Mr. Widgery.—Mr. Chairman, it will be recollected that I was last session of Congress opposed to the building of seventy-fours, until we had got more frigates. I have been rather opposed to them in the Committee of Naval Affairs, not because I was opposed to an augmentation of the Navy, but because I thought it more to the advantage of the country to build frigates and sloops of war at present; and if, hereafter, when we have sailors plenty to man the large ships with, it should be thought best to have larger ships, it may be very well to build them; but, at present, our resources are inadequate to build the seventy-fours and the ten frigates, and say eight or ten sloops of war, which are absolutely necessary for the protection of our seacoast, in order to keep off the British gun-brigs or privateers. The ships-of-the-line will not answer this purpose, when they are at sea; they must keep deep water; they cannot, with safety, follow in under the land those small vessels which annoy our coasters, and capture them all along shore. Within a few days, I have accounts of a small privateer, of eight guns, having captured twenty or thirty sail of coasting vessels. Sir, it is a sight to see a public armed ship of the United States anywhere on our shore to the eastward of Boston—a seacoast of 200 miles—when the enemy can take every thing that passes out to sea, and a country in which there are the best of ship-harbors, where they might cruise with safety, always having a harbor handy to run into. I cannot feel willing to build seventy-fours, to the exclusion of the smaller ships, of which we are so much in want at this time. If you had the money in your chest, and all ready for the building four seventy-fours, and all the timber in the yard—which you have not—still I should have doubts on my mind as to the propriety of those heavy ships. Say, if you please, that you had those ships built, could you send them to sea? I presume not, if at war with England, because she would always blockade your harbors wherever they were; and if you sent them out, perhaps you would never have to man them again; not because our ships in single combat are not a match for hers, but, because they have more ships than they know what to do with; they would always outnumber you at sea, and they would be able to come up with and capture your four ships. But, for what purpose are you to send them out? Certainly, not to take merchantmen. They are not calculated for that purpose, unless you had more than four of them. In case you had a number sufficient to intercept their East India fleet, which, generally, are under strong convoys of heavy ships, then it might be an object to send them to sea. If you are to keep them in port, for the purpose of harbor defence, you must always keep them manned; it will be too late to man them after the enemy comes in sight. And there is, in my mind, another difficulty: In the manning these heavy ships, you will have to impress men to go on board of them, or raise the wages up to what is given in a merchant ship; because the sailors will not be willing to go on board large ships, when they have no chance for prize money. On the other hand, they will be very willing to enter on board cruising ships, such as frigates or sloops of war, in hopes of taking prizes; and you have not, at present, a sufficient number of sailors to man what smaller vessels we want. If you build frigates and sloops of war, they can be furnished without your advancing the money; the merchants will build them, and loan them to the Government. The frigates and smaller vessels can be put afloat in six months from the time they are agreed for; and your ships-of-the-line will not be finished in less than two years; and if they do not cost 30 per cent. more than they are calculated at, I will dare pay all I am worth towards them for nothing. I am willing to go for almost any number of frigates, because I know you can have them built without advancing a dollar until they are ready for service, and because I am convinced they are most for our interest. Popular opinion, I know, has great weight at times; let us not be carried off on the wings of enthusiasm; we are at present at very great expense, and we ought to act prudently with our finances, or they will soon become low. At the same time, I cannot agree with the gentleman from Kentucky, who says he is opposed to any augmentation of the Navy, and asks if you are willing to tax the planters for the building a Navy, and the protection of the merchant? Sir, will not the same reasoning apply against the maritime towns being taxed to support the army of 10,000 men in the West? Gentlemen say, stay on shore, and you will be safe. Sir, may we not, in return, say to the gentlemen who are settling the cheap lands of the interior, keep among us; go not into the Indian country; we cannot be taxed to defend you. This reasoning will apply with as much force against the interior as theirs does against the Atlantic towns. Sir, we are all one people, and, in order to remain so, we must be willing to defend at all points.
Mr. Bassett spoke several times in the course of the debate. The following is the substance of the whole of his remarks: He said, on rising, that it was with no feigned diffidence that he addressed the House. I shall, said he, have credit with every one in the assertion that I am most anxious that the proposition I have made should succeed. Must I not, then, deplore the feebleness of voice, the want of force, of manner, and promptness of mind and thought, which limit me? But I shall feel compensated if the House will, in heart, join me in regretting that a cause worthy of the first of advocates has fallen into such puny hands. For the cause, then, will they hear me, and for their country's good will they improve each hint I may let fall, by their better judgment. It is true, sir, we have little experience—I cannot boast of naval knowledge in our land—but, yet, we are not quite deficient. Let it be remembered, that it is on the first principles that we are to decide; that we are to mark the outlines only, which depend much on general reasoning, and, in doing which, we may resort to the experience of others. I will follow (though with unequal step) the course taken by my predecessor last year, and, on the question to fill this blank, bring the whole subject before the committee. It will be assumed, as then proved, that protection is due to every national right, which cannot be estimated by pecuniary calculation, but must be tested by national ability only to defend and protect them. To the mode of effecting so desirable an object, I shall confine myself. The report has assumed it as a principle almost of instinct to oppose like to like, and so says the history of man, whom we find ever availing himself of the improvements of his assailant for self-defence. Hence has the art of war become to all nations the most interesting science, and no citizen is more estimable than he who can direct the national force with most efficiency. The importance of a naval force is amply attested on record. I will first, sir, point you to the conflicts between the rival Republics of Rome and Carthage, and ask you to remember the agency that their vessels had in them. Had the Romans confined themselves to the land, never had Carthage been destroyed. The history of Europe, from Venice to Great Britain, is too familiar to all who hear me, to require reference to particulars. It is sufficient for me to call attention to the effect of naval power, as it passed from nation to nation. What was the power of Venice and Genoa when they led the van of naval power? How quickly did the sceptre of Portugal rise, as she assumed a station on the ocean! how sink as she lost her naval preponderance! How did a navy once support the United Provinces! and how is it now the salvation of Great Britain! It is then a fact, that a naval armament gives effect to the power of a nation, as do the musket and bayonet, the cannon and the mortar. And how, sir, is it attempted to rebut this fact? By showing a physical disability in the country to avail itself of this force? No. For then would they be rebutted by the extent of our coasts, by the materials for ship-building, (so ample,) and the known habits and genius of our countrymen, as each day is evincing. And here, sir, I wish I could follow up the beautiful figure of my friend, who, on a former occasion, showed you our continent, extending to either ocean, with the finger of Munificence pointing to the goodly heritage.
We have then these facts: that a navy is a powerful means of national operation; that our local situation is fitted for its use; and that we have the necessary materials. To which it is objected that your infant Navy must be opposed to one which has reached the full manhood of power on the ocean. I admit it. But shall we therefore abandon the ocean, yield our birthright, our goodly heritage, without a struggle? Or, shall we not rather, deducing argument from example, like the gallant Captain Hull, avoid their fleets and capture their single ships.
I am aware that habit impels some to be fearful on this subject, and the experience of the past will not convince them. With diffidence, therefore, do I refer to the efficiency of twelve ships-of-the-line and twenty frigates, as demonstrated last session. Let me ask of gentlemen who thus think, who thus feel, to examine the extent of their argument. Does it not go, not only to the abandonment of the ocean, but to the seacoast also? I shall trust to former statements for the magnitude of this sacrifice, with the observation, that abandoning the ocean involves the loss of one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping; and that in giving up the coasts, you lose a valuable portion of your soil, and some of your fairest cities. I will not dwell on the magnitude of this sacrifice, because I cannot believe that Americans will abandon any right which there is a prospect to maintain. I cannot, I admit, answer as conclusively the objection, that much time will be passed before this force can be procured; yet, I believe, that a mind which relied on that objection, might be satisfied that late preparation is better than none. Nor could a mind, so circumstanced, fail to see, that, while making preparation, you come every day nearer your object; in neglecting it, you are every day further from it, and you are, in neglecting it, blending ultimate loss with temporary sacrifice.
Mr. Chairman, is it for an infant nation, or a popular Government, to be deterred by the want of preparation? What is it that the youth has not to prepare, or when was it that a popular Government taxed itself with previous preparation? But why this argument of despair? What were your preparations for the Revolutionary war, and when made? After an army was in your country. Yet were they then made and effectually made. By the bravery of our fathers our soil was secured; on us it rests to secure our rights on the water, common to every independent nation, and as clearly ours as they are essential to our interests. What is this argument of infancy? Had not the Navy of Great Britain a beginning? Yes. There was a time when Britain had no ship. What then? She was invaded, and more, she was conquered. At this day, her wooden walls, as they are proverbially called, are her defence and protection. Is it admitted that the British fleet secures her from attack? If so, would not a fleet secure us from attack also? But we have it not. Is it not then our duty, as guardians of the public interest, to provide this powerful, this necessary means of defence? But some are alarmed at the cost. Permit me to recur to the calculation of the last year. And first, as to the information derived from British experience, whose example may be taken as precedent on maritime subjects; at least they make a powerful argument, where they are rejected as full proof. In recurring to British estimates, it certainly was unexpected to the American eye to see the same sum charged for a soldier as for a sailor, viz: —— dollars per month; and as unexpected, on investigating the British expenditures for a series of years, to find that the appropriations for the Navy are found less than those for the Army, as will be seen by reference to the Annual Register. In corroboration of this is our own history, as appears from the calculations made by my predecessor, of which I will avail myself.
Is it not then demonstrated by foreign and domestic experience, that a naval force is the cheapest the nation can resort to for defence and protection? Is it not also proved, that a force believed to be competent, might be obtained at a sum greatly within the means of the Government—say twelve millions of dollars—or a fourth less than the ordinary amount of revenue for a year in good times? Test this subject in another way. The cost of your Navy, twelve millions; give up the ocean, and you lose, for one item, one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping, which at fifty dollars the ton, would be worth five times the sum. Yet that would unquestionably be the least item in the account, because that would be but one loss, while that of your coasting, and other trade, would swell into a great annual amount, and be as great a sacrifice of convenience as profit. Nor is such a conclusion the less to be deprecated, because it is difficult to foresee all the evils which must result from the abandonment of one essential right of an independent nation. I know it may be said by those who view this subject differently from me, that they do not mean to abandon the ocean. It is, then, for them to show the difference between not abandoning a right, and not defending it; for I cannot believe that any gentleman will contend that the national defence shall be left to privateers. They have most justly been considered an aid to the national arm, but Heaven forbid that they should be relied on as principal. A private arm, with power to shield the nation, is what I could not contemplate without terror. I cannot believe it necessary to pursue this argument.
To return then: The force adequate to the defence of our seas would cost twelve millions. I will not say that this whole expense ought to be incurred in one year; indeed, it ought to be remarked, that of the twenty frigates, nearly eight are ready for service. Let the principle be yielded, and we can then enter on the calculation as to the portion which may be procured each year. The decision, too, would, in my judgment, be the strongest inducement to the enemy to make peace when they saw that you were progressing to a force which they could not meet. If, indeed, the force which has been named was not altogether adequate to the object of defending your own waters, you would find, having that force, that you could make any small addition that was requisite without difficulty. In reference to the opinions of others, in some measure, did the select committee determine on the number of ships, and their force, to be procured this year. Thus if the first blanks are filled with four seventy-six gun ships, they cost, per estimate, $333,000, and will require an appropriation of $1,332,000. If the other blank be filled with six thirty-eight gun ships, which, by estimate, cost $220,000, the requisite appropriation for them will be $1,320,000. For the sloops of war, the last blank I have calculated at $61,200, which would require an appropriation of $367,200; which, with the necessary appropriation for the four frigates ordered to be rebuilt last year, viz: the Philadelphia, New York, General Greene, and Boston, will amount to $3,500,000. This would give you four seventy-sixes and eighteen frigates, mostly of the best size. Compare the efficiency of that force with the interest of three millions and a half, the cost, and you cannot but be gratified with the result. I say, Mr. Chairman, the interest; because, though it was not in the province of the select committee to look out the ways and means, yet was it so interested as to their object, that they could but ask how was the money to be had; and they were satisfied that three millions and a half could, with facility, be loaned for navy purposes. I state this with no view to limit the ways and means, but only that until the subject is given them to provide for, the House might not be embarrassed with the difficulty of money.
With the humble hope that the views of the committee have been shown to be at least most reasonable, if not most correct, I beg leave to say a few words as to the different kinds of vessels proposed. I will not ask that the clerk should read that excellent letter from Captain Stewart, because I presume every gentleman who wishes information has read it more than once. From that and the other documents, the committee thought themselves warranted in recommending four seventy-six gun ships. In addition to the sufficient reasons offered there, that a large ship, with fewer men and a less cost, will be more efficient than small ones, by the table A it is most conclusively evinced, that a seventy-six, at one round, throws on the enemy four pounds fourteen ounces of ball for each man; whereas, the gunboat throws only ten ounces. I only give the extremes, that the argument may be the more readily taken. Here, too, we have the fact, that six hundred and fifty men are sufficient for a seventy-six, while four hundred and twenty are required for a frigate. The annual expense is, for the large ship, $202,110; for the frigate, $110,000. While in action, the larger ship is equal or superior to three frigates. To support this calculation by figures, we have the opinions of Captains Hull, Stewart, and Morris; and Mr. Hamilton says, that all the officers in service concur in the opinion; and I am told that such is the real history of naval conflicts. Mr. Hamilton mentions one, and Captain Stewart mentions another, of four French frigates attacking a British seventy-four, of which one was sunk, two taken, and the other run off.
It is cause of some exultation to me, that our naval men, where the opportunity is afforded them, give the example to prove our theory. As I am told, orders were sent from Washington in September to Captain Chauncey, then at New York, who made his preparation, took his workmen with him to the Lakes, and some days since we had the account that he had built and launched, before November was out, a frigate of twenty-six guns. The gallant Chauncey enables me to present an argument that would, could I do it justice, I am sure, have much weight. Will any gentleman regret that this twenty-six gun ship has been built, though the mastery of the Lakes has been acquired without it? Neither shall we regret the building of the seventy-sixes, though peace, which God send, should come before they are launched. There is yet one other objection too important to be passed over, though it was on a former occasion so ably canvassed. It is the difficulty of getting seamen. That difficulty exists, I do admit. Yet is not the difficulty insurmountable. Here again I avail myself of the illustrations of my friend from South Carolina.
The gentleman has again referred to the difficulty of manning your ships, and deems impressment indispensable. Sir, I admit the weakness of our nation, and lament it too. Yet I cannot believe that the hard hand of tyranny is essential to their well-being; and I regret that in an assembly of freemen, that this, the most if not the only detestable example England has set us as to a navy, should be so much relied on. Look to the fact, that in five years forty-two thousand seamen deserted from the British navy. Look to the fact, that their prisoners require to be committed to return to their own country. It is with no little pride that I call the attention of the gentleman and the committee to our gallery. Did a British gallery ever exhibit such a spectacle? No, a seaman there is a slave, and seldom puts his foot on shore but under the guard of an officer. Let us therefore be cautious in admitting that though Great Britain has been most successful, that she owes it to the hard, to the iron hand of impressment. It would not be difficult to find in her naval institutions other principles to which the mind would delight to attribute her superiority, rather than that from which we cannot but turn in disgust.