Soon the intensity of Chinese small arms fire increased; at the same time enemy mortars and artillery opened up on the company. Marines attempting to assault the top of Hill 122 also came under a hail of hand grenades hurled by the staunch Chinese defenders. After a brief but vicious fight at point-blank range, the Chinese gave ground on the eastern side, heading uphill. Several Marines pursued the fleeing enemy to the summit, then joined the rest of the assault units of Company B in organizing a defense. By 0300, 12 August the battle had quieted down and for a short while all firing ceased. Then, as the Marines began to dig in, a bypassed pocket of enemy resistance came to life. Two fire teams in the 1st Platoon took these Chinese Communists under fire.
Even as the fighting continued, Marines and KSC personnel were hauling fortification materials towards Bunker to consolidate the precarious foothold. For a while, enemy mortars unleashed a heavy fire against the newly won position, but by 0230 Company B was able to report that enemy shelling had stopped and that the objective was in friendly hands. A new fire fight broke out at 0345 between a small force of enemy soldiers occupying a draw forward of Bunker Hill and Marines nearby. The exchange of fire continued for nearly two hours, but short of harassing the Marines on Bunker Hill the enemy did not launch a counterattack. Dawn on 12 August revealed that thus far in the Bunker Hill fighting 1 Marine of Company B had been killed and 22 were wounded. The earlier diversionary attack on Siberia had resulted in only one Marine casualty, the wounding of the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant James W. Dion.
Personnel losses were kept to a minimum by the well-organized medical support and the efficient service of medical and evacuation personnel. A forward aid station was established in the vicinity of the Company E CP. Casualties that were not ambulatory arrived at this two-bunker installation usually by hand litter, other wounded men were transported in armored personnel carriers, U.S. Army tracked vehicles similar in appearance to the Marine LVT, that had accompanied the diversionary unit and were part of the Panmunjom rescue force stationed in the area of COP 2 on the 3/1 left flank. Wounded Marines were examined immediately. Minor injury cases were treated and discharged; more seriously injured personnel were given emergency treatment and evacuated. Movement to the rear was accomplished by ambulance jeeps. Helicopters, landing only 30 yards from the station, flew out the critically wounded. A sandbag-protected squad tent was used to house casualties waiting to be examined. This emergency aid station closed down on 13 August, when action in the right battalion sector diminished.
Even though the remainder of the morning of 12 August was practically free of any retaliatory attempts by the Chinese against Bunker Hill, the Marines occupying the new position were not idle, for they anticipated an immediate and severe reaction for capturing the hill. Quickly, but methodically, the company dug in. At noon, regiment passed to 3/1[180] the responsibility for Bunker Hill and operational control of Company B. Consolidation of Hill 122 continued until about 1500, when the Marines were forced to put down their entrenching tools and grab their rifles instead. The Chinese had suddenly launched an intense mortar and artillery attack against the hill. Defending Marines expected to see enemy soldiers start up the western slopes at any minute.
[180] Initially the diversionary attack against Siberia and subsequent assault against Bunker had been made by Marines of 2/1 since Siberia was in the 2/1 sector. On 12 August operational control was transferred to 3/1 as the fighting continued at Bunker, in the area of responsibility of the left battalion sector.
Actually, more than an hour elapsed before the Communists initiated their first main ground attack to regain Bunker. By that time, heavy casualties from the continued shelling had forced Company B to pull back from the ridge and take up positions on the reverse (eastern) slope of Bunker Hill. At this point, with reduced Company B forces and with no radio communication between Captain Scranton’s unit and 3/1, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage sent I/3/1,[181] under Captain Howard J. Connolly, forward from the MLR. Shortly before 1600, a force of more than 350 Chinese lunged out of the low ground of Hill 123, west of Bunker, to attack defensive positions along the ridge between Hills 124–122. Striking in rapid succession first the west side and then the northern end of the Company B position to find a weak spot in the defense, the enemy counterattack finally concentrated on the southwestern part of the hill.
[181] From the division reserve, Captain Anthony J. Skotnicki’s company, I/3/7, was en route to take over the I/3/1 sector. As an interim measure, Captain Byron J. Melancon’s Company H extended its MLR positions to the right to cover the Company I area.
An intense exchange of fire raged here until 1715, when the defending fire of Company B plus the added weight of the Company I reinforcements combined to stall the enemy advance. Having failed to gain their objective, the Communists abruptly broke off their artillery and mortar fire and ordered their infantry to withdraw. They pulled back only to the far side of the hill, however. By 1740 the enemy was occupying his new post on the northern slope, while the Marines continued to hold their positions on the reverse slope of Bunker Ridge. Enemy supporting fires had lifted and a lull ensued in the fighting.
Consolidating the Defense of Bunker Hill[182]
[182] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 12–13 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.