Mr Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were first to protect the people agst their rulers; secondly to protect the people agst the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of Govt most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those chargd with the public happiness might betray their trust. An obvious precaution agst this danger wd be to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch & check each other. In this they wd be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of Govt, where all business liable to abuses is made to pass thro' separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It wd next occur to such people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, thro' want of information as to their true interest, and that men chosen for a short term, & employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection wd naturally suggest that the Govt be so constituted as that one of its branches might have an oppy of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, wd be that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives, were liable to err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence agst this danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose agst impetuous councils. It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating on a Govt for themselves, that as different interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might under sudden impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized Countries the people fall into different classes havg a real or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors & debtors; farmers, merchts & manufacturers. There will be particularly the distinction of rich & poor. It was true as had been observd (by Mr Pinkney) we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank which were a great source of the contests in the ancient Govts as well as the modern States of Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot however be regarded even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which every thing that affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we shd not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this Country, but symptoms, of a levelling spirit, as we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in certain quarters, to give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded agst on the republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded agst? Among other means by the establishment of a body in the Govt sufficiently respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergencies, the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed Govt he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger; but in pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require that the long term allowed to the 2d branch should not commence till such a period of life, as would render a perpetual disqualification to be re-elected little inconvenient either in a public or private view. He observed that as it was more than probable we were now digesting a plan which in its operation wd decide for ever the fate of Republican Govt we ought not only to provide every guard to liberty that its preservation cd require, but be equally careful to supply the defects which our own experience had particularly pointed out.
Mr Sherman. Govt is instituted for those who live under it. It ought therefore to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Govt. Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the good behavior of rulers. They also tend to give permanency to the Government, by preserving that good behavior, because it ensures their re-election. In Connecticut elections have been very frequent, yet great stability & uniformity both as to persons & measures have been experienced from its original establishmt to the present time; a period of more than a 130 years. He wished to have provision made for steadiness & wisdom in the system to be adopted; but he thought six or four years would be sufficient. He shd be content with either.
Mr Read wished it to be considered by the small States that it was their interest that we should become one people as much as possible; that State attachments shd be extinguished as much as possible; that the Senate, shd be so constituted as to have the feelings of Citizens of the whole.
Mr Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly into the subject. He concurred with Mr Madison in thinking we were now to decide forever the fate of Republican Government; and that if we did not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced & lost among ourselves, disgraced & lost to mankind forever. He acknowledged himself not to think favorably of Republican Government; but addressed his remarks to those who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their Government as high as possible. He professed himself to be as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted he should be as willing a martyr to it though he differed as to the form in which it was most eligible.—He concurred also in the general observations of (Mr Madison) on the subject, which might be supported by others if it were necessary. It was certainly true that nothing like an equality of property existed; that an inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This inequality of property constituted the great & fundamental distinction in Society. When the Tribunitial power had levelled the boundary between the patricians & plebeians, what followed? The distinction between rich & poor was substituted. He meant not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose principally to remark that (Mr Sherman) seemed not to recollect that one branch of the proposed Govt was so formed, as to render it particularly the guardians of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to have adverted to the true causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Cont. Under the British system as well as the federal, many of the great powers appertaining to Govt particularly all those relating to foreign Nations were not in the hands of the Govt there. Their internal affairs also were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes many of which were peculiar to that Country. Of late the Governmt had entirely given way to the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary functions in order to prevent those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He asks Mr S. whether the State at this time dare impose & collect a tax on ye people? To these causes & not to the frequency of elections, the effect as far as it existed ought to be chiefly ascribed.
Mr Gerry, wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a permanent Govt. All aim at the same end, but there are great differences as to the means. One circumstance He thought should be carefully attended to. There was not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens who were not agst every approach towards Monarchy. Will they ever agree to a plan which seems to make such an approach. The Convention ought to be extremely cautious in what they hold out to the people. Whatever plan may be proposed will be espoused with warmth by many out of respect to the quarter it proceeds from as well as from an approbation of the plan itself. And if the plan should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent opposition, it is easy to foresee that discord & confusion will ensue, and it is even possible that we may become a prey to foreign powers. He did not deny the position of Mr Madison, that the majority will generally violate justice when they have an interest in so doing: But did not think there was any such temptation in this Country. Our situation was different from that of G. Britain; and the great body of lands yet to be parcelled out & settled would very much prolong the difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms of injustice which had marked many of our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to leave hopes, that there would be a sufficient sense of justice & virtue for the purpose of Govt. He admitted the evils arising from a frequency of elections; and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four or five years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would be adopted by the people.
Mr Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others, but wd add an observation or two which he believed had not yet been suggested. Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its own citizens. 2 to foreign nations. It is therefore not only liable to anarchy & tyranny within, but has wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably be the depository of the powers concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign Nations. The true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty with us has been, because she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of our Government. 9 years with a rotation, will provide these desirable qualities; and give our Govt an advantage in this respect over Monarchy itself. In a Monarchy much must always depend on the temper of the man. In such a body, the personal character will be lost in the political. He wd add another observation. The popular objection agst appointing any public body for a long term was that it might by gradual encroachments prolong itself first into a body for life, and finally become a hereditary one. It would be a satisfactory answer to this objection that as 1/3 would go out triennially, there would be always three divisions holding their places for unequal times, and consequently acting under the influence of different views, and different impulses.—On the question for 9 years, 1/3 to go out triennially,
Massts no. Cont, no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question for 6 years,[110] 1/3 to go out biennially
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
[ [110] Yates has the question on five years, but this is obviously a mistake.—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 172.