placed by Heaven in a situation most favorable to commerce and naval power.
The objections, sir, to a navy are not a little amusing. Do you move the question in peace, it is objected, that commerce flourishes and you want not protection; at another time it is said not to be worth the expense of a navy, and lastly a navy will draw America into the European vortex and involve us in a war. Now that we are in war, a new book of logic is opened, and it is objected, that you have not time to build a navy, the war will be over before ships can be finished. It is thus, sir, that the arguments against a navy are made to answer and refute themselves; nay, more, the argument in war is a satire and reproach to the objection in peace. "There is not now time to build a navy," reproaches us for not having passed the requisite laws at the last session.
I have always considered the great policy of a navy settled by the constitution; need I spend time to show, that no great specific power was delegated to the General Government unless it was deemed necessary; not necessary for a dormitory, but to be executed for the general protection and welfare. This was the polar star—the test and criterion that governed in the delegation of powers by the States—powers not necessary to be exercised for the general good were retained by the several States. What greatly strengthens the argument is, the power to provide a navy is not only given to the General Government, but taken away or denied to the several States. In adopting the constitution, this question was considered at rest, and a navy was deemed the necessary consequence of this power; in the Virginia Convention, where great talent and ingenuity was displayed in the debate, the point was so considered, and the objection rested on that ground; the consequence of adoption was supposed to be an unequal strengthening of the commercial parts of the Union. So deeply impressed was President Washington with the importance of a navy, and so true to his duty and just claims of commerce for protection, that he could not consent to quit his high station in the public councils without placing on record his sentiments for the good of his country—this he did in his speech to the fourth Congress (second session) in language that well attests his wisdom and paternal care and solicitude for his country. He recommended and urged the policy of a navy in the strongest terms, and I will not believe that the parting lesson of that great and good man will be lost to his country—there is certainly too much respect for his memory to disregard his solemn advice and counsel on any subject. In this policy Mr. Jefferson also concurred at a period most auspicious to fair inquiry and dispassionate judgment; it was before the tempest of party arose, to obscure the great luminary of truth and blacken the political horizon.