"These reflections suggest the expediency of such a modification of Govt as would give security to the part of the Society having most at stake and being most exposed to danger. Three modifications present themselves.
"1. Confining the right of suffrage to freeholders, & to such as hold an equivalent property, convertible of course into freeholds. The objection to this regulation is obvious. It violates the vital principle of free Govt that those who are to be bound by laws, ought to have a voice in making them. And the violation wd be more strikingly unjust as the law makers become the minority. The regulation would be as unpropitious, also, as it would be unjust. It would engage the numerical & physical force in a constant struggle agst the public authority; unless kept down by a standing army fatal to all parties.
"2. Confining the right of suffrage for one Branch to the holders of property, and for the other Branch to those without property. This arrangement which wd give a mutual defence, where there might be mutual danger of encroachment, has an aspect of equality & fairness. But it wd not be in fact either equal or fair, because the rights to be defended would be unequal, being on one side those of property as well as of persons, and on the other those of persons only. The temptation also to encroach tho' in a certain degree mutual, wd be felt more strongly on one side than on the other: It would be more likely to beget an abuse of the Legislative Negative in extorting concessions at the expence of property, than the reverse. The division of the State into two Classes, with distinct & independt Organs of power, and without any intermingled agency whatever, might lead to contests & antipathies not dissimilar to those between the Patricians & Plebeians at Rome.
"3. Confining the right of electing one Branch of the Legislature to freeholders, and admitting all others to a common right with holders of property in electing the other Branch. This wd give a defensive power to holders of property, and to the class also without property when becoming a majority of electors, without depriving them in the meantime of a participation in the Public Councils. If the holders of property would thus have a two-fold share of representation, they wd have at the same time a two-fold stake in it, the rights of property as well as of persons, the two-fold object of political Institutions. And if no exact & safe equilibrium can be introduced, it is more reasonable that a preponderating weight shd be allowed to the greater interest than to the lesser. Experience alone can decide how far the practice in this case would correspond with the Theory. Such a distribution of the right of suffrage was tried in N. York and has been abandoned whether from experienced evils, or party calculations, may possibly be a question. It is still on trial in N. Carolina, with what practical indications is not known. It is certain that the trial, to be satisfactory ought to be continued for no inconsiderable period; untill in fact the non-freeholders should be the majority.
"4. Should experience or public opinion require an equal & universal suffrage for each branch of the Govt such as prevails generally in the U. S., a resource favorable to the rights of the landed & other property, when its possessors become the minority, may be found in an enlargement of the Election Districts for one branch of the Legislature, and an extension of its period of service. Large districts are manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over competitors depending on the personal solicitation practicable on a contracted theatre. And altho' an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely happen to many districts at the same time. The tendency of a longer period of service would be, to render the Body more stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction, till reason & justice could regain their ascendancy.
"5. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inadmissible, and universal suffrage and very short periods of elections within contracted spheres, be required for each branch of the Govt, the security for the holders of property when the minority, can only be derived from the ordinary influence possessed by property, & the superior information incident to its holders; from the popular sense of justice enlightened & enlarged by a diffusive education; and from the difficulty of combining & effectuating unjust purposes throughout an extensive country; a difficulty essentially distinguishing the U. S. & even most of the individual States, from the small communities where a mistaken interest or contagious passion, could readily unite a majority of the whole under a factious leader, in trampling on the rights of the minor party.
"Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the Mass of Citizens should not be without a voice, in making the laws which they are to obey, & in chusing the Magistrates who are to administer them, and if the only alternative be between an equal & universal right of suffrage for each branch of the Govt and a confinement of the entire right to a part of the Citizens, it is better that those having the greater interest at stake namely that of property & persons both, should be deprived of half their share in the Govt than, that those having the lesser interest, that of personal rights only, should be deprived of the whole."–Madison's Note.
Docr Franklin. It is of great consequence that we shd not depress the virtue & public spirit of our common people; of which they displayed a great deal during the war, and which contributed principally to the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable refusal of the American seamen who were carried in great numbers into the British Prisons during the war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of the Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism with a contemporary instance in which the British seamen made prisoners by the Americans, readily entered on the ships of the latter on being promised a share of the prizes that might be made out of their own Country. This proceeded he said from the different manner in which the common people were treated in America & G. Britain. He did not think that the elected had any right in any case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons having freeholds of a certain value; observing that this Statute was soon followed by another under the succeeding Parliamt subjecting the people who had no votes to peculiar labors & hardships. He was persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed would give great uneasiness in the populous States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at being disfranchised, and there are a great many persons of that description.
Mr Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in many points, but in none more than the present. He objected to the footing on which the qualification was put, but particularly to the mode of election by the people. The people can not know & judge of the characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in Virga as an example in point. The people in Towns can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; & by that means always prevail over the people of the Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes among a variety of candidates.
Mr Rutlidge thought the idea of restraining the right of suffrage to the freeholders a very unadvised one. It would create division among the people & make enemies of all those who should be excluded.