[747] Ibid., p. 402.
From late 1950 until early 1953, Marine air squadrons were assigned directly by FAF, with CG, 1st MAW, having virtually no tactical control over his own units. Marine Corps aerial doctrine traditionally employed close air support of ground operations as the primary role of its air arm. FEAF and FAF, however, in their interpretation of employment of tactical air power directed FAF maximum efforts toward interdiction missions, sometimes even to the expense of immediate CAS needs.[748] As Far East Air Forces stated late in 1951, “when required, close air support of United Nations Army forces may take precedence over other FEAF programs.”[749] Interdiction, general support, and close support missions were the normal order of priorities flown by FEAF-FAF.
[748] Comments Futrell, USAF, Korea, pp. 430–431: “Despite the fact that responsible Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force commanders had decided that the rail-interdiction attacks would best accomplish the United Nations mission in Korea, Eighth Army subordinate commanders were gravely dissatisfied with the limitations [96 sorties daily for the entire Eighth Army front, decided upon by EUSAK-FAF in November 1951] placed on close support.” One of those dissenting subordinates at the time was CG, 1st Mar Div. Following the September 1951 heavy fighting in the Punchbowl area, General Thomas officially described the Marine division’s air support as unsatisfactory and stated his division had “taken unnecessary casualties because its air support had not been adequate or timely.” Average elapsed time between the division’s CAS requests and its 187 approved missions that month had been nearly two hours. Only 32 immediate air-support requests had been filled within 30 minutes.
[749] Ibid., p. 432.
Operation STRANGLE, the 10-month, all-out, air interdiction campaign during 1951–1952 originally had as its objective the destruction of the North Korean road-rail network. The interdiction program had been defined at first as a move to “paralyze enemy transportation in the zone between the railheads at the 39th Parallel and the front lines.”[750] and later somewhat more conservatively as a measure to so “disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication ... that he will be unable to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces ... or to mount a sustained offensive himself.”[751]
[750] Ibid., p. 296.
[751] Ibid., pp. 435–436.
Despite more than 87,552 interdiction sorties flown during the period, CinCFE daily intelligence summaries showed that aerial harassment of the CCF had not hindered their defensive efforts. Instead, by the summer of 1952 the enemy had “actually doubled in troop strength, reinforced their artillery strength to equal that of the UN forces, developed a tremendous AA capability, and established the capability for launching a general offensive.”[752] With UNC air and sea superiority, the Chinese Communists had still succeeded in keeping their main supply route open. Rail track cuts were being repaired in as little as 36 hours. And the CCF was employing more fire power than ever: in May 1952, some 102,000 rounds fell against UNC positions compared to only 8,000 the previous July.
[752] PacFlt EvalRpt No. 5, p. 9-58.
Even the retiring UNC Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, admitted before Congressional representatives in 1952 that the enemy had greater offensive potential than ever before, and the Commander, Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, declared flatly: “The interdiction program was a failure ... It did not interdict.”[753] USAF spokesmen felt it had attained its limited purpose but opined: “Seen abstractly, the United Nations railway-interdiction campaign was defensive and preventive rather than offensive and positive.”[754] In early 1952, CG, FAF, General Everest, recognizing that his pilots “had been so long engaged in interdiction attacks that they were losing their skills in close support”[755] inaugurated a new system. Beginning in March all fighter-bomber squadrons were to be rotated on weekly close-support missions.