Canada is also of the greatest importance to the United States, in a commercial and political point of view. I have in a great measure explained its commercial importance, by stating its exports; a large portion of which were the products of the United States. Let an attentive observer cast his eye for one moment on the map of North America; let him bear in mind, that from the forty-fifth degree of latitude the waters of Canada bound for a vast extent one of the most fertile, and which will become, one of the most populous parts of the United States; and he will readily perceive that the river St. Lawrence must soon be the outlet for one-third of all the products of American labor. The same circumstances will enable it to lay an impost on one-third of our imported articles. Nor will the evil to our revenue end here. Great Britain will be enabled to smuggle her goods through this channel into all parts of the Union. It will be in vain that you attempt to counteract her by laws; from the great length and contiguity of her possessions, she will forever evade them, unless by your laws you can change the nature of man. But its greatest importance is in a political point of view: for, although not as happy in its government as the United States, it is sufficiently so to draw off multitudes of our new settlers, when the intermediate lands of the State of New York, which separate it from New England, shall be fully occupied. From this circumstance it will divide the American family, and, by the commercial relations which I have pointed out, it will exert a dangerous influence over a part of our country; for the transition from commercial dependence, to political allegiance, is too obvious to be insisted on. Having endeavored to show the importance of Canada to both of the contending nations, I I will only add that it is within our power.
The fourth objection is, that we cannot support the war—that we have not the ability to carry it on. Before I proceed to answer this objection, permit me, sir, to notice a single inconsistency of the gentlemen by whom it has been urged. It is this: in one part of their argument, they represent the people as too happy to enlist, and in another part as too poor to pay! Both of these propositions, I presume, cannot be true. Not to dwell longer, however, upon this contradiction, I do maintain, sir, that the nation is fully able to prosecute the war. On what does the ability of a nation depend? A person who will give himself the trouble of examining things rather than words, will find that it is proportioned to the number of laborers and the productiveness of their labor. Wherever, from soil, climate, or improvement, the labor of a country will produce more than a supply of the necessaries of life, it is evident that the surplus time may be devoted to idleness, to the production and consumption of luxuries, or to the carrying on of war. To illustrate this farther—suppose the labor of a person for five days will support him six, then it is clear, that the labor of five men will support the sixth man in idleness or in war. Now, sir, there is nowhere that the labor of seven millions of people will produce so much as in this country; consequently, nowhere have seven millions of people so great an ability to carry on a war. The quantity of circulating medium, whether made of paper or of silver dollars, has very little to do with the subject. If it is made of paper, and to a great extent, it only shows that the people are in their habits commercial; and that the faith of contracts is well supported. The real ability of a nation lies in what I have stated; and he must be a weak politician who cannot call it forth.
Mr. Speaker, I will now consider the last, and by far the most important objection of all; and one, without which, I certainly would not have spoken. It is, that in consideration of all the circumstances in which we are placed, it is the duty of this House to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war. It will not be denied, I trust, that this is a fair statement of the scope and object of most of the reasonings which have been employed; and that without this construction, they would be irreconcilable with common sense. This doctrine, in my opinion, goes not only to the overthrow of our constitution, but to the destruction of liberty itself. The principle of our Government is, not only that the majority shall rule, but that they shall rule in the manner prescribed by the constitution. So that if it could be proved that a majority of the people were in favor of certain measures, it would not be sufficient till they had pronounced that decision through the constitutional organs. In short, it must have been a principal object with the framers of our constitution to suspend, at least for a limited time, the effects of popular opinion. The constitution has committed the legislative power to three co-equal branches; and to the same hands has it entrusted the power of declaring war; while it has expressly confided the treaty-making power (and which alone can make peace) to two only of those branches. The claim now set up, goes to invest that branch which has no authority in the matter, not only with the treaty-making power, but also with a complete control over the other two branches. Thus one branch of the Government forcing the nation to desist from doing what three, including itself, had thought best to perform. Let us test the correctness of this principle by applying it to another co-equal branch of the Government. Let us suppose the President has made a treaty of peace, which is disapproved of by the Senate—and suppose upon this he should say, the war ought not to be further prosecuted, and refuse to employ the public force, would you not impeach him? Most unquestionably you would. I expressly admit that cases may be imagined, where such a course would be proper—where it would be not only the duty of this House to withhold supplies, but where it would be the duty of an individual to resist the laws; but such are extreme cases, not provided for by any organization of Government. What, sir, has been the practice of the British House of Commons? Have they ever refused supplies because a war was unpopular, since their revolution? Did not the same Parliament, which resolved that they would consider any man as an enemy to his country, who would advise his Majesty to the further prosecution of offensive war in America, still vote the means for carrying on the war? A similar case occurred when Mr. Fox came last into power—he disapproved of the commencement and conduct of the war, and yet he called for and received the necessary supplies.
Mr. Calhoun observed, that he could offer nothing more acceptable, he presumed, to the House, than a promise not to discuss the Orders in Council, French decrees, blockades, or embargoes. He was induced to avoid these topics for several reasons. In the first place, they were too stale to furnish any interest to this House or country. Gentlemen who had attempted it, with whatever abilities, had failed to command attention; and it would argue very little sagacity on his part not to be admonished by their want of success. Indeed, whatever interest had been at one time attached to these subjects, they had now lost. They have passed away; and will not soon, he hoped, return into the circle of politics. Yes, sir, as reviled as has been our country's efforts to curb belligerent injustice, as weak and contemptible as she has been represented to be in the grade of nations, she has triumphed in breaking down the most dangerous monopoly ever attempted by one nation against the commerce of another. He would not stop to inquire whether it was the non-importation act, or the menace of war, or, what was the most probable, the last operating on the pressure produced by the former. The fact is certain, that the Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809, which our opponents have often said that England would not yield, as they made a part of her commercial system, are now no more. The same firmness, if persevered in, which has carried us thus far with success, will, as our cause is just and moderate, end in final victory. A further reason which he had, not to follow our opponents into the region of documents and records, was, that he was afraid of a decoy; as he was induced to believe from appearances that their object was to draw our attention from the merits of the question. Gentlemen had literally buried their arguments under a huge pile of quotations; and had wandered so far into this realm of paper, that neither the vision of this House has been, nor that of the country will be, able to follow them. There the best and worst reasons share an equal fate. The truth of the one and error of the other, are covered with like obscurity.
Mr. C. said he would not multiply proof on a course of conduct the bad effect of which was too sensibly felt to be easily forgot, and the continuation of which was but too apparent in the present discussion. For what was the object of the opposition in this debate? To defeat the passage of this bill? It has been scarcely mentioned; and contains nothing to raise that storm which has been excited against it. The bill proposes to raise twenty thousand men only, and that for one year; and surely there is nothing in that calculated to lay such strong hold of the jealousy or fear of the community. What then is the object of the opposition? Gentlemen certainly do not act without an intention; and wide as has been the range of debate, it cannot be so lawless as to be without an object. It was not, he repeated, to defeat the passage of this bill; no, but what was much more to be dreaded, to thwart that, which the bill proposes to contribute to, the final success of the war; and for this purpose he must do the opposition the credit to say, they have resorted to means the best calculated to produce the effect. In a free Government, in the government of laws, two things are necessary for the effectual prosecution of any great measure; the law by which the executive officer is charged with the execution and vested with suitable powers; and the co-operating zeal and union of the people, who are always indispensable agents. Opposition to be successful must direct its efforts against the passage of the law; or, what was more common and generally more effectual, to destroy the union and the zeal of the people. Either, if successful, is effectual. The former would in most cases be seen and reprobated; the latter, much the most dangerous, has, to the great misfortunes of Republics, presented at all times a ready means of defeating the most salutary measures. To this point the whole arguments of opposition have converged. This gives a meaning to every reason and assertion, which have been advanced, however wild and inconsistent. No topic has been left untouched, no passion unessayed. The war has been represented as unjust in its origin, disastrous in its progress, and desperate in its farther prosecution. As if to prevent the possibility of doubt, a determination has been boldly asserted not to support it. Such is the opposition to the war, which was admitted on all sides to be just; and which in a manner received the votes even of those who now appear to be willing to ruin the country in order to defeat its success.
But, say our opponents, as they were opposed to the war, they are not bound to support it; and so far has this opposition been carried, that we have been accused almost of violating the right of conscience, in denying the right set up by gentlemen. The right to oppose the efforts of our country, while in war, ought to be established beyond the possibility of doubt, before it can be justly adopted as the basis of conduct. How conscience can be claimed in this case cannot be very easily imagined. We oppose not by laws or penalties; we only assert that the opposition experienced cannot be dictated by love of country, and is inconsistent with the duty which every citizen is under to promote the prosperity of the Republic. Its necessary tendency is to prostrate the country at the feet of the enemy, and to elevate a party on the ruins of the public. Till our opponents can prove that they have a right which is paramount to the public interest, we must persist in denying the right to thwart the success of the war. War has been declared by a law of the land; and what would be thought of similar attempts to defeat any other law, however inconsiderable its object? Who would dare to avow an intention to defeat its operation? Can that, then, be true in relation to war which would be reprobated in every other case? Can that be true which, when the whole physical force of the country is needed, withdraws half of that force? Can that be true which gives the greatest violence to party animosity? What would have been thought of such conduct in the war of the Revolution? Many good citizens friendly to the liberty of our country were opposed to the declaration at the time; could they have been justified in such opposition as we now experience? To terminate the war through discord and weakness is a hazardous experiment. But, in the most unjust and inexpedient war, it can scarcely be possible, that disunion and defeats can have a salutary operation. In the numerous examples which history furnishes, let an instance be pointed out, in any war, where the public interest has been promoted by divisions, or injured by concord. Hundreds of instances may be cited of the reverse. Why, then, will gentlemen persist in that course where danger is almost unavoidable, and shun that where safety is almost certain?
But, sir, we are told that peace is in our power without a farther promotion of the war. Appeal not, say our opponents, to the fear, but to the generosity of our enemy. England yields nothing to her fears; stop, therefore, your preparation, and throw yourself on her mercy, and peace will be the result. We might, indeed, have pardon, but not peace on such terms. Those who think the war a sacrilege or a crime, might consistently adopt such a course; but we, who know it to be for the maintenance of the just rights of the community, never can. We are farther told that impressment of seamen was not considered a sufficient cause of war; and are asked why should it be continued on that account? Mr. C. observed that he individually did not feel the force of the argument; for it had been his opinion, that the nation was bound to resist so deep an injury even at the hazard of war; but, admitting its full force, the difference is striking between the commencement and the continuance of hostilities. War ought to be continued until its rational object, a permanent and secure peace, could be obtained. Even the friends of England ought not to desire the termination of the war, without a satisfactory adjustment of the subject of impressment. It would leave the root that must necessarily shoot up in future animosity and hostilities. America can never quietly submit to the deepest of injury. Necessity might compel her to yield for a moment; but it would be to watch the growth of national strength, and to seize the first favorable opportunity to seek redress. The worst enemy to the peace of the two countries could not desire a more effectual means to propagate eternal enmity.
But it is said that we ought to offer to England suitable regulations on this subject to secure to her the use of her own seamen; and because we have not, we are aggressors. He denied that we were bound to tender any regulations, or that we had not. England was the party injuring. She ought to confine her seamen to her own service; or, if that was impracticable, propose such arrangements that she might exercise her right without injury to us. This is the rule that governs all analogous cases in private life. But we have made our offer; it is, that the ship should protect the sailor. It is the most simple and only safe rule; but, to secure so desirable a point, the most liberal and effectual provisions ought and have been proposed to be made on our part to guard the British Government against the evil they apprehended, the loss of her seamen. The whole doctrine of protection heretofore relied on, and still recommended by the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. P.,) is false and derogatory to our honor; and under no possible modification can effect the desirable objects of affording safety to our sailors, and securing the future harmony of the two countries. Nor can it be doubted, if governed by justice, she will yield to the offer of our Government, particularly if what the gentleman from New York (Mr. Bleecker) says be true, that there are ten thousand of her seamen in our service. She would be greatly the gainer by the arrangement. Experience, it is to be feared, however, will teach that gentleman that the evil lies much deeper. The use of her seamen is a mere pretence. The blow is aimed at our commercial greatness. It is this which has animated and directed all of her injurious councils towards this country. England is at the same time a trading and fighting nation; two occupations naturally at variance, and most difficult to be united. War limits the number and extent of the markets of a belligerent, makes a variety of regulations necessary; and produces heavy taxes, which are inimical to the prosperity of manufactories and consequently commerce. These causes combined give to trade new channels, which direct it naturally to neutral nations. To counteract this tendency, England, under various but flimsy pretences, has endeavored to support her commercial superiority by monopoly. It has been our fortune to resist with no inconsiderable success this spirit of monopoly. Her principal object in contending for the right of impressment is to have, in a great measure, the monopoly of the sailors of the world. A fixed resistance will compel her to yield this point as she has already done her Orders in Council. Success will amply reward our exertions. Our future commerce will feel its invigorating effects. But, say gentlemen, England will never yield this point, and every effort on our part to secure it is hopeless. To confirm this prediction and secure our reverence, the prophecies of the last session are relied on. Mr. C. felt no disposition to disparage our opponents' talents in that line; but he very much doubted whether the whole chapter of woes had been fulfilled. He would, for instance, ask whether so much as related to sacked towns, bombarded cities, ruined commerce, and revolting blacks, had been realized?
Such, then, is the cause of the war and its continuation; and such the nature of the opposition experienced, and its justification. It remains to be seen whether the intended effect will be produced. Whether animosity and discord will be fomented, and the zeal and union of the people to maintain the rights and indispensable duties of the community will abate; or, describing it under another aspect, whether it is the destiny of our country to sink under that of our enemy or not. Mr. C. said he was not without his fears and his hopes.
On the one hand our opponents had manifestly the advantage. The love of present ease and enjoyment, the love of gain, and party zeal, were on their side. These constitute part of the weakness of our nature. We naturally lead that way without the arts of persuasion. Far more difficult is the task of the majority. It is theirs to support the distant but lasting interest of our country; it is theirs to elevate the minds of the people, and to call up all of those qualities by which present sacrifices are made to secure a future good. On the other hand, our cause is not without its hope. The interest of the people and that of the leaders of a party are, as observed by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. Stow,) often at variance. The people are always ready, unless led astray by ignorance or delusion, to participate in the success of the country, or to sympathize in its adversity. Very different are the feelings of the leaders; on every great measure they stand pledged against its success, and almost invariably consider that their political consequence depends on its defeat. The heat of debate, the spirit of settled opposition, and the confident prediction of disaster, are among the causes of this opposition between the interest of a party and their country; and in no instance under our own Government have they existed in a greater degree than in relation to the present war. The evil is deeply rooted in the constitution of all free Governments, and is the principal cause of their weakness and destruction. It has but one remedy, the virtue and intelligence of the people—it behooves them, as they value the blessings of their freedom, not to permit themselves to be drawn into the vortex of party rage. For if by such opposition the firmest Government should prove incompetent to maintain the rights of the nation against foreign aggression, they will find realized the truth of the assertion that government is protection, and that it cannot exist where it fails of this great and primary object. The authors of the weakness are commonly the first to take the advantage of it, and to turn it to the destruction of liberty.