The prolonged foul weather, moreover, interrupted all classified radio communications between the ECIDU and the outside world. Crypto guard for the Wonsan islands was maintained by elements of the East Coast TG 95. Coded and decoded security radio messages had to be picked up by patrol boat which could not reach the islands during extreme conditions of icy seas and heavy snows.
As with the men on the front line, the Communists stepped up their pressure and gunfire against the island command Marines during March. The record[477] 524 rounds which fell on the ECIDU islands in March doubled the following month when the command received 1,050 rounds from active mainland batteries. In April the persistent NKPA artillerymen kept up a continuing bombardment of the eastern coastal UNC islands, missing only three days of the entire month, that caused nine casualties when a direct hit was made on the Tae-do CP bunker. It was the highest rate of incoming since UN occupation of the islands. Another April record was enemy mine laying, which increased sharply in both the WCIDU and ECIDU command areas. A total of 37 mines were sighted, the highest number since August 1952. Communist shore gunners, in addition to harassment of the island themselves, fired 2,091 rounds against TF 95 ships, another all-time high.
[477] Another record at this time was the spate of senior visiting officers. Seven times during the month no less than 15 flag and general officers had taken their turn inspecting the ECIDU command headquarters at Yo-do. Services represented were the Marine Corps, U.S. Army, Korean Marine Corps, ROK Navy, and ROK Army. “One local statistician computed the total number of stars for the month (one side of the collar only) as 38,” the monthly report brightly noted. This was believed possibly an all-time high for any headquarters in the Korean theater, short of the Eighth Army. ECIDE(U) ComdD, Mar 53, p. 1.
With respect to personnel, the situation had improved markedly. An increase in ECIDU command strength authorized by CG, FMFPac in March provided for an additional 9 Marine officers, 38 enlisted Marines, and 6 Navy personnel. These were exclusive of the current detachments of 1st ANGLICO shore party and naval maintenance personnel, and represented nearly a 40 percent strength increase.[478] Not long afterward the new ECIDU commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hoyt U. Bookhart, Jr., arrived to succeed Lieutenant Colonel Heinl, who had held the position since the preceding November.
[478] The previous T/O for the ECIDU was 5 officers and 30 enlisted USMC, 15 USN attached primarily to the Navy maintenance unit, and 55 officers and 1,217 enlisted KMCs.
As with the WCIDU force, by late spring it appeared that the days of UNC control and occupation of the east coast islands were numbered. In view of the imminent armistice, a CinCFE directive of 11 June called for the evacuation of all civilians, supplies, and equipment “in excess of immediate needs.”[479] This was a preliminary step towards full evacuation of the islands once the armistice agreement was reached. Accordingly, on 11 June, as evacuation of the friendly west coast partisans got under way, villagers from Yo-do, the largest and ECIDU headquarters site, and the far northern island of Yang-do were similarly moved south. The evacuation was completed by mid-June.
[479] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.
The Division is Ordered Back to the Front[480]
[480] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: PacFlt EvalRpt No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar ComdDs, Jun 53.
A rash of political activity in June markedly affected the tenor of military operations in Korea. Intensified Communist aggression broke out north of ROK sectors in the Eighth Army line, largely as a reaction to President Rhee’s unprecedented action on 18 June of freeing, with the help of ROK guards, approximately 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist prisoners at POW camps in the south. Other anti-Communist POWs at Camp No. 10, near Ascom City, staged violent break-out attempts at that same time and Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion passed to operational control of the camp commanding officer there to help prevent a repetition of any such incidents in the future. Following a recess of truce talks, pending a clarification of the status of the current military-diplomatic agreements, key delegates held crisis meetings at Panmunjom and Tokyo to get the beleaguered talks back on track.