[246] MAG-33 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 16.
Another congratulatory message was received in September, this one from General Pollock for the excellent support given by MAG-12 on the 20th. With three attack squadrons participating, Colonel Condon’s group had neutralized Chinese weapons and troops at OP 36 to help prevent a takeover of the Korean position. The pilots reported well over 100 Chinese casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Chamberlain’s VMA-323 contributed most of the 23 Marine sorties. The other attacking squadrons were VMA-121 (Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Cargill, who 10 days earlier had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Crawford), and VMA-212, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maurice W. Fletcher.
September was a month of mixed fortunes in the air war over Korea. The successful CAS strikes of the 20th followed only a few days after another high point set on 14 September, when Lieutenant Colonel Cargill’s attack squadron flew its 5,000th combat sortie since arrival in the Korean theater in October 1951. Then on 15 September, General Jerome commissioned a new kind of unit in the wing, Marine Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1), whose mission was to provide electronic counter-measures (ECM) for UN aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence F. Fox headed the squadron, the only one in the naval service with an ECM primary mission in Korea.
Three days after the commissioning, a strange incident transpired. North of the UN line and at an altitude of 9,500 feet, a F-84 Thunderjet fighter, with U.S. Air Force markings and insignia, attacked a propeller-driven Air Force trainer. The slower plane immediately began defensive maneuvering, flying in tight circles. After making five turns, the trainer pilot saw the supposedly friendly jet fly off.
It was believed that such a paradoxical occurrence was due to the substantial number of F-84 losses and the enemy’s ability to piece together and fly an aircraft of that model. A few similar episodes—attacks by apparently friendly aircraft on UN planes—had previously taken place. In each case, the impostor was a model of U.S. aircraft that had suffered particularly heavy losses.
Another incident in September had dire consequences. On the 10th, MAG-33 dispatched 22 fighter aircraft from VMF-115 (Lieutenant Colonel Royce W. Coln) to attack reported troop concentrations near Sariwon, 35 miles directly south of Pyongyang. The F9F Panther jets had completed the strike and were returning to their K-3 base when they were diverted to land at K-2, Taegu, where the weather was better. Fog had suddenly swept over the field at K-3, reducing visibility to zero. Sixteen Panthers landed safely at K-2, 45 miles southwest of the Marine field at Pohang. The remaining six, piloted by Majors Raymond E. Demers and Donald F. Givens, First Lieutenant Alvin R. Bourgeois, and by Second Lieutenants John W. Hill, Jr., Carl R. Lafleur, and Richard L. Roth, flying in formation in poor weather, crashed into the side of a 3,000-foot mountain while descending.[247] They would have required only an additional 600 feet of altitude to clear the summit.
[247] Although not definitely proven, there were “some indications of false radio beacons being used by the enemy in clandestine operations in the K-2 area.” Jack ltr.
Losses of Marine pilots and aircraft had been of growing concern to the wing command. The initial success of the flak suppression fires had eliminated the one successful Communist source of air defense, accurate antiaircraft firing. One result was that noncombat accidents for a while during the summer became the principal cause of pilot and plane attrition. To help reduce these operational accidents as well as the combat losses, the two Marine air groups instituted squadron training programs and also directed the adoption of several new corrective procedures. In MAG-12, for example, a study of results from the FAF policy that limited bombing runs to one for interdiction and two for CAS targets revealed a sharp reduction in hits from flak. Tactical squadron commanders in MAG-12 drew up a syllabus during September to test proposed defensive tactics for their propeller aircraft to employ against enemy jets. The carrier squadron, VMA-312, began that same month the additional practice of field carrier landing qualification at K-6 for new pilots before permitting them to operate from the carriers.
In spite of these efforts, pilot losses spiralled alarmingly in October. For the rest of 1952, the monthly totals remained near that month’s level. On the other hand, aircraft losses during October dropped sharply to 10 from the September total of 22. This lower figure was not to be exceeded until May 1953. These remedial procedures were considered at least partially responsible for the substantial decrease in aircraft losses.
In another area, a mid-October landing at Kojo, on the east coast immediately south of the 39th Parallel, did not work out as planned. The amphibious operation was in reality a feint intended to draw troops away from frontline positions and expose them to naval air and gunfire as they rushed in reinforcements. The enemy failed to rise to the bait, and actually only a few Communist troops were sighted. VMA-312 provided armed reconnaissance, tactical air operation, and naval gunfire spotting during the feint. Although they made little enemy contact, the Marine “Checkerboard” pilots operating off the Sicily gained much experience in landings and take-offs under the adverse conditions of rough seas and high winds.