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Timeliness of Orders Major Kinney, Infantry, Sicily: “Our chief difficulty throughout the campaign was the lack of time given for the execution of orders. Frequently we received operations orders which did not allow enough time for proper preparation and execution. At San Fratello, we received an order after 11 PM to attack at 6 AM the next morning. The battalions were in assembly areas some five or six miles from the line of departure. The terrain over which they had to move to get in position in the dark was the roughest, most rugged mountain country you could imagine, and all the ammunition, weapons, and supplies had to be taken by hand and by mule pack. Although it might seem that from 11 PM to 6 AM was sufficient time, the actual conditions were such that it was less than half enough, because of the terrain, darkness, and transport difficulties. Also, the men had just completed marches over mountain trails of nine to fourteen miles and were not fresh for the new movement.”
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Maps Seventh Army Report, Sicily: “Instill in all personnel an appreciation of the value of maps. The supply of maps will never be adequate to the demand. Training in the care and preservation of maps is as important as training in the care and preservation of matériel.
AA Fire “It was found necessary to issue instructions that ground troops, with the exception of AA units, would not fire at airplanes unless the planes attacked them or were close enough to be identified beyond a possible doubt.”
Security 1st Division G-2 Report, Sicily: “Interrogation report of a captured German pilot includes the following: ‘About the end of June, 1943, German air crews were shown a report and given a lecture on the tactical and technical details of the P-47 Thunderbolt, alleged to be based upon the statements made by a captured U. S. Army Air Force captain.’”
COMMENT: The moral of this story is obvious. Hammer home the necessity for saying absolutely nothing but, “My name is ...; my rank is ...; my serial number is ....”
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Strafing Aircraft Fifth Army Report, Salerno: “During landing operations at Salerno, many members of the —th Division would stand up to fire their rifles, carbines, and even pistols at strafing and bombing German aircraft. This resulted in many unnecessary casualties.”
COMMENT: Personnel not assigned to a definite AA mission should disperse and take cover, firing their individual weapons from such cover at attacking aircraft only, and even then only when these come within the effective ranges of their weapons.