The inadequacy of the supply on the basis of home production is a fact which cannot be eliminated during the next 2-3 years, even with the greatest efforts and in spite of the planning started for additional expansion of production.
II. Reserves.
To assure the requirements of the Wehrmacht it becomes necessary to bridge the supply gaps by reserves. For the first period of mobilization the Wehrmacht relies on the reserves of business, especially of great importing corporations, which also in peace time consider stored reserves for about 3 months as indispensable for smooth distribution. The Wehrmacht ought to be enabled to count on the amount of these reserves remaining constant.
Beyond that the Wehrmacht accumulates its own reserves in large storage houses so that considerable national reserves will be available as buffers in case of supply difficulties.
III. Dependency of the overall supply on imports.
The obstacle to importing encountered to a large extent during the last weeks, and which have been brought about by an accumulation of economic-political events in foreign trade, endanger not only the maintenance of industrial reserves but also the continuation of the storage policy of the Wehrmacht. They shake the very foundations of the motorization program of industry and consequently also of Wehrmacht mobilization of mechanized vehicles to the extent planned for in case of war.
In particular large gaps have been opened:
1. due to the Russian prohibition of exporting petroleum, by which the benzol-association supplying about 20% of the German market got into considerable difficulties.
2. due to suddenly considerably increased demands of the Rumanians, who offer fuel only in exchange for foreign bills proper [Bardevisen] and/or at greatly increased prices in marks. The contribution of Rumanian imports to the supply of German requirements was 40% during the last year. The firm Olex which contributes 11% to the German market has already been forced, due to the obstruction of Rumanian deliveries, to decrease its business considerably, and will face a close-down of its market supply if relief is not procured before June 1936. Due to this reduction of imports similar stoppages are to be expected by the other great organizations of distribution during the same period.
IV. Means to secure the supply.