“Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
“The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.
(J)” (388-PS, Item 54)
On the same day, 27 September, Keitel sent a most secret memorandum to Hess and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is Item 32 in the Schmundt file. It directs the Party officials and organizations to comply with the demands of the Army during the secret mobilization in such matters as turning over equipment and facilities. The first four paragraphs of this message read:
“As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.
“Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.
“The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.
“OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.” (388-PS, Item 32)
Two additional entries from Jodl’s diary reveal the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried forward their preparations for attack even during the period of the negotiations which culminated in the Munich Agreement. The entries for 26 and 27 September read:
“26 September: