“Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.
“In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions. “Question by Foreign office whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.
“1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.
“It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.
“A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.
“The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander in chief who is to have priority.
“The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.
“2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportspalast.
“27 September:
“1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.” (1780-PS)