Table 1-2. Examples of Known or Suspect Biological Warfare Agents
| PATHOGENS | TOXINS |
|---|---|
| BACILLUS ANTHRACIS (ANTHRAX) | BOTULINUM TOXIN |
| FRANCISELLA TULARENIUS (TULAREMIA) | MYCOTOXINS |
| YERSINIA PESTIS (PLAGUE) | ENTEROTOXIN |
| BRUCELLA SPECIES (BRUCELLOSIS) | RICIN |
| VIBRIO CHOLERAE (CHOLERA) | |
| VARIOLA (SMALLPOX) | |
| VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVERS |
Table 1-3. The Future of Biological Warfare Agents
| CURRENT THREAT | FUTURE |
|---|---|
| PATHOGENS | MODIFIED PATHOGENS |
| LIMITED NUMBER OF TOXINS | EXPANDED RANGE OF TOXINS (ORGANO-TOXINS) |
| AGENTS OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGIN | PROTEIN FRACTIONS |
| AGENTS OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGIN |
(4) Many governments recognize the industrial and economic potential of advanced biotechnology and bioengineering. The same knowledge, skills, and methodologies can be applied to the production of second and third generation BW agents. Naturally occurring infectious organisms can be made more virulent and antibiotic resistant and manipulated to render protective vaccines ineffective. These developments complicate the ability to detect and identify BW agents and to operate in areas contaminated by the BW agents. For biological agent characteristics and effects see [Appendix A.] The first indication that a BW agent release/attack has occurred may be patients presenting at a medical treatment facility with symptoms not fitting the mold for endemic diseases in the area of operations (AO). See [Appendix B] for sampling requirements, sampling procedures, packaging and shipping, and chain of custody requirements.
c. Chemical Warfare.
(1) Since World War I, most western political and military leaders have publicly held chemical warfare (CW) in disrepute. However, evidence accumulated over the last 50 years does not support the position that public condemnation equates to limiting development or use of offensive CW agents. The reported use of chemical agents and biological toxins in Southeast Asia by Vietnamese forces; the confirmed use of CW agents by Egypt against Yemen; and later by Iraq against Iranian forces; and the probable use of CW agents by the Soviets in Afghanistan indicate a heightened interest in CW as a force multiplier. Also, an offensive CW capability is developed as a deterrent to the military advantage of a potential adversary. For a list of common chemical agents, their characteristics, behavior, and effects see [Appendix A]. [Table 1-4] lists those countries known or suspected of having offensive chemical weapons.
(2) The Russian Republic has the most extensive CW capability in Europe. Chemical strikes can be delivered with almost any type of conventional fire support weapon system (from mortars to long-range tactical missiles). Agents known to be available in the Russian inventory include nerve agents (O-ethyl methyl phosphonothiolate [VX], thickened VX, Sarin [GB], and thickened Soman [GD]); vesicants (thickened Lewisite[L] and mustard-Lewisite mixture[HL]); and choking agent (phosgene). Although not considered CW agents, riot control agents are also in the Russian inventory.
(3) The US is in the process of destroying its stockpiles of CW weapons. Many weapons have already been destroyed and the storage facilities have been rendered safe of all CW agent residues.
Table 1-4. Nations Known or Suspected of Possessing Chemical Weapons