When Mr. Randolph concluded, the House adjourned.
Thursday, January 14.
Additional Military Force.
The House then resumed the consideration of the bill to raise twenty additional regiments of infantry for one year.—The question being on the passage of the bill.
Mr. Stow, said: Mr. Speaker, I am aware of the delicacy and novelty of my situation, as well from the indulgence of the House, as from the neutral course which I mean to pursue. He must have been indeed an inattentive observer of mankind who proposes to himself such a course without being exposed to difficulties and dangers from every side. Our country has experienced them too long from the great belligerents of Europe, and an individual will quickly find them here. For even this House is not exempt from its great party belligerents who issue their conflicting decrees and Orders in Council; and, in imitation of the hostile Europeans, it is sometimes a sufficient cause of condemnation to have been spoken with by the adverse side. Yet, notwithstanding all these dangers, I mean to launch my neutral bark on this tempestuous ocean, conscious of the rectitude of my intentions, and humbly hoping for the approbation of my country and my God.
The proper extent of the discussion growing out of this bill seemed to be confined to these inquiries: Can the force contemplated be obtained? If obtained, will it accomplish the end proposed? And lastly, will the force be an economical one? If the discussion had been confined to these limits I would have listened, and not have spoken; but, sir, it has taken a wider range, and assumed a more important aspect. It has embraced the present, and past, and the future. The causes of the war, and the mode of conducting it, have been investigated, and even confident predictions have been made as to its end. The history and the state of our negotiations have been carefully examined—and the Presidential order of succession has been scrutinized by the light of experience as well as that of prophecy. We have sometimes been forced into the scenes of private life; and, at other times, we have been chained to the car of Napoleon. In short, sir, the discussion has ranged as wide as existence, and, not content with that, the speakers "have exhausted worlds, and then imagined new." I do not pretend to censure this—it may be well for the people to have their political concerns thus splendidly dressed and passed in review before them. But still I will attempt to call the attention of the House from the regions of fiction, of fancy, and of poetry, to the humble, but I trust no less profitable, sphere of reality and prose. Passing by many of those things which have amused by their ingenuity, or surprised by their novelty, but which do not deserve a serious answer, I will endeavor to state distinctly the grounds taken by the opponents of this bill, or rather the opponents of furnishing the means of prosecuting the war: Firstly. It is alleged "that the war was originally unjust." Secondly. "That if the war was originally just, it has become unjust to continue it in consequence of the revocation of the British Orders in Council." Thirdly. "That it is inexpedient to prosecute the war, because we have no means of coercing our enemy or enforcing our claims." Fourthly. "That we are unable to support the war." And fifthly. "That, in consideration of all these circumstances, the House ought to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war."
First, then, it was alleged that the war was originally unjust. Here let me call on the House to distinguish between unjust and inexpedient. Nothing can be more important than to have clear and distinct ideas about those words which lie at the bottom of a science, or inquiry. This is happily illustrated in mathematics—there every word, by the help of diagrams, is carefully defined; and the consequence is, that there are no disputes among mathematicians, while their labors have done honor to mankind. A thing may be just and yet inexpedient: the justice of an act relates to the conduct of another, the expediency of our own situation. It may be just for me to sue the man who withholds from me the smallest sum; and yet so inexpedient as to be even ridiculous. Thus a war may be perfectly just, and at the same time highly inexpedient. This, if I mistake not, was the ground generally taken the last year by the opponents of the war, particularly by the gentleman from Virginia before me, (Mr. Sheffey,) which pointed out the distinction which I have endeavored to do, though with more ability and success. I hope the House will bear this distinction in mind; because it is of the greatest importance in the investigation which I intend to make. Before I enter further on the argument, I ask the House to indulge me for a moment while I explain my views relative to the commencement of the war. I never saw any want of provocation on the part of Great Britain. I never for an instant doubted the justice of the war, while I urged its inexpediency with all my might. I considered man placed here by a beneficent Providence, on a fertile soil, and in a happy climate, enlightened by science, and protected by the wisest of laws. By our Revolution cut adrift, as I may say, from the old world, before the storm which was about to desolate Europe arose, I fondly hoped that this new world would furnish one fair experiment of what science, liberty and peace, might achieve, free from those corruptions which have eternally attended on war. I hoped to see the country improved, and bound together by roads and canals, to see it adorned by literary institutions, and by every establishment which reflects honor upon man. Nor do I yet believe that this was an Utopian vision, or an idle dream. I still believe it might all have been realized by a different course—but the nation has determined on war, and, though it was not my choice, I still maintain that it is not unjust.
I shall now examine the second proposition, "that if the war was originally just, its further prosecution is unjust." On what ground does this rest? It is this, that the Orders in Council were the cause of the war; those orders having ceased, the prosecution of the war becomes unjust. Here again justice and expediency are confounded. It was never maintained, that the Orders in Council rendered war more just than many other outrages, though they went farther to prove its expediency, and even necessity. It therefore follows, that their repeal does not affect the justice of the war; unless accompanied with compensation for the spoliations committed under them, and atonement made for other wrongs. Neither of these, is it pretended, has been done; except so far as relates to the affair of the Chesapeake, and which I purposely left out of the catalogue of grievances. An injury which was a just cause of war, remains a just cause for its continuance, till atonement is offered, or till it is settled by negotiation. But, sir, an ample justification of war remains in the impressment of our seamen. The claim on our part is not, as has been alleged, a claim to protect British seamen—it is a claim to protect American citizens. Nay, more, as respects the justice of the continuance of the war, it is a claim only, that they will cease from the practice during the truce, that it may be seen whether it is possible to arrange it by negotiation. Is it unjust to continue the war, till this demand is complied with? or does any American wish to see his country prostrated still lower?
Having thus far explained my ideas relative to the justice of the commencement and continuance of the war, I will now proceed to answer the third objection, namely: That it is inexpedient to carry it on, because we have no means of coercing our enemy—of compelling him—to what? barely to a just and honorable peace; for that is all we demand. And have we no means of doing this? Better, then, to surrender the charter of our independence, confess we are incapable of self-protection, and beg his most gracious Majesty to again take us under his paternal care. Such a doctrine, sir, is as unfounded, as it is degrading to the American character. We have ample means of compelling Great Britain to do us justice; they are to be found in the value of our commerce; in the enterprise of our privateers; in the gallantry of our ships of war, and the conquest of her provinces. Our custom (considering her in the light of a mechanic or merchant who supplies) is of vital importance to Great Britain. It is not to be measured by its amount, in pounds, shillings, and pence, but by the strength and support she derives from the intercourse. For, while I admit that Great Britain does not send half her exports to the United States, I do maintain, that the custom of this country is of more importance to her, than that of the whole world besides. It is with a nation as with an individual, if he exchange luxuries for luxuries, or superfluities, such as ribands for ribands, which he consumes, he adds nothing to his wealth; but if he exchange his luxuries, or his ribands, for bread, or for such materials as give scope to his industry, he is then benefited, and enriched by the interchange. Such is the situation of Great Britain with regard to America. She, and her dependencies, receive more of provision, and raw materials, from America, than from all other parts of the world together. Our trade exactly gives effect to her industry, her machinery, and her capital. And it is this which has, in a great degree, enabled her to make such gigantic efforts in the awful contest in which she is engaged. Our privateers; will they have no effect on Great Britain? Will she learn nothing from the loss of three or four hundred ships? And will she be insensible to the efforts of our little Navy? Can they touch no nerve in which Britons feel? Far different are my conclusions, from what I have seen in British papers—they show that she is tremblingly alive to that subject.
Sir, I will now consider her provinces, about which so much has been said. I, too, will speak of that wonderful country, called Canada, which unites in itself all contrarieties! Which is so cold and sterile, as to be not worth possessing; and so fertile, that if, by any calamity it should become ours, it would seduce away our population; which is so unhappy under the British Government as not to lure our inhabitants; yet so happy, that it is criminal to disturb their felicity;—whose inhabitants, if united with ours, would destroy us, because they have none of the habits of freemen; and who, well knowing the privileges of their free Government, will defend them to the last. A country which is of no importance to Great Britain, and whose loss would not make her feel; a country which is so valuable to Great Britain that she will never give it up. A country so weak that it is inglorious to attack it; and a country so strong that we can never take it. But, sir, leaving these, and a thousand other contradictions, the work of fancy or of spleen, I will present to the House what I believe to be a true view of the subject, drawn from a near residence and much careful examination. Canada is of great importance both to Great Britain and the United States. It is important to Great Britain in the amount and kind of its exports. In the last year preceding war, its exports amounted to between seven and nine millions of dollars, an amount almost as great as the exports of the United States preceding the Revolutionary war. And had the most discerning statesman made out an order, he could not have selected articles better adapted to the essential wants of Great Britain. It has been said that Canada is of less value than one of the sugar islands of the West Indies. Sir, in the present state of the world, Canada is of more importance to Great Britain, in my opinion, than the whole West India Islands taken together. In danger, as she is, of being shut out from the Baltic, and fighting for her existence, she wants not the luxuries, the sugars, and the sweetmeats of the West Indies—she wants the provisions, the timber, the masts, and the spars of the North.