MAP 10 K. WHITE
2/1 SECTOR
9–11 AUGUST 1952
When the M-46 gun tanks were in position to fire on Siberia and its flanks, their powerful 90s opened up on the objective. At this time, 2110, the first section of flames (two tanks) made its way along the stream bed between the MLR and Hill 56A (Samoa). Lighting their way with very short bursts of flame, the two tanks advanced in this manner to the base of Hill 58A. There the vehicles paused momentarily, then began to move up the near slope, using longer spurts of flame to sear the ground and sparse vegetation to the crest of the position. The gun tanks, in the meantime, had shifted their fire from Siberia northeast to neutralize Hill 110. When the flame vehicles reached the top of Siberia, they lumbered down the far slope, firing then in shorter bursts and sweeping the area with machine guns to discourage any enemy infantry interference.
With some fuel reserved to light their way on the return trip, the flame section reversed its course from the far side of the objective, mounted the crest, and clanked back to the Changdan Road. When the first section had returned, the second departed, completing its mission in much the same manner. Tank personnel of both groups observed that the enemy artillery and mortar fire was medium to heavy on Siberia. Some rifle fire was also received. Gun tanks, firing from Changdan Road east of Siberia, experienced less fire from the Chinese.
Although the flame vehicles had completed their mission and were on their way home, the M-46s remained on position in support of the 3d Platoon, Company D which, at 2230, was advancing from the MLR to complete the infantry part of the diversion. Staying out of the low ground that the tanks had used, the platoon swept over Hill 56A at 2255 and immediately struck out for the further objective, Hill 58A. Gun tanks firing their 90s on the Chinese OPLR on Hill 110 and on Siberia illuminated the target area with their fighting lights, the shutter of which the tankers flicked open and closed during each five-second interval that the light remained on.
Less than an hour after crossing JAMESTOWN, the platoon from Captain George W. Campbell’s Company D reported the capture of Siberia. The enemy quickly made his presence felt at the objective; a half hour before midnight, he assaulted the hill in reinforced platoon strength. Ten minutes later the Chinese withdrew and the Company D Marines, in accordance with their battle plan, did likewise. At about the same time the 5th Marines, having completed its part in the diversion, also secured from the operation.
Ten minutes after the diversionary infantry had cleared Samoa while enroute to Siberia, the main attack force, Company B, which had come under operational control of 2/1 at 1800, crossed the MLR, the line of departure. Moving at a fast pace to preserve the element of anticipated surprise, the attack force, commanded by Captain Sereno S. Scranton, Jr., soon deployed two squads of the lead platoon against the near side of the hill. By 2318 on 11 August the squads were moving up Bunker Hill and, 10 minutes later, one platoon had gained the top of the objective and one was at the base of the hill, both moving northward along the forward slope. As the advancing units neared the end of their sweep forward, they began to come under small amounts of rifle fire from the front and left flank of the position.[179] The Company B platoons continued to advance, returning well-placed small arms fire.
[179] Recalling the Marine seizure of Bunker, the G-3, 1stMarDiv at that time expressed the view that “taking these places was easy but holding them under heavy Chinese artillery and mortar fire was extremely costly. Our counterbattery fire was ineffective because we were limited to from one to eight rounds per tube per day, depending on the weapon, by Army order, because of an ammunition shortage.” Col Russell E. Honsowetz MS comments, dtd 15 Jun 67, hereafter Honsowetz ltr II.