Under the South Carolina doctrine, if established, the consequence would be a dissolution of the union, immediate, inevitable, irresistible. There would be twenty-four chances to one against its continued existence. The apprehended dangers of the opposite doctrine, remote, contingent, and hardly possible, are greatly exaggerated; and, against their realization, all the precautions have been provided, which human wisdom and patriotic foresight could conceive and devise.
Those who are opposed to the supremacy of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, are adverse to all union, whatever contrary professions they may make. For it may be truly affirmed, that no confederacy of states can exist without a power, somewhere residing in the government of that confederacy, to determine the extent of the authority granted to it by the confederating states.
It is admitted, that the South Carolina doctrine is liable to abuse; but it is contended, that the patriotism of each state is an adequate security, and that the nullifying power would only be exercised ‘in an extraordinary case, where the powers reserved to the states, under the constitution, are usurped by the federal government.’ And is not the patriotism of all the states, as great a safeguard against the assumption of powers, not conferred upon the general government, as the patriotism of one state is against the denial of powers which are clearly granted? But the nullifyingpower is only to be exercised in an extraordinary case. Who is to judge of this extraordinary case? What security is there, especially in moments of great excitement, that a state may not pronounce the plainest and most common exercise of federal power an extraordinary case? The expressions in the constitution, ‘general welfare,’ have been often justly criticised, and shown to convey, in themselves, no power, although they may indicate how the delegated power should be exercised. But this doctrine of an extraordinary case, to be judged of and applied by one of the twenty-four sovereignties, is replete with infinitely more danger, than the doctrine of the ‘general welfare,’ in the hands of all.
We may form some idea of future abuses under the South Carolina doctrine, by the application which is now proposed to be made of it. The American system is said to furnish an extraordinary case, justifying that state to nullify it. The power to regulate foreign commerce, by a tariff, so adjusted as to foster our domestic manufactures, has been exercised from the commencement of our present constitution down to the last session of congress. I have been a member of the house of representatives at three different periods, when the subject of the tariff was debated at great length, and on neither, according to my recollection, was the want of a constitutional power in congress, to enact it, dwelt on as forming a serious and substantial objection to its passage. On the last occasion (I think it was) in which I participated in the debate, it was incidentally said to be against the spirit of the constitution. Whilst the authority of the father of the constitution is invoked to sanction, by a perversion of his meaning, principles of disunion and rebellion, it is rejected to sustain the controverted power, although his testimony in support of it has been clearly and explicitly rendered. This power, thus asserted, exercised, and maintained, in favor of which leading politicians in South Carolina have themselves voted, is alleged to furnish ‘an extraordinary case,’ where the powers reserved to the states, under the constitution, are usurped by the general government. If it be, there is scarcely a statute in our code which would not present a case equally extraordinary, justifying South Carolina or any other state to nullify it.
The United States are not only threatened with the nullification of numerous acts, which they have deliberately passed, but with a withdrawal of one of the members from the confederacy. If the unhappy case should ever occur, of a state being really desirous to separate itself from the union, it would present two questions. The first would be, whether it had a right to withdraw, without the common consent of the members; and supposing, as I believe, no such right to exist, whether it would be expedient to yield consent. Although there may be power to prevent a secession, it might be deemed politic to allow it. It might be considered expedient to permit the refractory state to take the portion of goods that fallethto her, to suffer her to gather her all together, and to go off with her living. But, if a state should be willing, and allowed thus to depart, and to renounce her future portion of the inheritance of this great, glorious, and prosperous republic, she would speedily return, and, in language of repentance, say to the other members of this union, brethren, ‘I have sinned against heaven and before thee.’ Whether they would kill the fatted calf, and, chiding any complaining member of the family, say, ‘this thy sister was dead, and is alive again; and was lost, and is found,’ I sincerely pray the historian may never have occasion to record.
But nullification and disunion are not the only, nor the most formidable, means of assailing the tariff. Its opponents opened the campaign at the last session of congress, and, with the most obliging frankness, have since publicly exposed their plan of operations. It is, to divide and conquer; to attack and subdue the system in detail. They began by reducing the duty on salt and molasses, and, restoring the drawback of the duty on the latter article, allowed the exportation of spirits distilled from it. To all who are interested in the distillation of spirits from native materials, whether fruit, molasses, or grain, this latter measure is particularly injurious. During the administration of Mr. Adams, the duty on foreign molasses was augmented, and the drawback, which had been previously allowed of the duty upon the exportation of spirits distilled from it, was repealed. The object was to favor native produce, and to lessen the competition of foreign spirits, or spirits distilled from foreign materials, with spirits distilled from domestic material. It was deemed to be especially advantageous to the western country, a great part of whose grain can only find markets at home and abroad by being converted into distilled spirits. Encouraged by this partial success, the foes of the tariff may next attempt to reduce the duties on iron, woollens, and cotton fabrics, successively. The American system of protection should be regarded, as it is, an entire and comprehensive system, made up of various items, and aiming at the prosperity of the whole union, by protecting the interests of each part. Every part, therefore, has a direct interest in the protection which it enjoys of the articles, which its agriculture produces, or its manufactories fabricate, and also a collateral interest in the protection which other portions of the union derive from their peculiar interests. Thus, the aggregate of the prosperity of all is constituted by the sums of the prosperity of each.
Take any one article of the tariff, (iron, for example,) and there is no such direct interest in its protection, pervading the major part of the United States, as would induce congress to encourage it, if it stood alone. The states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Kentucky, which are most concerned, are encouraged in the production or manufacture of this article, in consequence ofthe adoption of a general principle, which extends protection to other interests in other parts of the union.
The stratagem which has been adopted by the foes of the system, to destroy it, requires the exercise of constant vigilance and firmness, to prevent the accomplishment of the object. They have resolved to divide and conquer—the friends of the system should assume the revolutionary motto of our ancestors, ‘united we stand, divided we fall.’ They should allow no alteration in any part of the system, as it now exists, which did not aim at rendering more efficacious the system of protection, on which the whole is founded. Every one should reflect, that it is not equal, to have a particular interest which he is desirous should be fostered, in his part of the country, protected against foreign competition, without his being willing to extend the principle to other interests, deserving protection, in other parts of the union.
But the measure of reducing the duty on salt and molasses, and reviving the drawback on the importation of spirits distilled from molasses, was an attack on the system, less alarming than another which was made during the last session of congress, on a kindred system.
If any thing could be considered as settled, under the present constitution of our government, I had supposed that it was its authority to construct such internal improvements as may be deemed by congress necessary and proper to carry into effect the power granted to it. For nearly twenty-five years, the power has been asserted and exercised by the government. For the last fifteen years it has been often controverted in congress, but it has been invariably maintained, in that body, by repeated decisions, pronounced, after full and elaborate debate, and at intervals of time implying the greatest deliberation. Numerous laws attest the existence of the power; and no less than twenty-odd laws have been passed in relation to a single work. This power, necessary to all parts of the union, is indispensable to the west. Without it, this section can never enjoy any part of the benefit of a regular disbursement of the vast revenues of the United States. I recollect perfectly well, that, at the last great struggle for the power, in 1824, Mr. P. P. Barbour, of Virginia, the principal champion against it, observed to me, that if it were affirmed on that occasion, (Mr. Hemphill’s survey bill,) he should consider the question settled. And it was affirmed.