3. The same commission has to examine the assets of all public and official party organizations, how the assets have been invested, and to what extent these assets can be utilized for the financing of armament.
4. The Reichministry of Finance is to be commissioned to investigate the possibilities of an increased tax income by the introduction of new taxes or the increase of existing tax rates.
The financing of armament previously by the Reich Bank was a necessity under the existing political conditions, and the political success has proved the correctness of this action. However, now other methods of financing of armament must be attempted under all conditions. With that, all not absolutely necessary expenses in other fields must be refrained from, and the entire, actually small, financial power of Germany must be concentrated on this one goal, the financing of armament. Whether the financial problem will succeed with this method of approach is as yet doubtful, but without such concentration it will fail with certainty.
Memorandum 9.III.1936 on the supply situation in the field of fuels and its effect on the Wehrmacht.
The simultaneous throttling and blocking of foreign sources of liquid fuel has caused an increasingly critical situation of supply of the German market since the beginning of the year 1936.
This situation calls for a description of the serious effects on the preparedness for action of the Wehrmacht and of the extraordinary measures which necessitate a decision in this matter.
The supply of the Wehrmacht is based on the home production, the reserves which can be made available in case of mobilization and the foreign imports which still for some time must fill the present gaps of supply.
I. The German production.
The anticipating measures taken during the last 2 years by the Reich Cabinet to increase the home production of fuel, will not bring about an essential improvement of the supply situation during the current year because of the time required for factory construction and the uninterrupted increase of demand, but cannot bring an appreciable relief until the year 1938. The list in enclosure 1 of the requirements in case of mobilization and of the supply of these requirements by production, as well as the graphs added to the other enclosures, show the influence to be expected from the German production on the entire supply.
The expanding German production favors mainly light fuels, especially fuel for airplanes, and in addition, oil for airplane engines. As to the other kinds required by the Wehrmacht in case of war, we cannot expect any improvement for the time being; as to heating oils it may be anticipated that the situation will deteriorate. The developments of new processes (Uhde and Pott), the extent of which will shortly permit an opinion, offers certain possibilities of auxiliary supply which do not appear on the graphs, because the extent of the production possible until 1938 cannot yet be foreseen.