“During the enemy counterattacks we did pretty well with other fire, too. Lead was flying fast and furiously at twenty to thirty yards. We fire at flashes. In this kind of firing you learn to fire and roll to one side or they’ll soon get you.”
“One of the corporals sneaked up on a dug-in vehicle and got it with an ’03 rifle grenade at 25 yards.
“The ‘bazooka’ man of my platoon heard ‘Tanks to the right,’ went around a bend in the road, and fired at about 35 yards. He got the first of a pair of vehicles. A German officer tried to capture him with a pistol, but he gave the officer an uppercut and then killed him with his helmet. I don’t know how the other vehicle was knocked out, but one of the BAR men got its driver.
COMMENT: In these accounts of a successful night attack by a small unit the application of the following principles is worthy of note:
a. Close control during the approach by the use of control lines adjusted to difficult terrain features.
b. Designation of a Line of Departure as close to the objective as possible and after all major terrain obstacles had been passed. This is essential to assure proper organization of the unit immediately prior to the assault.
c. Attainment of the vital element of surprise (Germans caught undressed and dressing, airplanes landing on the field).
d. Use of the bayonet and hand grenades with no weapon firing permitted. It may often be advisable to prohibit the loading of rifles.
e. Use of frontal attack only. Any attempt at envelopment tends to cause disorder and confusion. Note that one platoon which had advanced ahead of the general line was pulled back to conform.