A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from Kentucky / Containing Also, a Complete Report of All His Speeches; Selections From His Private Correspondence; Eulogies in the Senate and House; and a Poem, by George D. Prentice, Esq.

by Unknown

The doctrine of some of the South Carolina politicians is, that it is competent to that state to annul, within its limits, the authority of an act deliberately passed by the congress of the United States. They do not appear to have looked much, beyond the simple act of nullification, into the consequences which would ensue, and have not distinctly announced, whether one of them might not necessarily be, to light up a civil war. They seem, however, to suppose, that the state might, after the act was performed, remain a member of the union. Now if one state can, by an act of its separate power, absolve itself from the obligations of a law of congress, and continue a part of the union, it could hardly be expected, that any other state would render obedience to the same law. Either every other state would follow the nullifying example, or congress would feel itself constrained, by a sense of equal duty to all parts of the union, to repeal altogether the nullified law. Thus, the doctrine of South Carolina, although it nominally assumes to act for one state only, in effect, would be legislating for the whole union.

Congress embodies the collective will of the whole union, and that of South Carolina among its other members. The legislation of congress is, therefore, founded upon the basis of the representation of all. In the legislature, or a convention of South Carolina, the will of the people of that state is alone collected. They alone are represented, and the people of no other state have any voice in their proceedings. To set up for that state a claim, by a separate exercise of its power, to legislate, in effect, for the whole union, is to assert a pretension at war with the fundamental principles of all representative and free governments. It would practically subject the unrepresented people of all other parts of the union to the arbitrary and despotic power of one state. It would substantially convert them into colonies, bound by the parental authority of that state.

Nor can this enormous pretension derive any support from the consideration, that the power to annul, is different from the power to originate laws. Both powers are, in their nature, legislative, and the mischiefs which might, accrue to the republic from the annulmentof its wholesome laws, may be just as great as those which would flow from the origination of bad laws. There are three things to which, more than all others, mankind in all ages, have shown themselves to be attached; their religion, their laws, and their language.

But it has been argued, in the most solemn manner, ‘that the acknowledgments of the exclusive right of the federal government to determine the limits of its own powers, amounts to a recognition of its absolute supremacy over the states and the people, and involves the sacrifice not only of our dearest rights and interests, but the very existence of the southern states.’

In cases where there are two systems of government, operating at the same time and place, over the same people, the one general, the other local or particular, one system or the other must possess the right to decide upon the extent of the powers, in cases of collision, which are claimed by the general government. No third party, of sufficient impartiality, weight, and responsibility, other than such a tribunal as a supreme court, has yet been devised, or perhaps can be created.

The doctrine of one side is, that the general government, though limited in its nature, must necessarily possess the power to ascertain what authority it has, and, by consequence, the extent of that authority. And that, if its legislative or executive functionaries, by act, transcend that authority, the question may be brought before the supreme court, and, being affirmatively decided by that tribunal, their act must be obeyed until repealed or altered by competent power.

Against the tendency of this doctrine to absorb all power, those who maintain it, think there are reasonable, and, they hope, sufficient securities. In the first place, all are represented in every legislative or executive act, and of course, each state can exert its proper influence, to prevent the adoption of any that may be deemed prejudicial or unconstitutional. Then, there are sacred oaths, elections, public virtue and intelligence, the power of impeachment, a common subjection to both systems of those functionaries who act under either, the right of the states to interpose and amend the constitution, or to dissolve the union; and, finally, the right, in extreme cases, when all other remedies fail, to resist insupportable oppression.

The necessity being felt, by the framers of the constitution, to declare which system should be supreme, and believing that the securities now enumerated, or some of them, were adequate, they have accordingly provided, that the constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance of it, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties, of the United States.

The South Carolina doctrine, on the other side, is, that that state has the right to determine the limits of the powers granted to the general government; and that whenever any of its acts transcend those limits, in the opinion of the state of South Carolina, she is competent to annul them. If the power, with which the federal government is invested by the constitution, to determine the limits of its authority, be liable to the possible danger of ultimate consolidation, and all the safeguards which have been mentioned might prove inadequate, is not this power, claimed for South Carolina, fraught with infinitely more certain, immediate, and fatal danger? It would reverse the rule of supremacy prescribed in the constitution. It would render the authority of a single state paramount to that of the whole union. For undoubtedly, that government, to some extent, must be supreme, which can annul and set aside the acts of another.

The securities which the people of other parts of the United States possess against the abuse of this tremendous power claimed for South Carolina, will be found, on comparison, to be greatly inferior to those which she has against the possible abuses of the general government. They have no voice in her councils; they could not, by the exercise of the elective franchise, change her rulers; they could not impeach her judges, they could not alter her constitution, nor abolish her government.