[753] Cagle and Manson, Sea War, Korea, p. 270.
[754] Futrell, USAF, Korea, pp. 437–438.
[755] Ibid., p. 434.
Actually, the skies had begun to clear for Marine aviation operational difficulties by the latter half of 1952. A better understanding had developed between both high-level officials and the working day-to-day liaison operations at JOC CG, 1st MAW had “established his position so firmly he was able to guide establishment of the policies which governed his operations merely by expressing his desires to CG 5th AF.”[756] The battle for Bunker Hill in August 1952 had marked excellent cooperation between Eighth Army and FAF, with the 1st Marine Division receiving air priority for two days. In any event, matters were substantially improved from late 1951-early 1952 when, during a 12-month period, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1st MarDiv had plummeted to the incredibly low figure of 1,956[757] or 15.8 percent of the wing’s total 12,372 CAS sorties during FY 1952 (1Jul51–30Jun52).
[756] PacFlt EvalRpt No. 5, p. 9-45.
[757] By contrast: in FY 1951, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1stMarDiv were 7,000 of total 14,028 CAS sorties, or 50 percent; for FY 1953, the figure was 4,912 of total 14,540 CAS sorties, or 32.4 percent. Generals’ Summary, Chart C, following p. 58.
Commenting on this unhappy period for both air and infantry Marines, Lieutenant General Richard C. Mangrum, USMC (Retired), who was CO, MAG-12 during part of the STRANGLE operations, said “for the rest of 1951 and well into 1952 the major effort of my Group and of MAG-33 was devoted to cutting the rail lines in North Korea. Without success, of course. Little by little we were able to increase the percentages of effort devoted to close support of the troops.”[758] And by the last six months of the war the bulk of all CAS missions received by the division were flown by 1st MAW aircraft, in contrast to earlier periods when a third or half of the division’s sorties were Marine-flown. As the last Korean War Wing CG noted, despite basic differences between Army-Air Force and Marine Corps-Navy concept and tactics, ultimately “the commanders of the Fifth Air Force in actual daily practice decentralized control to a marked degree.”[759]
[758] Quoted in Heinl, Soldiers of Sea, p. 647.
[759] MajGen V. E. Megee, “Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces,” Marine Corps Gazette, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), p. 17.
Throughout the war, however, a lack of standardized terms and differences in request procedures continued to exist. (This was resolved by using Marine control procedures when flying for the division, and Army-Air Force procedures when scrambled on flights for other divisions.) Whereas EUSAK-FAF considered strikes inside the bombline[760] as “close air support” and those outside it as “general support,” the Marine CAS concept was one of support in close proximity to frontlines (ranging from 50 to 500 yards out) that affects the fire and maneuver of those ground units. In the hands of Marine FACs, Marine planes employed on close support strikes had a definite influence on the MLR tactical situation.