[471] ECIDE ComdD, Oct 2, p. 1.
Individual island commanders were responsible for the defense of their small parcels of seaborne real estate, control of both defensive and offensive NGF missions in the area, and evaluation of intelligence regarding enemy troop locations, the movement of supplies north, or new emplacements of hostile guns. Fire support for the ECIDU islands, exposed to the enemy shore batteries above the 39th Parallel, was available from Task Force 95, which maintained a task, group of ships off both the east and west coasts. Aircraft and ships of Task Force 77 (Seventh Fleet Striking Force), operating off the East Korean coastline, were also on call. In December, for instance, the Corsairs of TF 77 had resumed their rail-bridge interdiction. All-out attacks on railroad and highway bridges, as well as bombing runs on the 90-mile stretch of east coast railroad from Hungnam to Songjin, were undertaken to cut off supplies being moved north for Communist industrial use.
February marked the second anniversary of the siege of Wonsan by the UNC, the longest blockade of a port in recent U.S. history. Some naval authorities by this time argued that the venture had become one of doubtful merit which “should never have been undertaken, but its long history made it difficult to abandon without apparent admission of defeat.”[472] In any event, the month also signaled increasing attention paid by hostile shore batteries to the little island enclave. For seven consecutive days, 9–15 February, the harbor islands were targets for enemy mixed artillery and mortar shells. Minor materiel damage and casualties were sustained at Yo-do during a Valentine’s Day bombardment, 14 February.
[472] Field, NavOps, Korea, p. 434.
Altogether, the enemy harassed the harbor islands for 16 days during the month, expending 316 rounds, compared with 11 days in January. Hostile fire, not limited to the Wonsan Harbor islands, was also directed against friendly ships USS DeHaven and USS Moore. These provided counterbattery fire and were, in turn, fired upon, the nearest shells landing only 400 yards from the two vessels. This attack, also on 14 February, was described as an “unusually determined and precise”[473] effort. The enemy, moreover, did not appear to take his usual precautions with respect to disclosing his positions. The fact that a Communist shore battery would cease fire when subjected to friendly counterbattery, with other positions then immediately taking up the delivery, “indicated some sort of central control for the first time.”[474] The I Corps, NKPA artillery units across from the Wonsan Island command revealed the “heavy, effective artillery capability of enemy batteries which encircle Wonsan Harbor.”[475]
[473] PacFlt EvalRpt No. 6, Chap. 2, p. 2-5.
[474] Ibid.
[475] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Feb 53, p. 1. Seventh Fleet intelligence estimated that there were no less than “21 active batteries emplaced on Wonsan Bay and within range of our islands.” Heinl ltr.
Unseasonably good weather the latter part of February improved the transportation and supply situation. With the bitter cold and wind subsiding, maintenance crews could repair the ravages of the past several months. Craft, up to LCVP size, were hoisted in on a large pontoon for repair. For most of December and January, “this small, physically remote Marine Corps command,”[476] as the ECIDU commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr. himself described it, had been snowbound. Winds howled in excess of 40 knots, and temperatures dropped to 10° below at night. Personnel at the command island, Yo-do, subsisted on C rations for eight days. With boating operations suspended because of the high winds, it was not possible to send supplies or water to Hwangto-do which for several days relied solely on melted snow.
[476] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.