A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from Kentucky / Containing Also, a Complete Report of All His Speeches; Selections From His Private Correspondence; Eulogies in the Senate and House; and a Poem, by George D. Prentice, Esq.

by Unknown

Yet we are told, that this power can no longer be exercised without an amendment of the constitution! On the occasion in South Carolina, to which I have already adverted, it was said, that the tariff and internal improvements are intimately connected, and that the death-blow which it was hoped the one had received, will finally destroy the other. I concur in the opinion, that they are intimately, if not indissolubly, united. Not connected together,with the fraudulent intent which has been imputed, but by their nature, by the tendency of each to advance the objects of the other, and of both to augment the sum of national prosperity.

If I could believe that the executive message, which was communicated to congress upon the application of the veto to the Maysville road, really expressed the opinion of the president of the United States, in consequence of the unfortunate relations which have existed between us, I would forbear to make any observation upon it. It has his name affixed to it; but it is not every paper which bears the name of a distinguished personage, that is his, or expresses his opinions. We have been lately informed, that the unhappy king of England, in perhaps his last illness, transmitted a paper to parliament, with his royal signature attached to it, which became an object of great curiosity. Can any one believe, that that paper conveyed any other sentiments than those of his majesty’s ministers? It is impossible, that the veto message should express the opinions of the president, and I prove it by evidence derived from himself. Not forty days before that message was sent to congress, he approved a bill embracing appropriations to various objects of internal improvement, and among others, to improve the navigation of Conneaut creek. Although somewhat acquainted with the geography of our country, I declare, I did not know of the existence of such a stream until I read the bill. I have since made it an object of inquiry, and have been told, that it rises in one corner of Pennsylvania, and is discharged into lake Erie, in a corner of the state of Ohio; and that the utmost extent, to which its navigation is susceptible of improvement, is about seven miles. Is it possible, that the president could conceive that a national object, and that the improvement of a great thoroughfare, on which the mail is transported for some eight or ten states and territories, is not a national consideration? The power to improve the navigation of watercourses, nowhere expressly recognised in the constitution, is infinitely more doubtful than the establishment of mail roads, which is explicitly authorized in that instrument! Did not the president, during the canvass which preceded his election, in his answer to a letter from governor Ray, of Indiana, written at the instance of the senate of that respectable state, expressly refer to his votes given in the senate of the United States, for his opinion as to the power of the general government, and inform him that his opinion remained unaltered? And do we not find, upon consulting the journals of the senate, that among other votes affirming the existence of the power, he voted for an appropriation to the Chesapeake and Delaware canal, which is only about fourteen miles in extent? And do we not know, that it was at that time, like the Maysville road now, in progress of execution under the direction of a company incorporated by a state? And that, whilst the Maysville road had aconnection with roads east of Maysville and southwest of Lexington, the turnpiking of which was contemplated, that canal had no connection with any other existing canal.

The veto message is perfectly irreconcilable with the previous acts, votes, and opinions of General Jackson. It does not express his opinions, but those of his advisers and counsellors, and especially those of his cabinet. If we look at the composition of that cabinet, we cannot doubt it. Three of the five who, I believe, compose it, (whether the postmaster-general be one or not, I do not know,) are known to be directly and positively opposed to the power; a fourth, to use a term descriptive of the favorite policy of one of them, is a non-committal, and as to the fifth, good Lord deliver us from such friendship as his to internal improvements. Further, I have heard it from good authority, (but I will not vouch for it, although I believe it to be true,) that some of the gentlemen from the south waited upon the president, whilst he held the Maysville bill under consideration, and told him if he approved of that bill, the south would no longer approve of him, but oppose his administration.

I cannot, therefore, consider the message as conveying the sentiments and views of the president. It is impossible. It is the work of his cabinet; and if, unfortunately, they were not practically irresponsible to the people of the United States, they would deserve severe animadversions for having prevailed upon the president, in the precipitation of business, and perhaps without his spectacles, to put his name to such a paper, and send it forth to congress and to the nation. Why, I have read that paper again and again; and I never can peruse it without thinking of diplomacy, and the name of Talleyrand, Talleyrand, Talleyrand, perpetually recurring. It seems to have been written in the spirit of an accommodating soul, who, being determined to have fair weather in any contingency, was equally ready to cry out, good lord, good devil. Are you for internal improvements? you may extract from the message texts enough to support your opinion. Are you against them? the message supplies you with abundant authority to countenance your views. Do you think that a long and uninterrupted current of concurring decisions ought to settle the question of a controverted power? so the authors of the message affect to believe. But ought any precedents, however numerous, to be allowed to establish a doubtful power? the message agrees with him who thinks not.

I cannot read this regular document without thinking of Talleyrand. That remarkable person was one of the most eminent and fortunate men of the French revolution. Prior to its commencement, he held a bishoprick under the ill-fated Louis the sixteenth. When that great political storm showed itself above the horizon, he saw which way the wind was going to blow, and trimmed hissails accordingly. He was in the majority of the convention, of the national assembly, and of the party that sustained the bloody Robespierre and his cut-throat successor. He belonged to the party of the consuls, the consul for life, and finally the emperor. Whatever party was uppermost, you would see the head of Talleyrand always high among them, never down. Like a certain dexterous animal, throw him as you please, head or tail, back or belly uppermost, he is always sure to light upon his feet. During a great part of the period described, he was minister of foreign affairs, and although totally devoid of all principle, no man ever surpassed him in adroitness of his diplomatic notes. He is now, at an advanced age, I believe, grand chamberlain of his majesty, Charles the tenth.

I have lately seen an amusing anecdote of this celebrated man, which forces itself upon me whenever I look at the cabinet message. The king of France, like our president, towards the close of the last session of congress, found himself in a minority. A question arose, whether, in consequence, he should dissolve the chamber of deputies, which resembles our house of representatives. All France was agitated with the question. No one could solve it. At length, they concluded to go to that sagacious, cunning old fox, Talleyrand, to let them know what should be done. I tell you what, gentlemen, said he, (looking very gravely, and taking a pinch of snuff,) in the morning I think his majesty will dissolve the deputies; at noon I have changed that opinion; and at night I have no opinion at all. Now, on reading the first column of this message, one thinks that the cabinet have a sort of an opinion in favor of internal improvements, with some limitations. By the time he has read to the middle of it, he concludes they have adopted the opposite opinion; and when he gets to the end of it, he is perfectly persuaded, they have no opinion of their own whatever!

Let us glance at a few only of the reasons, if reasons they can be called, of this piebald message. The first is, that the exercise of the power has produced discord, and, to restore harmony to the national councils, it should be abandoned, or, which is tantamount, the constitution must be amended. The president is therefore advised to throw himself into the minority. Well—did that revive harmony? When the question was taken in the house of the people’s representatives, an obstinate majority still voted for the bill, the objections in the message notwithstanding. And in the senate, the representatives of the states, a refractory majority, stood unmoved. But does the message mean to assert, that no great measure, about which public sentiment is much divided, ought to be adopted in consequence of that division? Then none can ever be adopted. Apply this new rule to the case of the American revolution. The colonies were rent into implacable parties—thetories every where abounded, and in some places outnumbered the whigs. This continued to be the state of things throughout the revolutionary contest. Suppose some timid, time-serving whig had, during its progress, addressed the public, and, adverting to the discord which prevailed, and to the expediency of restoring harmony in the land, had proposed to abandon or postpone the establishment of our liberty and independence, until all should agree in asserting them? The late war was opposed by a powerful and talented party; what would have been thought of president Madison, if, instead of a patriotic and energetic message, recommending it, as the only alternative, to preserve our honor and vindicate our right, he had come to congress with a proposal that we should continue to submit to the wrongs and degradation inflicted upon our country by a foreign power, because we were, unhappily, greatly divided? What would have become of the settlement of the Missouri question, the tariff, the Indian bill of the last session, if the existence of a strong and almost equal division in the public councils ought to have prevented their adoption? The principle is nothing more nor less than a declaration, that the right of the majority to govern, must yield to the perseverance, respectability, and numbers of the minority. It is in keeping with the nullifying doctrines of South Carolina, and is such a principle as might be expected to be put forth by such a cabinet. The government of the United States, at this juncture, exhibits a most remarkable spectacle. It is that of a majority of the nation having put the powers of government into the hands of the minority. If any one can doubt this, let him look back at the elements of the executive, at the presiding officers of the two houses, at the composition and the chairmen of the most important committees, who shape and direct the public business in congress. Let him look, above all, at measures, the necessary consequences of such an anomalous state of things—internal improvements gone, or going; the whole American system threatened, and the triumphant shouts of anticipated victory sounding in our ears. Georgia, extorting from the fears of an affrighted majority of congress an Indian bill, which may prostrate all the laws, treaties, and policy which have regulated our relations with the Indians from the commencement of our government; and politicians in South Carolina, at the same time, brandishing the torch of civil war, and pronouncing unbounded eulogiums upon the president, for the good he has done, and the still greater good which they expect at his hands, and the sacrifice of the interests of the majority.

Another reason assigned in the Maysville message is, the desire of paying the national debt. By an act passed in the year 1817, an annual appropriation was made of ten millions of dollars, which were vested in the commissioners of the sinking fund, to pay the principal and interest of the public debt. That act wasprepared and carried through congress by one of the most estimable and enlightened men that this country ever produced, whose premature death is to be lamented on every account, but especially because, if he were now living, he would be able, more than any other man, to check the extravagance and calm the violence raging in South Carolina, his native state. Under the operation of that act, nearly one hundred and fifty millions of the principal and interest of the public debt were paid, prior to the commencement of the present administration. During that of Mr. Adams, between forty and fifty were paid, whilst larger appropriations of money and land were made, to objects of internal improvements, than ever had been made by all preceding administrations together. There only remained about fifty millions to be paid, when the present chief magistrate entered on the duties of that office, and a considerable portion of that cannot be discharged during the present official term.

The redemption of the debt is, therefore, the work of congress; the president has nothing to do with it, the secretary of the treasury being directed annually to pay the ten millions to the commissioners of the sinking fund, whose duty it is to apply the amount to the extinguishment of the debt. The secretary himself has no more to do with the operation, than the hydrants through which the water passes to the consumption of the population of this city. He turns the cock on the first of January, and the first of July, in each year, and the public treasure is poured out to the public creditor from the reservoir, filled by the wisdom of congress. It is evident, from this just view of the matter, that congress, to which belongs the care of providing the ways and means, was as competent as the president to determine what portion of their constituents’ money could be applied to the improvement of their condition. As much of the public debt as can be paid, will be discharged in four years by the operation of the sinking fund. I have seen, in some late paper, a calculation of the delay which would have resulted, in its payment, from the appropriation to the Maysville road, and it was less than one week! How has it happened, that, under the administration of Mr. Adams, and during every year of it, such large and liberal appropriations could be made for internal improvements, without touching the fund devoted to the public debt, and that this administration should find itself baulked in its first year?

The veto message proceeds to insist, that the Maysville and Lexington road is not a national, but a local road, of sixty miles in length, and confined within the limits of a particular state. If, as that document also asserts, the power can, in no case, be exercised until it shall have been explained and defined by an amendment of the constitution, the discrimination of national and local roads would seem to be altogether unnecessary. What is or isnot a national road, the message supposes may admit of controversy, and is not susceptible of precise definition. The difficulty which its authors imagine, grows out of their attempt to substitute a rule founded upon the extent and locality of the road, instead of the use and purposes to which it is applicable. If the road facilitates, in a considerable degree, the transportation of the mail to a considerable portion of the union, and at the same time promotes internal commerce among several states, and may tend to accelerate the movement of armies, and the distribution of the munitions of war, it is of national consideration. Tested by this, the true rule, the Maysville road was undoubtedly national. It connects the largest body, perhaps, of fertile land in the union, with the navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and with the canals of the states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York. It begins on the line which divides the state of Ohio and Kentucky, and, of course, quickens trade and intercourse between them. Tested by the character of other works, for which the president, as a senator, voted, or which were approved by him only about a month before he rejected the Maysville bill, the road was undoubtedly national.